The foreign policy of the United States of America towards Iran in the period from 1953 to 1974.

Gurin Grigorii Gennad'evich ORCID: 0000-0002-4070-4905 Postgraduate student, MCU 129226, Russia, Moscow, Vtoroy Selskohoziajstvenny proezd, 4 dmx836@gmail.com

During the crisis over Iranian oil 1947-1953 The United States of America has consistently opposed military intervention in Iran's affairs, offering various options for resolving contradictions. The administration of President G. Truman (1945-1953) considered the possibility of involving international financial organizations that had influence in the negotiation process, including the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction ^[4]. However, the Iranian government, headed by M. Mosaddegh, could not under any circumstances stop the process of nationalization of the oil industry. This movement has taken on a nationwide character. The broadest segments of the population took an active part in it, including the clergy, who traditionally have a strong influence on Iranian society ^[8]. In addition, the embargo on Iranian oil, which Britain unequivocally defined as "stolen", increased the hatred of Iranians towards the British ^[18].

D. Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman as president, initiated a significant change in American policy towards Iran. By the spring of 1953, the Iranian side began to receive clear signals that without resolving the oil crisis, further assistance from the United States would be impossible. Pressure and hidden threats are beginning to be exerted on M. Mosaddegh. In a letter to the Iranian Prime Minister, D. Eisenhower notes that economic support for Iran does not meet American national interests. Such a statement under the conditions of the embargo on "stolen" Iranian oil meant a sharp aggravation of the internal political situation in the country. In addition, the same letter for the first time formulated threats against the government of M. Mosaddegh: "What (D. Eisenhower - approx. G.G.) (he hopes) before it is too late, the Iranian Government will take such steps as are in its power to prevent further deterioration of this situation."^[1]

It should be noted that by the time D. Eisenhower took office as President of the United States, Soviet influence in Iran was significantly weaker than after the end of World War II. The liquidation of the Soviet-Iranian joint-stock company Kevir-Khurian, simultaneously with the adoption of the decree on the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, opened up wide opportunities for the United States to influence the internal affairs of Iran ^[16].

Thus, already in the first months of D. Eisenhower's presidency, the crisis over Iranian oil became one of the priorities of American foreign policy, therefore, to resolve it, the United States was ready to use force (during the same period, American intelligence agencies began discussing the possibility of conducting a military operation to overthrow the Iranian government, which will go down in history as "Ajax" - G.G.'s note). The ruling circles of the United States also came to the inevitability of the overthrow of the incompetent M. Mosaddegh, in which there was a consensus on this issue. The administration of the 34th President of the United States relied on Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who at that time had no real power in the country. In the context of the above, it should be noted that the public statements of the head of the CIA, A. Dulles, that it was the Shah who organized and carried out the removal of M. Mosaddegh from the post of prime minister, look untenable ^[23]. The intelligence services of Great Britain and the United States took a direct part in the coup.

After the overthrow of the government of M. Mosaddegh, the adviser to the US Secretary of State, G. Hoover Jr., was sent to Iran, who had to find the best option for the return of Iranian oil to the global market. According to his proposal, the development of Iranian fields was planned to be offered to an International Oil Consortium (IOC), which would include the largest Western oil companies. At the same time, American oil companies, after a high-profile investigation by the US Department of Justice conducted in the last year of President Truman's tenure, did not seek to start their activities in Iran ^[9]. Ever since the division of Standard Oil into several independent companies in 1911, the American government has been actively fighting business based on the principle of "vertical integration of production (combining all segments of the industry up and down the technological chain – from exploration and production to refining and retail sales) ^[17]. This is exactly the format of work that was planned in Iran.

The solution to this contradiction was found at the highest state level: American companies belonging to the MNC should not have been subject to American antitrust law ^[4]. Under the current conditions, Western oil companies quickly established the production and sale of Iranian oil ^[10].

It is noteworthy that the establishment of the MNC, not least, allowed large international oil companies to control the global oil market until 1973. Until that moment, it was controlled by a group of companies that went down in history under the name "Seven Sisters" ^[15].

Thus, during the presidency of D. Eisenhower, Iranian oil became a strategic interest of the United States and relations with Iran were built around consolidating control over the Iranian oil industry by the United States.

In parallel with the increasing activity of American oil companies in Iran, the D. Eisenhower administration consistently pursued a policy of increasing the Shah's dependence on the United States. The Iranian government's approval of the "Eisenhower doctrine" in 1957 "further strengthened Iran's military and political dependence on the United States"^[13]. In fact, during this period, the United States spared no expense in implementing its foreign policy towards Iran, which was seen as a kind of outpost of containment of the Soviet Union in the region.

In general, it was under President Eisenhower that Iran was introduced into the new contours of the American zone of influence in the Greater Middle East. This thesis is also confirmed by Iran's signing of the Baghdad Pact in the autumn of 1955 ^[20]. In addition, according to the American-Iranian treaty of 1959, the United States received the right to deploy its troops on Iranian territory ^[7]. It should be recalled that it was the United States that led the process of pressure on the USSR on the issue of the withdrawal of the Red Army from the territory of South Azerbaijan.

The period of D. Eisenhower's presidency is also characterized by an increase not only in American investments in Iran, but also a significant increase in the number of loans. In the current situation, the Shah was forced to pursue a deliberate policy towards the United States of America, since American capital was an additional lever of influence on Iran, where by that time the non-oil economy had not developed ^[12].

The arrival of D. Kennedy in the White House in 1961 launched the transformation of American policy towards Iran and other regional states: the United States refused patronage in favor of cooperation. Within the framework of such a structure, high demands began to be placed on the partners of the United States, including in terms of the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as economic regulation. It was during this period that the Shah, with the support of the United States, initiated the beginning of large-scale domestic political transformations that went down in history as the "white revolution". It is noteworthy that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, during a visit to Washington, received an instruction from D. Kennedy that American support would not be transferred to Iran if the shah refused to carry out socio-economic and political transformations ^[22]. At the same time, issues related to the means by which reforms will be carried out were not the subject of special attention. But by this point, the Iranian special service SAVAK was becoming the government's main weapon against any opposition ^[11].

Declassified US diplomatic documents reveal the principles of American foreign policy towards Iran, formulated by Robert W. Comer, an employee of the National Security Council: "One of John F. Kennedy's incredible achievements was to deceive our nervous Shah so that he would begin reforms and modernization at home, instead of constantly telling us about his need for more weapons to deter Advice and even Nasser. Every time the shah said "more weapons," the president replied "more reforms." Now we have a Shah who thinks he is a reformer of the 20th century (which, in fact, is not a bad thing)."^[2] Thus, the Shah of Iran faced open pressure from the American side for the second time, Iranian-American relations remained unequal, and the Shah himself was not perceived as an equal politician in the eyes of the American leadership.

L. Johnson, who succeeded D. Kennedy as President of the United States after the assassination, declared in his letter to the Shah the continuation of his predecessor's policy aimed, among other things, at protecting Iranian sovereignty ^[3]. At the same time, since the early 1960s, Iran has seen a significant increase in the number of American advisers and qualified specialists employed not only in the oil industry, but also in other sectors of the economy, as well as in public administration. In addition, Iran's growing oil revenues made it an attractive market for Western companies' products. The outstanding domestic researcher A.Z. Arabajyan emphasizes that despite the fact that the Iranian oil industry was one of the most modern industries, its integration into the national economy was weak until the 1960s ^[5]. Thus, it can be noted that during the period of President L. Johnson's tenure, American policy towards Iran did not undergo significant changes, and American-Iranian relations, despite the declared parity, were not such.

The annual growth in oil revenues allowed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi at some point to begin to pursue a more independent policy in relations with the oil companies participating in the MNC. Such a change could still happen only with the tacit consent of the United States government, which traditionally stood behind the oil companies that were the conductors of American foreign policy.

The unification of oil-producing countries into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) opened up the possibility for them to unite against the largest oil companies that had lost the support of national governments. As the American researcher D. Yergin rightly notes: "the governments of consumer countries especially did not want to support and encourage companies in their confrontation with exporters" ^[9]. An interesting vision of the current situation is formulated by G. Kissinger, who noted that "before the revolution of the Ayatollahs, the West and Iran maintained mutually beneficial cooperation based on the equally interpreted concept of national interests" ^[14]. The reluctance of the American government to interfere in the relations between the Iranian government and the leadership of oil companies can also be explained by the fear of upsetting the existing balance of power in the region.

By the early 1970s, the United States, bogged down in the severe Vietnam War, was unable to maintain its presence in the Greater Middle East to the extent typical of the presidency of D. Eisenhower, D. Kennedy and L. Johnson. In the current situation, the 37th President of the United States R. Nixon was forced to formulate updated approaches of the United States to the implementation of national foreign policy. The so-called "Nixon doctrine" not only consolidated the principle of cooperation with regional powers, formulated during the presidency of D. Kennedy, but also set the allies the task of independently ensuring security in the region. There were three leadership contenders in the Persian Gulf region: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, which are "strong enough to defend themselves, but too weak to apply for regional hegemony"^[21]. Moreover, capitalist countries, including the United States, dependent on cheap Middle Eastern resources, could not resist the consolidated performance of OPEC member states during the 1973-1974 fuel crisis. During this period, Iran, in fact, achieved maximum dominance in the region and was able to build the most equal relations with the United States in its entire history ^[19].

Summing up the above, it is worth noting that the United States of America played a key role in the process of creating an International Oil Consortium and returning Iranian oil to the world market. For years to come, American oil companies, which were initially supported by the US government, became the guides of American foreign policy in the region.

At the same time, until the inauguration of the President of the United States, R. Nixon's dependence of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the United States did not allow for a sovereign policy in Iran – the strategic importance of Iranian oil and the need to maintain control over it determined the principles of American-Iranian cooperation.

The annual growth of oil revenues coupled with the unification of oil-producing countries in OPEC allowed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to consolidate his role as a regional leader. Iran's similar transformation was also facilitated by the "Nixon doctrine", which transferred responsibility for regional security to the allied states. Thus, changes in the basic principles of American-Iranian relations allowed Iran to achieve the most subjective position by the mid-1970s during the entire period of the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Until the Islamic Revolution, the country will retain the status of a key regional actor.