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Philosophy and Culture
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Philosophy in Roman society of the late Ist –early IInd centuries AD.

Danilova Valeria

PhD in History

Assistant professor, Department of Universal History, Vladimir State University named after Alexander and Nikolay Stoletovs

600014, Russia, Vladimirskaya oblast', g. Vladimir, pr. Stroitelei, 11, aud. 320a

fasikcat@yandex.ru
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0757.2024.9.69660

EDN:

KATNEZ

Received:

24-01-2024


Published:

05-10-2024


Abstract: The subject of research in this article is the role of philosophy in the life of Roman society in the late Ist – early IInd centuries AD. The period of the reign of Emperor Domitian (81-96), Nerva (96-98) and Trajan (98-117) is considered. The author sets himself the following tasks: firstly, to determine how strong the influence of philosophical teachings on the political views of Roman citizens was; secondly, to analyze the role of philosophy in the worldview and behavior of the Romans in other spheres of life other than political; thirdly, to consider the relationship between the ideas of Greek philosophy and Roman ideas and traditions. To achieve this goal, the works of Roman authors Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, and Juvenal were studied in the original language. Fragments in which philosophy and philosophers are mentioned are identified and analyzed, and their comparison with each other is carried out. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that the period of the late Ist –early IInd centuries AD was not the subject of independent research in terms of the influence of philosophical ideas on Roman society. The political situation influenced the spread of philosophy. Under Domitian, philosophers were expelled from Rome, freedom of speech was not allowed, and under Nerva and Trajan, philosophers returned to Rome, and the number of followers increased. The listeners of the philosophers were both well-educated representatives of the upper classes, as well as less educated and less noble people. The fashion arose to imitate philosophers without a serious passion for philosophy. Stoicism was the most popular teaching. Its ideas and Roman traditional values crossed in relation to virtues, in the question of suicide. The attitude of representatives of the Roman nobility towards stoicism in the political plan was ambiguous.


Keywords:

Roman Empire, Roman society, philosophy, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Juvenal, Roman traditions, political views, attitude to suicide, imitators of the philosophers

This article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here.

The period of the I–II centuries AD in the history of Roman philosophy is known primarily for the teachings of Stoic philosophers, representatives of the so-called Late Stoic. Accordingly, most of the modern works on this period concern the views and activities of the Roman Stoic philosophers Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius [1, pp. 360-394; 2-5; 6, pp. 564-568; 7; 8, pp. 322-327]. The purpose of this article is not to consider the writings of Roman philosophers, as is traditionally done, but to show how philosophical ideas were reflected in Roman society, how and to what extent they influenced it. To do this, the works of Roman, Latin-speaking, authors will be considered, in which there are references to their own attitude to philosophy and the attitude of other Romans towards it, and a comparative analysis of the revealed information will be carried out.

The chronological framework of the study is designated as the end of the I–beginning of the II centuries AD, that is, the period of the reign of Emperor Domitian, the last of the Flavian dynasty (81-96), as well as representatives of the Antonine dynasty — Nerva (96-98) and Trajan (98-117). The relevance of the work is determined by the fact that this particular period has been little studied in the history of philosophy, it was not the subject of independent research in terms of the influence of philosophical ideas on Roman society. Among the works close to the topic, one can point out the articles of A. A. Stolyarov, who examined the activities and ideas of the Stoic philosopher of the first century AD Gaius Muzonius Rufus in the context of Roman public life [9-10].

The first task of the article is to determine how strong the influence of philosophical teachings on the political views of Roman citizens was. It is known that during the reign of Nero (54-68) and Vespasian (69-79) in Rome there was a strong stoic opposition to the emperors in the Senate, its representatives relied on the ideas of Stoicism [15; 16, pp. 37-38; 17]. It is important to study whether these trends persisted under Domitian, who is represented in Roman literature as a tyrant emperor, and how representatives of the senate nobility reacted to the possibility of opposing the emperor based on the ideas of Stoicism. These issues can be considered on the basis of the writings of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger.

The second task is to analyze the role of philosophy in the worldview and behavior of the Romans in other spheres of life besides politics. In Tacitus and Pliny the Younger, we can find information about how the Romans treated the problems of death and suicide. The question of death and suicide was important for Roman philosophy, and it is of interest to modern researchers [18, pp. 43-45; 19-20]. However, they consider this problem only according to philosophical writings, and literary works will be involved in this article.

There is an opinion in historiography that philosophy was not very popular in the Roman Empire and was needed only by a few intellectuals who wanted to achieve virtue or went into philosophy from life problems [21, p. 40]. However, the letters of Pliny the Younger and the satire Juvenal, analyzed in this work, show that at the end of the I–beginning of the II centuries A.D. there was quite a lot of interest in philosophy in Roman society, not only from the upper strata of society (senators and horsemen), but also less noble and less educated people. It is important to study what caused this interest in philosophy and how serious it was.

The third task is to consider the correlation in this period of ideas that came from Greek philosophy and Roman ideas and traditions. Roman ideas are understood as stable ideas and values (what the Romans called "ancestral mores"), developed in the culture of Ancient Rome on the basis of local socio-political conditions and reflected in the writings of Latin-speaking authors. The question of the correlation of the Stoic teachings, which originally came to Rome from Greece, with Roman traditions and moral norms, is relevant in the scientific literature. For example, S. N. Kocherov emphasizes that the popularity of the Stoic doctrine in Roman society is due to the fact that it turned out to be consonant with the morality of the Roman civil community [16, p. 32]. W. Turpin characterizes the relationship between Roman ideas and Stoic ideas as very complex, so that sometimes they cannot even be grasped [22, p. 364]. Nevertheless, the question of the correlation of these ideas seems to the author of the article to be important and worthy of study.

When analyzing the sources, attention was paid primarily to those fragments where philosophy and philosophers were directly mentioned. Let's look from a linguistic point of view at what words Roman authors use to refer to philosophy and philosophers. Tacitus and Pliny the Younger have the words sapientia [23, 2, 4; 26, XV.71; 24, I.22.6] and philosophy [23, 4; 25, III.81; 24, I.10.10]. The philosophers are called professores sapientiae [23, 2; 25, IV.10], doctores sapientiae [25, IV.5], sapiens/ sapientes [23, 46; 26, XVI.19, 24, I.10.4; III.11.5], philosophus/ philosophi [24, I.10.1; III.11.2, 6]. Thus, Roman authors use approximately equal amounts of both the Greek word philosophia and the Latin word sapientia, which is most often translated as "wisdom", but in fact Tacitus and Pliny are synonymous with "philosophy", as the word "sage" (sapiens) is synonymous with "philosopher".

What do we know about the obvious supporters of any philosophical teachings in Roman society at the end of the I-beginning of the II century AD? First of all, we can note Junius Arulen Rusticus, who was an adherent of Stoicism [24, I.5.2], a student of the Stoic philosopher Gaius Muzonius Rufus. Rusticus' youth fell during the reign of Nero, and during that period he sympathized with the stoic oppositionist Trazea Peta [26, XVI.26]. During the reign of Domitian, Rusticus wrote a work praising Trazea Peta, as a result of which he was executed and his book burned [23, 2]. Together with Arulen Rusticus, Herennius Senecion suffered, praising the Stoic oppositionist Helvidius Priscus in his books [23, 2; 24, VII.19.5]. There is no direct indication in the sources whether Herennius Senecion shared the ideas of Stoicism, but perhaps he did if he praised the Stoic of previous times. Also, under Domitian, Junius Mauricus, who was the brother of Junius Arulenus Rusticus, was sent into exile [24, I.5.10, I.14.1-2; II.18.1; III.11.3]. There is also no direct indication of his attitude to philosophy in the sources, but perhaps he shared his brother's stoic ideas. In any case, Pliny the Younger describes Junius Mauricus as a man firm in his convictions, ready to boldly express his views in the presence of the emperor [24, IV.22.3-6].

There are two more examples of the fact that after Domitian's death, the praise of the opposition was popular. It is known that Gaius Fannius wrote a great work about those who were killed or sent into exile under Nero [24, V.5.3]. He did not have time to finish it, but the three books that were published, according to Pliny the Younger, were popular in society. Titinius Capito, a literary acquaintance of Pliny, wrote a work that Pliny does not name exactly, but says that it was dedicated to the death of famous people, including some very dear to him [24, VIII.12.4]. According to the contents of other letters, it can be assumed that we are talking about Helvidius Priscus the Younger, Rusticus Arulen and Gerennius Senecion, who died under Domitian. Thus, if we talk about the highest and educated stratum of Roman society, which had the opportunity to participate in political life, then, firstly, we see among its representatives explicit or alleged supporters of Stoicism, and secondly, we observe an interest in praising the Stoic opposition of the times of Nero and Vespasian.

Consider the question of whether philosophy influenced the political views of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger. It should be noted that in the scientific literature there are different opinions about the influence of Stoic ideas on Tacitus and the writer's attitude towards them: some researchers believe that Tacitus did not like the teachings of the Stoics, others speak of his sympathy for Stoicism, the similarity of some of his ideas with the ideas of the Stoics [22, p. 395; 27, p. 11-24; 28, pp. 25-29]. Based on the works of Tacitus, we can analyze his attitude towards the stoic opposition and its desire to resist the cruel emperors. Tacitus, in the Life of Agricola, disapproves of the reign of Domitian, describing it as a period of enslavement, the inability to freely express one's own thoughts in contrast to the rule of Nerva and the beginning of the reign of Trajan, when freedom of speech appeared. Part of this enslavement in Tacitus is the expulsion of philosophers from Rome (expulsis insuper sapientiae professoribus) [23, 2]. Tacitus also mentions with disapproval the exile of Junius Mauricus, the condemnation and execution of Arulen Rusticus and Herennius Senecion, who praised Trazea Peta and Helvidius Priscus — leaders of the senate opposition under Nero and Vespasian [23, 2, 45]. Tacitus condemns the social atmosphere during Domitian's reign and the character of the emperor for his envy and hatred of the successes and virtues of other people, anger, and a penchant for all evil [23, 39-41], but he did not oppose him. On the contrary, Tacitus' career, as he himself admits, developed successfully under Domitian [25, I.1]. Consequently, Tacitus did not seek to imitate the behavior of the stoic opposition.

When Tacitus evaluates the behavior of his father-in-law Agricola under Domitian, he says that obedience and modesty, along with the energy and diligence that Agricola showed, are worthy of no less praise than the behavior of those who opposed the princeps and died a decisive death, but completely useless for the state [23, 42]. Here, in our opinion, the writer clearly expressed his position, far from stoic resistance to the tyrant ruler. Tacitus approves of the actions of Agricola, who did not defy the emperor and did not seek death for glory.

The similarity of Tacitus' thoughts with the teachings of the Stoics can theoretically be seen in the fact that he emphasizes the importance of virtues (virtutes) in the life of Agricola [23, 44, 46], since virtues were very important in the teachings of the Stoics [29, I.4.3; 30, pp. 262-264]. But, in our opinion, in this matter, Tacitus is more likely to see a commitment to the mores of his ancestors, whose virtues (virtutes) were highly valued. Thus, Tacitus, as the merits of his father-in-law Agricola, ranks his consular and triumphal distinctions on a par with the virtues, that is, emphasizes his merits in serving the state, successes in his political and military career [23, 44]. The duty of service to the state, courage and valor in war were traditional Roman values [31, p. 24].

If you carefully look at what Tacitus writes about the above-mentioned Stoic Arulen Rusticus and his teacher Gaius Muzonius Rufus, you can catch some negative connotation in their characterization. The act of Rusticus during the reign of Nero, when a young man, who then held the position of tribune of the people, proposed to go against the Senate's decree on the guilt of Trazea Peta, Tacitus explains with a thirst for praise (cupidine laudis impollutus) [26, XVI.26]. Note that Tacitus writes about his father-in-law Agricola that, on the contrary, he did not seek approval from public opinion for his behavior in the political field [23, 42]. Tacitus characterizes Musonia Rufa as a man who zealously imitated the study of philosophy and the views of the Stoics (studium philosophiae et placita Stoicorum aemulatus) [25, III.81], as if hinting at his lack of independence in his views. Tacitus disapproves of the behavior of Muzonius Rufus during the civil war in the late 60s, when the Senate decided to send ambassadors to Vespasian's troops to persuade them to cease hostilities. Musonius Rufus, as Tacitus writes, became involved in the number of these ambassadors, joined the army of Vitellius and began to convince the soldiers of the advantage of peace against war. Tacitus calls these instructions of armed soldiers "untimely philosophical teachings" (intempestivam sapientiam) [25, III.81]. On the other hand, when Tacitus talks about the Stoic Helvidius Priscus, he writes with approval that he studied philosophy in his youth in order to strengthen his spirit against all accidents and devote himself to state activities [25, IV.5]. It is noteworthy that, characterizing Helvidius as a just and brave man, Tacitus notes as his disadvantage the desire for fame, ambition [25, IV.5-6]. It can be concluded that Tacitus appreciated adherence to the teachings of the Stoics when it was for the benefit of the state and the political career of a Roman citizen, but he did not like the excessive desire of people, including Stoics, for glory.

Pliny the Younger was a contemporary and good friend of Tacitus, and similar ideas can be found in their works. Pliny also mentions in his letters the expulsion of philosophers from Rome under Domitian [24, III.11.2] and condemns the gloomy atmosphere of persecution of free thought that developed under this emperor. Pliny reports that during this period he ventured to visit the villa of Artemidorus, the son—in-law of the Stoic philosopher Muzonius Rufus, who at that moment needed money. Pliny was friendly with many people who were expelled from Rome or executed by Domitian [24, III.11.3], a denunciation to the emperor was already ready for him, so his trip to Artemidorus could be dangerous. However, as we can see from his biography, Pliny did not take decisive action against Domitian's ideology and continued to hold public office. He opposed the informers and wrote a work in revenge of his friend Helvidius Priscus the Younger after the death of this emperor [24, IX.13], when it was allowed and encouraged under Nerva and Trajan.

Thus, according to the works of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger, there is no direct influence of philosophy on their political views. Both of them were well aware of the representatives of the stoic opposition to Domitian, Pliny was familiar or friendly with them, but neither Tacitus nor Pliny shared their political behavior.

Let's consider what was the impact of philosophy on the Romans during this period in other spheres of life besides politics.

As mentioned above, under Domitian, many philosophers were expelled from Rome, as the emperor obviously saw them as a threat. After Domitian's death, the ideological course changed, and philosophers began to return to Rome. As a result, there was a revival of the social atmosphere. Pliny the Younger noted that in Rome at that time "liberal arts flourished" (liberalibus studiis floruit) [24, I.10.1]. Philosophy also belonged to the liberal arts. We can see how society reacted to philosophers using the example of the philosopher Euphrates, described by Pliny the Younger [24, I.10]. Pliny first met Euphrates in Syria when he was on military service there in the 80s. Then the acquaintance resumed in Rome. Euphrates is mentioned in the Lives of the Sophists by Philostratus as a contemporary and friend of the philosopher Dion Chrysostomus [32, I.7.3], and Dion Chrysostomus returned from exile under Nerva, after the death of Domitian. Probably at the same time, Euphrates also came to Rome from the East. Judging by what the Stoic Epictetus writes about Ephratus, Euphrates was also a Stoic [29, IV.8.17-20]. Pliny describes the teaching and behavior of Euphrates as follows: the philosopher is characterized by kindness(humanita s), following virtues (virtutes), and the pursuit of vices in his teaching [24, I.10.2, 3, 7]. These ideas also correspond to the teachings of the Stoics. Euphrates, according to Pliny, was a good speaker and made a strong impression even on people with little education (mediocriter doctos). Epictetus confirms Pliny's opinion that Euphrates could speak beautifully: some people, after listening to him, would like to study philosophy themselves [29, I.15.8]. From this it can be concluded that the philosopher Euphrates was willingly listened to by various people — not only well, but also poorly educated, and he made a great impression on them, encouraging them to study philosophy.

Pliny advises one of his addressees, Attius Clement, to follow the exhortations of Euphrates [24, I.10.7]. The question arises, did Pliny himself follow the advice of the philosopher? There is definitely no way to answer this question. In the letter, Pliny complains about his workload as prefect of the state treasury, which prevents him from communicating with the philosopher more often. He also cites Euphrates' statement in this regard that "philosophy in its best department teaches to serve society: to investigate, to create a court, to reveal justice, means to put into practice what it teaches" [33, I.10.10, per. M. E. Sergeenko]. Here we see that the philosopher justifies Pliny's state activity and employment by serving for the benefit of society. The letter also contains a characteristic phrase that "only a sage can comprehend a sage" (nisi sapiens non potest perspicere sapientem) [24, I.10.4], from which it becomes clear that Pliny himself does not consider himself a wise philosopher.

In addition to Euphrates, Pliny met and became friends in his youth, while serving as a military tribune in Syria, with Artemidorus, who was the son-in-law of the Stoic Gaius Muzonius [24, III.11.5]. Pliny writes about Gaius Muzonius himself that he admired him and was close to him to the best of his age [24, III.11.5]. Speaking of age, Pliny means that Muzonius was much older than him. A. A. Stolyarov suggests that Pliny could have been part of the circle formed about Muzonia Rufe [10, p. 141]. Thus, Pliny was undoubtedly well acquainted with the teachings of the Stoics, but hardly followed them in life.

Pliny was also familiar with other representatives of Greek philosophy. For example, he writes about Euphrates that "there is subtlety, thoroughness, elegance in his reasoning; often even something of Platonic height and scope" [33, I.10.5, per. M. E. Sergeenko]. If Pliny compared Euphrates with Plato, it means that he had an idea of Plato's works. Since Pliny knew Greek (there are phrases in Greek in his letters), he could read Plato in the original. However, we do not find any obvious philosophical reflections in Pliny's letters.

The return of the philosophers to Rome and the change of the political situation at the end of the first century aroused great public interest in philosophy. How serious was he? There are references in the sources to the so-called "lovers" of philosophy. In letter I.22 Pliny contrasts the life of the lawyer Titus Ariston with the behavior of such lovers of philosophy, speaking ironically about them. These philosophers are different from the rest, they can be recognized by their appearance and clothes. They diligently attend gymnasiums and porticos, pronounce long discourses in front of other idlers, as Pliny calls them. According to Pliny, these people prefer the appearance of philosophers to the study of philosophy (sapientiae studium habitu corporis praeferunt) [24, I.22.6]. Pliny praises Titus Ariston for being engaged in a real case in court and for his good qualities — moral purity (castitas), piety (pietas), justice (iustitia) and courage (fortitude o) [24, I.22.6-7]. It may seem somewhat strange that Pliny scolds adherents of philosophy for the same thing for which he praised the philosopher Euphrates in letter I.10: long speeches to listeners. This fact can be explained by the literary method of opposition, with which Pliny wanted to emphasize the virtues of Titus Ariston, characteristic of a true Roman. It can also be assumed that in Euphrates Pliny saw a real philosopher, and in other people — just imitators of philosophers. For comparison, Tacitus in the "History" hints that some young Romans studied philosophy only in order to "cover up shameful idleness with loud words" [34, IV.5, translated by G. S. Knabe].

When Pliny recalls Artemidorus, the son-in-law of the Stoic Gaius Muzonius Rufus, he says that among those who call themselves philosophers at the time of writing the letter (after Domitian's death), it is difficult to find one or two with the same sincerity and truthfulness as his [24, III.11.6]. Here one can see, on the one hand, praise for Artemidorus, with whom Pliny was friendly, and on the other hand, Pliny may mean philosophers who became such simply by paying tribute to fashion, and not by inner conviction.

That such a problem – to be a philosopher, and not to appear to be one – existed, we see in Epictetus. He mentions philosophers for whom the important thing was not the content of their teachings, but the appearance: they say that they are philosophers "as soon as they put on a shabby cloak and grow a beard" [29, IV.8.15, trans. G. A. Taronyan]. Epictetus contrasts such imaginary philosophers with Euphrates, who acted according to Stoic teaching not for the sake of the audience, but for himself and for God [29, IV.8.17-18].

We also find similar information about the "lovers" of philosophy in Roman society in Juvenal's second satire of the first book, published after 100 under Emperor Trajan. Juvenal supposedly came from the freedmen's estate [14, pp. 222-223]. His point of view is important and interesting because it represents the opinion of a native of the low-class strata of Roman society. Satire is directed against hypocrisy in general. In the first part of the satire, the poet writes that some libertines pretend to be philosophers and defend virtue, although they themselves behave licentiously. By themselves, these people are uncultured, unlearned (indocti) [35, I.2.4], however, they specifically buy plaster busts of philosophers to show their commitment to virtue and perfection:

They are not ignorant at all, although you will find them everywhere

They have casts with Chrysippus; the one who is most perfect among them is the one who

He will buy a portrait of Aristotle or Pittacus, as well as

The busts of Cleanfa will be ordered to guard their bookshelves [36, I.2.4-7, D. Nedovicha Lane and F. Petrovsky].

Let's pay attention to which philosophers are mentioned in this passage. Pittak of Mytilene, one of the seven legendary Greek sages of the VII century BC, Aristotle, the famous philosopher of the IV century BC, the head of the school of peripatetics, and two Stoic philosophers of the III century BC — Cleanthes, a disciple of the founder of the Early Stoic Zeno, and Chrysippus, a disciple of Cleanthes [37, Introduction I. 13-14, 19; VII.36, 168, 179]. It is characteristic that Chrysippus, Cleanthes and their teachings were often mentioned by the Stoic Epictetus, a contemporary of Juvenal.

In this passage, Juvenal criticizes people of depraved behavior who only pretend to be supporters of philosophy in order to show their enlightenment. But the very possibility of buying busts of philosophers and putting them on shelves suggests that philosophy was quite popular in Roman society at the time of writing the work.

In the same satire of Juvenal, there is another fragment that is related to philosophy. The poet ridicules the same people who buy busts of philosophers, in that they rarely say anything and are more willing to remain silent (rarus sermo illis et magna libido tacendi) - apparently to hint at their importance and scholarship — and also that their hair is shorter than their eyebrows (supercilio brevior coma), that is, they cut them very short [35, I.2.14-15]. The question arises: who exactly are these Romans trying to imitate with such an appearance?

In the Roman Empire, images of philosophers representing copies of Greek originals were popular. To answer the above question, let's look at what the philosophers looked like in sculpture and who had short hair. In Juvenal's satire, two Stoic philosophers are mentioned at once - Chrysippus and Cleanthes, so let's start with the Stoics. For example, in the collection of the British Museum there is a marble bust of Chrysippus, where we see short-cropped hair, a receding hairline in the center of the head and a beard. There is a portrait in the State Hermitage Museum, which art historian A. A. Trofimova suggests identifying as a Stoic philosopher, presumably Cleanth. This is a Roman copy from the Greek original of the III century BC. e. We see on it a man with a short haircut, bald head and a long full beard [38, p. 62, Fig. 1]. The author notes that a typical portrait of a Stoic philosopher is exactly like this: "the hair is cut short, the receding hairline reveals a high forehead, a neat beard frames the face" [38, p. 65].

For comparison, let's take the portraits of the Cynics and Epicureans, since their teachings were also popular at that time. An Epicurean was, for example, Maximus, governor of the province of Achaia under Trajan [29, III.7.1; 24, VIII.24]; Epictetus mentions those wishing to lead a Cynic lifestyle [29, III.22]. The bust of Antisthenes from the British Museum, the founder of the Cynic school, which is a Roman copy of the Greek original, depicts an elderly man with a beard and wavy, rather thick hair. Let's look at the portrait of Epicurus from the British Museum, which is also a Roman copy of the Greek original. It depicts a man with a wavy beard and wavy hair. According to A. A. Trofimova, Epicureans were usually depicted with flowing hair, and Cynics with tousled hair [38, p. 65]. Aristotle is also mentioned in Juvenal's satire. According to the preserved images of Aristotle, we can judge that this philosopher had a wavy beard and rather long hair. Thus, when the Romans deliberately cut their hair short, they most likely imitated the Stoic philosophers.

Literary critic V. S. Durov emphasizes that Roman satire was characterized by "pure realism", that is, consideration of the events of everyday life [39, p. 6]. We can be sure that Juvenal was describing what he actually saw.

An interesting fragment related to the role of philosophy in the life of the Roman nobility can be found in Tacitus' Life of Agricola. He shows the opportunity to study philosophy in the Roman Empire, as well as the relationship between Greek philosophy and Roman traditions. Agricola's father Julius Graecinus was known as an orator and philosopher during the time of Emperor Caligula (studio eloquentiae sapientiaeque notus) [23, 4]. Gnaeus Julius Agricola himself told Tacitus that in his early youth he was ready to fervently devote himself to the study of philosophy, but his mother cooled his ardor, since such an occupation was considered unacceptable for a Roman and a senator [23, 4]. Agricola studied in the city of Massilia, and this city, located in the province of Narbonian Gaul, was the center of Greek cultures in the West of the Roman Empire [40, p. 481]. We see, on the one hand, that Agricola's father knew philosophy well, and Tacitus does not say that this was abnormal. On the other hand, studying philosophy with great fervor and zeal (Tacitus used the word acer — hot, ardent) was considered inappropriate for a Roman who was going to make a political career. Apparently, this was permissible only for the Greeks, since philosophy came to Rome from Greece.

The sources allow us to consider the influence of Stoic philosophy or Roman traditions on the attitude of the Romans to death and suicide.

At the end of the Life of Agricola, Tacitus discusses the death of his father-in-law and mentions philosophy: "If the manas of the righteous have a special abode, if, as philosophers say, great souls do not disintegrate with their bodies, rest in peace..." [41, 46, trans. A. S. Bobovich]. Here Tacitus speaks of manas — the souls of deceased ancestors, the idea of which was characteristic of Roman religion and had no connection with Greek philosophy [42, pp. 50-51, 187-188]. The writer also emphasizes the piety and virtue of his father-in-law, using the words pius and virtutes. Piety (pietas) and the possession of virtues (virtutes) are considered by researchers to be traditional Roman values [43]. Tacitus further argues that Agricola's wife and daughter, after his death, should most of all take care to remember his virtues and imitate his decent behavior [23, 46].

In what teaching can one find the idea that "great souls do not disintegrate with bodies" (non cum corpore extinguuntur magnae animae), as Tacitus writes? E. M. Shtaerman drew attention to the fact that even under Emperor Augustus in the first century BC in Rome, the belief in the dependence of the immortality of the soul on the virtues and vices of man in earthly life spread [42, pp. 197-198]. This was facilitated by the widely spread poem "Aeneid" by Virgil in Roman society, where the sixth book describes the fate of the dead in the kingdom of the dead and mentions that in the underworld the souls of the dead (mana) atone for their evil deeds with suffering, and then they can re-inhabit the bodies [44, VI.713-751]. Perhaps Tacitus shared exactly these ideas. Mention of the immortality of the soul as a familiar idea among the noble Romans of the 1st century AD is also found in the Annals of Tacitus when describing the death of Petronius [26, XVI.19].

The letters of Pliny the Younger also allow us to consider the question of the attitude of the Romans to suicide and whether philosophical teachings could have influenced this. In letter I.12, Pliny reports that his friend Corellius Rufus committed suicide due to a long and severe illness (gout). He was 60 years old and starved himself to death. According to Pliny, Corellius was prompted to this decision by reason, since the sages obey him (Corellium quidem summa ratio, quae sapientibus pro necessitate est, ad hoc consilium compulit) [24, I.12.3]. The mention of such a concept as reason suggests that Corellius Rufus could have been a follower of Stoic doctrine, since reason is one of the key concepts of the Stoics [29, I.2.3; IV.8.12; 37, VII.1.86, 88]. It is also noteworthy that Corellius Rufus told the doctor "I have decided" (to starve and die) in Greek (ΚέΚρικα), and not in Latin [24, I.12.10]. Greek was the language of philosophy, and therefore Corellius Rufus knew it.

Letter I.22 again raises the issue of suicide due to illness. Pliny tells about the lawyer Titus Ariston. This man got sick and wanted to find out from the doctors how severe his illness was. If it turned out to be incurable, then he wanted to leave his life, if it was just a protracted one, then he would fight. Pliny approves of his decision, since "only a high soul can discuss and weigh the grounds for it (death) and, on the advice of reason, choose between life and death" [33, I.22.10, per. M. E. Sergeenko]. Pliny, as in the letter about Corellius Rufus, approves of the choice made with the help of reason.

In letter III.7, written around 99, Pliny tells that Silius Italicus starved himself to death in his estate near Naples due to a severe incurable disease (like Corellius Rufus). He was an old man, he was 75 years old. Pliny in this letter does not give any justification for the act of Silius Italicus - perhaps because the deceased was not his friend or good acquaintance. The writer laments how quickly life passes, and sees the possibility of his immortality in literary works [24, III.7.10-14]. Based on this, it can be assumed that for Pliny himself, his literary activity was more important than philosophy.

In letter VI.24 Pliny tells the story of a married couple with whom he was not acquainted. The husband had a serious illness, and the wife, realizing that her husband's problems were very serious, persuaded him to commit suicide. They rushed into the lake together [24, VI.24.2-4]. In this case, Pliny gives a positive assessment of his wife's actions and compares her act with the earlier act of Arria the Elder, the wife of Caecina Peta, who pierced herself with a dagger and also prompted her terminally ill husband to resort to suicide [24, III.16.2-6]. In these actions, Pliny sees the wife's loyalty to her husband and approves of her act. Therefore, for the Romans, suicide due to a serious illness was not unusual and met with approval in society.

If we look at the history of Stoic teaching, we will see examples of suicides related to diseases. One of the versions of Zeno's death is that, being at an advanced age, he fell, broke his finger and died, deliberately holding his breath [37, VII.1.28], and another — that he refused to eat being tired of his age [37, VII.1.31]. The philosopher Cleanf died after refusing food during gum disease — first on the advice of doctors, and then by his own decision [37, VII.5.176]. Seneca admitted the possibility of suicide in case of illness [45, LVIII.32-36]. The philosopher Euphrates died in 118, having voluntarily taken poison. He was already old and sick, and Emperor Hadrian allowed him to do this [46, LXIX.8.3]. Diogenes Laertius, giving a general description of the Stoic teachings, writes that it is quite reasonable for a Stoic sage to die "both for the fatherland, and for a friend, and from too severe pain, or mutilation, or an incurable disease" [37, VII.130, per. M. L. Gasparov]. These facts, as well as Pliny's references to the decision made by reason, suggest that Corellius Rufus and Titus Ariston, named in Pliny's letters, shared the teachings of the Stoics. As for the other Romans who committed suicide, we do not know for sure whether they were adherents of Stoicism.

According to Roman sources of the I–II centuries AD, suicide due to illness and suicide for political reasons can be distinguished. In Pliny we see the first. Political suicides were common in an earlier period — under Nero and further during the civil wars. During the time of Nero, many Roman senators and horsemen committed suicide, which is described in detail by Tacitus in the Annals [26, XV–XVI]. They either received an order from the princeps to die or understood that they were going to be executed soon. Tacitus himself explains the reasons for numerous suicides by saying that at that time it was the easiest way to death [26, XVI.17]. In the "History" Tacitus describes the death of Otho, who decided to die because he realized that he was losing in the civil war, and rushed to the dagger [25, 47-49]. Some soldiers followed his example, thus showing their loyalty to their emperor. Both Otho's act and the soldiers' act were received with approval in society [25, 47-49, 53-54].

It is known for sure that of those who died under Nero, the Stoics were Trazea Pet and Bareia Soran [25, IV.10; 29, I.1.26]. But it is unlikely that absolutely all the Romans listed in Tacitus and Pliny who committed suicide were followers of the Stoics. Rather, suicide in a difficult life situation was a Roman tradition that was consistent with the teachings and behavior of the Stoics.

Note also that, unlike during the reign of Nero and the civil wars, there were no political suicides under Domitian. The oppositionists Herennius Senecion, Arulen Rusticus and Helvidius Priscus the Younger were executed [23, 2; 24, I.5.2-3; III.11.3], while none of them committed suicide, so this tradition is not typical for the period under review.

Let's summarize the results of the study. In Rome, in the late I–early II centuries AD, philosophy was popular among both the higher, educated, and middle, less educated, strata of society. The rise of interest in philosophy was observed after the death of Emperor Domitian, which can be explained by the change in the socio-political situation under Nerva and Trajan. The previously exiled philosophers were allowed to return to Rome from exile, and the opportunity to freely express their thoughts appeared, which caused a revival of the public atmosphere. However, not all Romans had a serious fascination with philosophy: many, paying tribute to fashion, showed themselves to be philosophers only externally in the absence of a deep inner interest. All the Roman authors who drew attention to this problem did not approve of the ostentatious fascination with philosophy and the "empty" imitation of philosophers.

As for the influence of philosophy on the political behavior of Roman citizens, under Domitian it is possible to note the continuity of Stoic opposition from the time of Nero and Vespasian in the person of the Stoic follower Arulen Rusticus. Perhaps some other oppositionists also sympathized with the ideas of the Stoics. However, using the example of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger, we see that not all the noble Romans of that time were ready to directly oppose the emperor they condemned, although the same Pliny the Younger was well acquainted with the oppositionists and sympathized with their ideas. Under Nerva and Trajan, on the one hand, there was massive praise for representatives of the Stoic opposition. On the other hand, Tacitus, in The Life of Agricola, spoke skeptically about them, considering the death of the oppositionists to be a desire for glory rather than a benefit to the state. In our opinion, Tacitus had an ambivalent attitude towards Stoicism: he was not an explicit supporter of this doctrine, but approved of the ideas of the Stoics in those moments that contributed to the service for the benefit of the state.

During the period under review, the teachings of the Stoics found the greatest response from the Romans and were most often mentioned in literary works. This can be explained by the fact that some provisions of the ethics of Stoicism intersected with traditional Roman values: the need to possess certain virtues for a Roman citizen (including influencing the posthumous fate of his soul) correlated with virtue as one of the key concepts among the Stoics; the possibility of suicide and the theoretical justification of suicide in a difficult life situation among the Stoics correlated with the prevalence and approval of the practice of suicide in Roman society. For the Romans, the most important virtue was serving the state and moving up the career ladder, holding public office. It is noteworthy that the Stoic Euphrates justified his employment in public service with the benefit of society. Thus, the ideas that originally came from Greek philosophy were closely intertwined with Roman traditions and values.

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First Peer Review

Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
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The reviewed article is devoted to the consideration of the most important period in the history of Roman philosophy. It is well known that Roman philosophy is clearly insufficiently represented in Russian historical and philosophical science. Some major Russian researchers turned to the study of the heritage of Roman philosophy, but in most cases this topic did not become dominant for them (let's mention at least the works of G.G. Mayorov, for some reason ignored by the author), so it is not necessary to talk about any kind of integral "philosophical portrait" of the era yet. Therefore, we can only welcome the appearance of new works in this field. Unfortunately, however, there are some very serious flaws in the reviewed article. The beginning of the article looks "too formal". Thus, the formulation of the goal only repeats the title of the work and does not give the reader additional information about its content. And in the formulation of one of the tasks we read: "... the correlation of the ideas of Greek philosophy and Roman ideas proper." What are the "Roman ideas"? This is clearly an unfortunate expression, at least it should be deciphered, for example, as follows: ideas that arose in culture under the influence of specific conditions of social life in the Roman Empire. The "literature review" is even weaker: the author simply lists the research of some authors, indicating their subject content or features of the approach. What is the significance of this enumeration for the reader's perception of the content of the article? It makes sense to give such a review only if it allows you to see unresolved problems and thereby substantiates the relevance of the work and prepares the reader to understand its place in the process of researching the stated topic. The following presentation also raises a lot of questions. Why does the author provide the reader with a lot of facts and detach himself from their analysis? The author's task is not only to offer the reader certain information, providing them with private remarks, but also to offer his own vision (in this case, of the specified period of philosophical thought), as original as possible, justified and with references to sources (since we are talking about historical and philosophical work), and theoretical arguments. In this case, we do not see not only an analysis in the proper sense, but also almost no elements of classification of the set of proposed facts. No less perplexing is the lack of a conclusion, the presentation literally breaks off, the author does not even try to offer any conclusion. These circumstances make it inappropriate to publish the article in its current form. At the same time, it should be noted that the author has considerable erudition (as evidenced by the abundance of sources used), is "immersed" in the topic, however, the work is clearly not completed, one should try to offer an analysis of the collected material and present the article precisely as a holistic historical and philosophical study. The design of the text does not cause any great complaints, punctuation errors occur in some places. Based on what has been said, I recommend sending the article for revision.

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The list of publisher reviewers can be found here.

In the peer–reviewed article "Philosophy in Roman Society of the late I–early II centuries AD", the subject of the study is the place of philosophy in the socio-political and socio–cultural life of Roman society of the late I-early II centuries AD. The purpose of the study is to demonstrate how philosophical ideas were reflected in Roman society, how and to what extent they influenced him. The theoretical and methodological foundations of the study have not been stated. The research methods used are the analysis of works by Roman and other Latin-speaking authors, in which there are references to their own attitude to philosophy and the attitude of other Romans towards it, on the basis of which a comparative analysis of the revealed information is carried out. The study covers the period from the end of the I to the beginning of the II century AD, including the reign of Emperor Domitian, the last of the Flavian dynasty (81-96), and representatives of the Antonine dynasty — Nerva (96-98) and Trajan (98-117). In general, studying the role of philosophy in society helps us expand our knowledge, acquire critical thinking and a meaningful understanding of the world around us, as well as evaluate our own beliefs and values. Philosophy is certainly an integral part of Roman society, which makes a significant contribution to the formation and development of its culture, morality, and legal system. The scientific novelty of the publication is related to the argumentation of the following conclusions: 1. Philosophy was popular in Rome in the late I - early II centuries AD among various strata of society, although the fascination with philosophy was not always deep and serious. 2. The influence of philosophy on the political views of Roman citizens was noticeable, especially in the context of the teachings of the Stoics. 3) it was the teaching of the Stoics that found the greatest response among the Romans in the period under review, since its provisions intersected with traditional Roman values. This suggests that philosophy, and in particular Stoicism, played an important role in Roman society and politics during this period. However, the attitude towards her and her influence were complex and multifaceted. This study is characterized by a general sequence, which is set by a consistent solution of three scientific problems: 1) to determine how strong the influence of philosophical teachings was on the political views of Roman citizens; 2) to analyze the role of philosophy in the worldview and behavior of the Romans in other spheres of life other than political; to consider the ratio in this period of ideas that came from Greek philosophy and Roman ideas and traditions. The article will be of interest to specialists in the field of philosophy of history, especially those specializing in the late Antique period of its development. The bibliography of the work includes 46 publications and consists of works by Roman and other Latin-speaking authors, as well as other authors studying the philosophy of the ancient period and Roman society. Thus, the appeal to the main opponents from the area under consideration is fully present. Conclusion: The article "Philosophy in Roman society of the late I–early II centuries AD" has scientific and theoretical significance. The work can be published.