Analysis of Russia's policy in the Middle East in 2000-2023 in the works of foreign researchers.

Ionov Dmitriy Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0008-8598-0189 Graduate student of the Institute of International Relations and World History, Department of Political Science, National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 dmitriy.ionov@unn.ru Other publications by this author     Koreneva Lyudmila Nikolaevna ORCID: 0009-0007-3962-2156 Graduate student of the Institute of International Relations and World History of the National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 korluyd@gmail.com Nazarov Aleksei Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0007-7985-9975 Graduate student of the Institute of International Relations and World History of the National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 nazarov.alex.8989@mail.ru

Ryzhov Igor' Valer'evich ORCID: 0000-0002-6417-1517 Doctor of History Professor, Head of the Department of History and Politics of Russia of Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod; Senior researcher at the international interdisciplinary research laboratory “Study of World and Regional socio-political processes” of the Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University named after N.A. Dobrolyubov 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 ivr@fmo.unn.ru

The Middle East is a region that often experiences tense situations, one of the most prone to escalation parts of the planet. It is perceived by Russia as a complex geopolitical territory of great strategic importance, including due to its accessibility to major sea and trade routes, proximity to energy sources and their supply routes to Europe, as well as the opportunity that the region can offer Russia to establish a demonstrative presence against the dominance of the collective West. This region is a zone of competition and conflict between great Powers, as well as a strategic intersection of various diplomatic, economic and security–related goals, events and processes, and also offers a synthesis of various regional and global interests. For these reasons, the Middle East occupies an important place in the list of Russia's foreign policy priorities.

Since the beginning of 2000, Russia has been actively involved in world politics, focusing on the Middle East region. The Russian Federation has participated in various peacekeeping operations in the region, including Lebanon in 2006 and Syria since 2015. In addition, Russia has become a supplier of weapons to a number of states in the region, including Iran and Syria.

The Middle East provides an opportunity to protect its geostrategic interests, consolidate its presence and expand its circle of influence in the region through the supply of weapons and military assistance, along with the development of relations and increasing its cooperation with many countries in the region. Moreover, the Middle East is a platform where Russia can position itself as an international mediator and a leading player ensuring regional stability, and as a strong regional power. This confuses the United States and other rivals – NATO and the EU – and narrows their sphere of influence.

Results and their discussion

Based on the specifics of the region under study, Russia's sphere of interests includes the need to ensure national security. According to the current official doctrine, national security is defined as the state of protection of an individual, public and state institutions from internal and external threats. Within the framework of this state, the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens are ensured and implemented, as well as a decent quality and standard of living, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity, as well as sustainable socio-economic development.

The problem of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation was actualized in connection with the destabilization of the studied region as a result of the "Arab Spring" of 2010-2012.

The complexity of ensuring national security lies in the plane of Russia's relations with those countries of the Middle East that suffered the most from the upheavals of the early 2010s, which led to civil wars within these states, which, as a result, do not have stable political and economic institutions on their territories, as well as being a stronghold of international terrorist organizations, such as such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (ISIL), Jabhat al-Nusra and other gangs banned in the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as those sponsored by Western powers.

The subversive terrorist activities of these organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation lead to the need to preserve political regimes that oppose radical Islamism. Within this context, Russia supports these regimes both at the armed and humanitarian levels.

All of the above is one of the leading reasons for the interest of the Russian Federation in this region at the present time, as well as the object of close reflection among domestic specialists such as I.D. Zvyagelskaya, S.G. Luzyanin, V.A. Avatkov, S.B. Druzhilovsky, A.V. Krylov, M.A. Sapronova, I.V. Ryzhov, E.P. Totskaya.

At the same time, Russia's policy in the Middle East arouses interest and controversy among foreign researchers. Some believe that Russia is striving to develop constructive relations with all countries in the region, while others point to its desire to strengthen its influence and economic interests in individual countries.

In their research, experts note that Russia is trying to strengthen its relations with the countries of the Middle East, using diplomatic and economic mechanisms for this purpose. In this context, the researchers point to the successful development of Russia's relations with Iran and Syria, as evidenced by both the high level of trade turnover between the countries and military-technical cooperation.

At the same time, other experts note that Russia uses its political relations and economic interests to promote its military and political strategies in certain countries, for example, in Syria. They also point out that Russia is seeking to maintain its military base in Syria and thus strengthen its influence in the region.

Robert Owen Friedman, an American political scientist, an employee of the Hebrew University of Baltimore and Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, USA), in his work "Russian Policy towards the Middle East: Yeltsin's Legacy and Putin's Challenge" writes that, given the sharp weakening of geopolitical positions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow was forced to reorient its foreign policy [Freedman, 2001, p.64]. Showing growing concern about the newly independent states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, which Russia considers its "soft underbelly", Russian policy pays special attention to Iran and Turkey. Russia has established a close tactical alliance with Iran, which was not only a major buyer of Russian nuclear reactors and military equipment, but also shared with Moscow a common political approach to events in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. Russia's relations with Turkey were more ambiguous, although by the time Vladimir Putin took over as president of Russia, relations had shifted towards closer cooperation, especially in the field of energy.

Nevertheless, according to another specialist on this topic, senior researcher and head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Program at the Institute of International Political Studies (Milan, Italy) Valeria Talbot in the work "The role of Russia in the Middle East and North Africa region. Strategy or opportunism?", written jointly with Chiara Lovotti, Ziad A. Akl, Youssef Cherif, Christopher Hartwell, Mira Milosevic and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, argues that the policy of combating global terrorism helped the Russian ruling circles in the 2000s to find common ground with the United States, as well as to build favorable trusting relations with Israel and Syria [Talbot, 2019, p.57]. However, according to the authors, Russia is ineffective in the fight against terrorism throughout the region, unlike its overseas "partner", but nevertheless its influence will increase exponentially, largely due to joint actions with China.

Despite the convergence of interests between Russia and China regarding the need to curb radical Islamic extremism, their approaches to ensuring stability in the region differ. Both countries have expressed concern about potential political instability and popular protests in connection with the chaos that has arisen in the Middle East since 2011. They seek to maintain the political status quo in their countries. China and Russia are also concerned about the spread of extremism from Afghanistan or the Middle East to Central Asia, which borders both China and Russia. However, Russia is focused on using hard power, such as arms trade and military intervention, while China is focusing its efforts on stabilizing the region through economic might rather than military action.

Abdullah Mohammed Ali, a researcher at the Arab Democratic Center, holds a similar, but less promising opinion for Russia in his article "Russia's Foreign Policy in the Middle East from 2011-2014" [Ali-essen, 2015]. He argues that the Russian Federation, due to its desire for economic and political security, is unable to consolidate its nascent influence in the Middle East in the long term.

The author explains this by the extremely limited capabilities of Russian diplomatic actors for closer cooperation between the Russian Federation and the leading countries of the region. This cooperation, according to the author, is purely economic in nature and does not seek to go beyond its scope, unlike the practices of the United States, which seek to fully integrate into the political and economic processes of the region under consideration. Therefore, Russia's goal in the Arab region is to maintain the balance of power.

Melih Yildiz, PhD in Political Science at Sakarya University (Turkey), holds a different point of view in his article "The military dimension of Russia's return to the Middle East". He noted that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union managed to create a sphere of influence in the Middle East [Yildiz, 2022, p.89]. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Russia began to rapidly lose its influence in the region.

Currently, Russia has managed to restore its sphere of influence in the Middle East. The biggest factor in Russia's success is the rapid development of its military relations with Syria and Egypt in the 2010s. Moscow's policy towards the Syrian civil war has strengthened Russian influence in Syria and allowed it to participate more actively in events in the Middle East. As in Soviet times, Russia's growing influence in the Middle East in recent years has largely been achieved by military means.

Isabelle Facon, an expert on Russian defense and security policy, associate professor at the Polytechnic School (Paris, France), holds a different opinion. Being the author of about 150 publications, in her article "Russia's desire for influence in North Africa and the Middle East", she summarized that over the past few years Moscow's policy in the Middle East has a distinctive feature of the ability to competently and effectively use opportunities [Facon, 2017, p.8]. Whereas the return at the beginning of the 21st century was slow, and part of its potential was undermined by the Arab Spring, Moscow was able to become part of a dynamically developing regional landscape, acting rapidly in most areas of the diplomatic spectrum. Another motive the author highlights is Russia's desire to appear stronger than its economy. Thus, the Russian authorities are trying to put pressure on the European Union in order to benefit from their southern neighbors. These motives are related to the willingness of the Russian side to establish contacts with all actors in the region in order to obtain forces and means for actions in the region that can affect the security of Russia and its allies, especially in Central Asia. These goals set by Moscow are designed to be implemented in the long term. Thus, Syria, chosen as the place of permanent military presence of the Russian Armed Forces, apparently remains one of the key entry points into the politics of the region.

Despite Russia's obvious presence at all levels in the region, which stands out against the background of Moscow's temporary absence during the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia does not make its demands for regional primacy. The circumstances indicate that the Middle East, apparently, is not the main goal of Russian foreign policy. This is evident in the structure of regional priorities presented in the new foreign policy concept revised in autumn 2016. Such conclusions confirm the fact that Russia's regional policy remains, first of all, a means aimed at implementing more global tasks not only in its foreign policy, but also on the security agenda. This can be seen in the key of Russia's still limited economic development. Given this factor, the states of the region take into account the calculations of a strengthened Russia, often becoming a source of such rapprochement. Using the example of Egypt, the rapprochement can be explained by Cairo's attempt to pit Russia and America against each other to make more profit. And this is in conditions when it is necessary to build a certain position of Western countries in relation to the regime of President Al-Sisi. Thus, regional actors, while maintaining their independence and despite their newfound political and military authority, are still considered "outsiders in the Middle East."

According to Paul M. Carter, PhD, American Institute of Peace (Washington, USA), the article "Understanding Russia's Interest in Conflict Zones" argues that under Vladimir Putin, Russia's global ambitions steadily increased, including in unstable areas of the Middle East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere [Carter, 2020]. For the most part, Moscow's actions in these and other areas run counter to Western interests and undermine efforts to mitigate the conflict through broad and transparent processes. This report describes the factors that seem to motivate the Kremlin's interventions in the conflict zone, and they are placed in the broader context of Russia's foreign policy interests.

Over the past decade, Russia's foreign policy ambitions have steadily increased, including in conflict or instability zones in the Middle East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Russia's current actions in conflict zones are driven by the geostrategic interests and nature of the traditional Russian state, global political ambitions and behavioral patterns inherited from the Soviet Union, as well as the political, economic and personal motives of President Vladimir Putin. There is a rough general pattern of Moscow's interventions in conflict zones based on proximity to the center of Russia.: The closer to Russia, the more important traditional geostrategic factors are and the more the Kremlin is willing to allocate resources. In more remote conflict zones, such as the Middle East, Russia places greater emphasis on global political or economic and private interests and uses its resources more selectively. Russia's actions in conflict zones usually directly or indirectly contradict the interests of the West. Nevertheless, sometimes the United States of America and its allies can find space to cooperate with Russia on specific issues in conflict zones, such as in anti-terrorism policy.

In Western historiography, mainly American, there is a hypothesis that Russia seeks to take the place of the United States as the main mediator in the Middle East. According to this hypothesis, Russia, using its successes in Syria as a starting point, has transformed the already existing balance of power in the region, established contacts, thus increasing its authority among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, Moscow is widely demonstrating to the leaders of the countries of the region that, in contrast to the United States, it can be a reliable partner. In this vein, an interesting article by American researchers Eugene Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council and Andrew S. Weiss, "A Short Guide to Russia's return to the Middle East" [Rumer, Weiss, 2019]. In it, they note that the Kremlin holds high positions in the Middle East, where Russia's military intervention in Syria has changed the course of the country's civil war. The Kremlin's actions in the Middle East have deep historical roots, but Russia's potential influence should not be exaggerated.

An Iraqi researcher from Anbar University (Ramadi, Al-Anbar, Iraq), Dr. Bashir Hadi Abdul Razzaq, holds a similar opinion in his article "The Middle East and its strategic aspects: a theoretical study" [Razzaq, 2021]. Considering the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Middle East for the Russian Federation, he largely adheres to the rhetoric of his Western colleagues regarding the prospects of the Russian side for its interference in the politics of this region and its competition with Western players, the main of which is the United States. However, in assessing the promising capabilities of the Russian Federation to defend its political interests in the Middle East, the author traces quite obvious positive achievements of Russian diplomacy in conflict resolution. As a clear example of this, Abdul Razzak notes the positive outcome in the destruction of the ISIS terrorist organization banned in Russia and other countries in the territories of the Syrian Arab Republic, which was engulfed in the civil war, in which the Russian Federation was directly involved. B.H.A. Razzak also emphasizes that the Russian Federation and the United States of America have opposite geopolitical goals in the Middle East region. While the United States seeks to strengthen its strategic and economic dominance in the region, the Russian Federation seeks to avoid such American dictates and preserve its sovereignty, given its current global geopolitical position. Nevertheless, the researcher, in addition to the objective reasons for Russia's geopolitics in the Middle East, also points to subjective points, namely the speeches of Russian officials to the Arab establishment demanding the preservation of Christian Orthodox shrines and the rights of people of other faiths located and living in the territories of the Middle East. This fact is indicated by the author of the study as one of the motives for the participation of the Russian side in the Syrian conflict.

Another Iraqi researcher on this issue, Dr. Fatima Hussein Fadhil al-Mafraji (Iraqi Association of Scientific Manuscripts), in her article "The development of Russian-Iraqi relations over the period (2011-2019)", on the example of cooperation between Russia and Iraq, adheres to a somewhat opposite prevailing Western opinion. She believes that the Russian role in the region is a desire to determine itself as an equal counterweight to the US hegemony in the Middle East. Since the collapse of the USSR, this trend, according to the author, was actualized at the time of condemnation of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US armed forces and the fight against terrorism [Fadhil, 2021]. The task of the Iraqi side in relation to the Russian Federation, according to the author, is to provide, first of all, a political and economic space for comprehensive interaction and cooperation between the two countries on topical issues of our time: from the fight against terrorism to the formation of military and economic sovereignty and a "multipolar" world.

Turkish analyst Irem Nur Kaya (Istanbul, Turkey) in his work "Russia's Middle East Policy: Foreign Policy and Relations (1992-2022)" [Kaya, 2023] analyzed and explained Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Middle East region and Russia's diplomatic relations with the states of the region, by linking them to events, crises and movements in the Middle East The East. She notes that the rich energy and water resources of the Middle Eastern lands attract the attention of many countries of the world. The Middle East, which is seen as a field of political rivalry between Western states trying to maximize their power, is also attracting Russia's attention. By opposing Western states that have organized numerous political and military interventions to enter the region, Russia has taken its place as a defender of the countries of the Middle East. The most important reason for this is Russia's desire to expand or expand in these lands, gaining the trust of Middle Eastern states. Striving to be an important player in this region, which is seen as an international political platform, Russia has acted in the spirit of a win-win policy in the face of crises and problems in the Middle East.

Christopher M. Blanchard (US Congressional Research Group, Washington, USA) in his work "The Middle East and North Africa: the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2022" determines Russia's activity in the Middle East by the fact that the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is the result of regular measures by the Kremlin to restore political, economic and military positions in the region Once considered a significant arena of the Soviet-American geopolitical confrontation [Blanchard, 2023, p13.]. On the other hand, as possible explanations for Russia's actions, the author notes the growing correlation of Russia's military potential with its desire to conduct international relations corresponding to a great power, as well as Russia's desire to diversify economic relations in the conditions of Western sanctions. As the author notes, after February 2022, many countries in the Middle East were concerned about what was happening in Ukraine, but most countries did not impose economic sanctions against the Russian government or Russian business leaders; some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), calmly welcomed the influx of Russian capital. The special military operation has led to uncertainty about Russia's position in the energy sector, in the international oil and natural gas markets. At the same time, existing energy trade flows and trade transactions are being subjected to new controls as prices continue to rise. Russia, together with other states, are parties to an oil supply management agreement with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which includes several producers from the Middle East. The group, also known as OPEC+, operated until May 2022 with a plan that assumed a gradual increase in oil production. Reserve crude oil production capacities in the region and around the world are usually concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In early May 2022, Saudi officials stated that, in their opinion, the global oil market is provided unnaturally, and called for increased global investment in production to facilitate what they consider more important. In June, KSA and UAE officials supported OPEC+'s decision to expand the planned production volume for July and August 2022. These hints, according to the authors, allow us to assume a future cooling between the OPEC+ countries, which may negatively affect Russia's positions in this region.

However, in addition to oil and gas, Russia is a major global player in the arms business, a third of the total arms turnover in this region is bought on the Russian market, especially by those countries supported by the Russian side. Since the beginning of the SDF, these flows have decreased, but not so much that it would be possible to stop the operations of private military companies in conflict zones.

The work of Israeli geopolitical analyst and researcher Anat Hochberg Marom (Israel) is of interest for the study [Marom, 2023]. In her article "Russia's Foreign Policy in the Middle East," she notes that over the past decade, especially in the last year after the start of a Special Military Operation, Russia's foreign policy has undergone drastic changes. Her participation in current major geopolitical affairs and her active activities in the international arena leave no room for doubt – the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, is making great efforts to strengthen Russia's influence as a great power and an important key player in world politics. By violating the existing status quo and creating a new and complex balance of power with the United States and the West. In accordance with this, Vladimir Putin has been acting – especially since 2012 – in the direction of increasing Russia's presence and influence in the Middle East, as well as in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Africa, baffling the United States and blocking the expansion of NATO and the EU. However, it is already becoming obvious that the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine is leading to a critical turn on the map of Moscow's relations and interests in the Middle East. In solving its tasks, Russia combines hard power (the use of military measures along with security support) with soft power (political values, the use of economic and information power). Through this prism, the idea of the collapse of the Soviet Union – perceived by V. Putin as the most pernicious event of the 20th century – forced Moscow to "recalculate the route." Since taking office in 2000 Putin acted to ensure political stability and strengthen Russia's position as a powerful world power, motivated by the perception of a multipolar global diplomatic map and a distinct anti-Western approach, which is fueled by fears of Western invasion and expansion into the post-Soviet region, i.e. the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. At the same time, Vladimir Putin is working towards developing and strengthening relations with the countries of the Middle East, namely Iran, Syria, Israel, Turkey and the countries of the Persian Gulf. However, despite Russia's increasing military and naval presence in the region, its foreign policy is shrouded in ambiguity, inconsistency and versatility, which serve its various interests and obligations in the region.

To give a more accurate assessment of the analysis of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, it is worth referring to the work of Polish political scientist and analyst Witold Rodkiewicz (Center for Oriental Studies, Warsaw, Poland). In his work "Russia's Middle East Policy. Regional ambitions, global goals" he conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Russian foreign policy strategy in the region [Rodkiewicz, 2017, p.36]. First of all, he notes that Russia's policy in the Middle East is an element of a broader strategy aimed at creating an international order capable of protecting Russia from Western interference in its internal affairs and guaranteeing it an equivalent position with the United States. In practice, this means that Russia's Middle East policy depends on Moscow's global strategy towards Washington. Moscow's goal in the Middle East is to create a regional version of what it considers the best model of the international order, i.e., to include, in addition to Russia, also regional powers – Iran and Turkey, as well as the United States; on condition that Washington is ready to cooperate with Russia on equal terms and abandon its "hegemonic habits." At the same time, in the long term, Russia's policy towards Turkey is to weaken the ties linking Ankara with the United States, NATO and the West, and include Turkey as a "junior partner" in a new regional order based on multipolarity. As part of this policy, Russia has tried to establish alternative economic ties with Turkey, which could become a lever of pressure on Ankara. However, Turkey's vulnerability to Russian economic pressure was not enough to force it to abandon its strategic priorities, which Russia had to come to terms with.

Agreeing with the opinion of most experts that Iran has become Russia's most important strategic partner in the Middle East in recent years, Rodkevich focuses on the fact that Russian-Iranian relations have been complicated by a great historical legacy of mutual distrust and marked by rivalry. And also the fact that, without taking into account the unsuccessful attempts to develop closer economic cooperation in various fields, undermining the US position in the region remains a common priority for both states. Therefore, Moscow and Tehran consider each other as strategically indispensable partners.

Speaking about the Syrian conflict, the Polish analyst notes that for Russia, the main goal of launching an operation in Syria was to suspend the Western, or rather, the American policy of so-called humanitarian intervention. Moscow views this policy as geopolitically motivated and fears that Russia may eventually become a target itself. The start of the Russian operation was a demonstration to Washington of the limits of its ability to influence the situation in the region and to show the United States that they will have to take into account the opinion and interests of Russia as an indispensable player in the Middle East. Russia's successes in supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad and changing the fragile balance of power in the Syrian civil war in his favor have obviously strengthened Moscow's ambitions in the Middle East. This achievement, at least in the short term of the use of force, has prompted Moscow to try to build a new regional order in which Russia could play a key role. Thus, the greatest risk to Russia's position in the region comes from the anti-Iranian course of the White House administration. Russia may be faced with a choice: to maintain a "strategic partnership" with Iran or face direct conflict with the United States.

Brett A. Schneider (Joseph Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Colorado, USA) in his work "Russia's Foreign Policy in the Middle East: priorities and effectiveness" analyzed the attitudes of Russia's foreign policy towards the countries of the Middle East. The author argues that Russia is currently unable to overcome foreign policy barriers that represent mutual benefits with Middle Eastern states. In this regard, Russia does not pose a serious threat to undermine the main goals of US policy in the region. The author notes that Russia is most effective in achieving its pragmatic goals, but ineffective in achieving abstract ones. He identifies 6 of the most important factors for Russia's foreign policy in the region, including the fight against international terrorism, the supply of weapons and military equipment, the development of deposits of natural resources, primarily hydrocarbons, the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space, trade relations and the restoration of the status of a great power [Schneider, 2012, p.103]. In his opinion, with rare exceptions, since the beginning of the 21st century, these principles have become decisive in Russian foreign policy in the Middle East.

Well-known American researcher of Russian foreign policy Mark Norman Katz (George Mason University, Virginia, USA) in his work "Contradictory goals, limited means: Russia in the Middle East" highlighted a number of important geopolitical interests in the Middle East, among which he attributed countering Western influence, deterring Sunni jihadist forces, regulating hydrocarbon prices and expanding Russian exports in the region [Katz, 2015, p. 6]. However, according to the researcher, it is still difficult for Russia to successfully achieve these tasks in the Middle East, since they often contradict each other, Russia's funds are limited, and various political actors, including Moscow-friendly regimes, sometimes interfere with Russian ambitions. And as long as Vladimir Putin is the leader of Russia, it is unlikely that Moscow will view Russia's geopolitical interests in the Middle East differently than it does now. It is doubtful whether a more democratic Russia could be more positive about democratization efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, given that Western democratic governments have long supported authoritarian regimes there.

Considering the specifics of Russia's relations with the countries of the Middle East region, Aron Lund, a researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Relations (Stockholm, Sweden), in his article "Russia in the Middle East" comes to the following conclusions, rather cautious and skeptical for the Russian side. Firstly, analyzing the rather long period of relations between the Russian Federation, the author points out that Russian policy is gradually changing for objective and subjective reasons [Lund, 2019, p.43]. If during the Soviet period Moscow was geopolitically more consistent in its intentions on the basis of economic, ideological and military confrontation with the United States as the main rival of the socialist bloc, then with the loss in the cold war, the Russian Federation has now had to and still has to build a strategy of relations with the countries of the Middle East. Secondly, based on the first point, according to A. Lund, the Russian establishment, in the situation of economic, political and geographical losses after 1991, turned out to be insufficiently competitive with Western countries in the "Middle East ring", which logically should push the Kremlin to work out certain foreign policy doctrines corresponding to the challenges of the time. However, the author does not give him an adequate assessment.

Conclusion

Thus, we can conclude that foreign researchers treat Russia's policy in the Middle East in different ways. Some see this policy as a constructive approach to developing relations with all countries in the region, while others point to Russia's desire to strengthen its influence and interests in certain countries, as well as an attempt to disrupt the already fragile balance of power in the region, which is considered one of the most tense and unstable in the world. However, they all conclude that Russia plays a significant role in the Middle East and actively influences political processes in this region.

The researchers note that Russia is showing its interests in the Middle East region, including in order to strengthen its geopolitical position and compete with other great powers, including the United States and China. At the same time, Russia is actively using diplomatic levers and economic relations to stabilize the situation in the region and resolve international conflicts.

One of the key components of Russia's policy in the Middle East is support for authoritarian regimes and regional conflicts. Foreign researchers note that Russia actively supports the governments of Syria, Iran and other countries in the region, which allows it to strengthen its influence and protect its interests.

Nevertheless, a number of foreign researchers point out that Russia's policy in the Middle East is not always successful. For example, in the case of Syria, Russia has faced opposition from other states, such as the United States and its allies. In addition, some researchers note that Russia's policy in the Middle East may lead to a deterioration in relations with other regional actors, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia.