Heidegger’s Thesis on ancient Ontology: Being as Production

Heidegger constantly turned to ancient philosophy, which was for him a kind of constant, an unchanging guideline, so it is not worth trying to cover in one study all the variety of issues that he touched on in this regard. However, among these questions there is one that deserves the closest attention, since it is central to both early and late Heidegger's philosophy, defining his understanding of the entire ancient, and through it medieval and even New European ontology. We are talking about the interpretation of being in the sense of being manufactured. What is this interpretation and why is it so important?

Until recently, it was quite difficult to answer these questions, since the relevant texts have only become public in recent years, and therefore have not yet been fully mastered in Heidegger studies. (This is mainly about the 62nd volume of the collected works, in which the most important course of lectures on Aristotle, delivered in 1922, was published. The appendix to it reproduces the text of Natorp-Bericht, found in 1989 and previously considered lost, in which Heidegger summarized his achievements of previous years and, thus, created the first draft of "Being and Time" ^[1],[2]). In this regard, it is clear why the question of being as manufactured is still rather poorly studied in the specialized literature. Of course, researchers have addressed this topic before, but many of them did not have the opportunity to take into account the course of 1922, in which Heidegger first presented his interpretation (for the first time, apparently, it was here: ^{[1, pp. 249-252, 373-375],[2, pp. 104-111, 164-171]}). Accordingly, even very useful works that highlight the subject of Heidegger's fabrication focus more on the question of technology and do not consider the formation of this problem, and therefore do not touch it in essence (see ^[3],[4],[5]). For a long time it was not even clear exactly when such an interpretation of ancient ontology arose. Thus, the very thorough historian of philosophy R. Dostal wrote that Heidegger formulated this concept in Marburg (in particular, he speaks of "the thesis of fabrication" in relation to Greek ontology, which Heidegger developed in Marburg," i.e. after 1923 ^{[6, p. 82]}), whereas after publication It became clear from the early Freiburg lectures that this had happened a few years earlier.

In fact, in 1921-1924. Heidegger was closely engaged in Aristotle and for four years in a row lectured about his favorite philosopher. It was during this period that he began to interpret being in the Stagirite as being-manufactured, being-produced (das Hergestelltsein), after which he extended this interpretation to the entire ancient and medieval philosophy. This is a very remarkable moment from the point of view of methodology, which characterizes Heidegger as a historian of philosophy. After continuous studies of Aristotle, a young private professor announces a course on Plato, explaining this anachronism by the fact that the darkness of the latter can supposedly be understood only through Aristotle.

"There is no scientific understanding, i.e. historical return to Plato, without passing through Aristotle. Aristotle initially, as it were, closes all access to Plato. <...> Therefore, passing through the interpretation of Aristotle, explicit or not, in principle is self-evident, especially when you consider that in Aristotelian studies there is nothing else but a more radical version of the problems that Plato and his predecessors struggled with. Plato's interpretation not only cannot miss Aristotle, but everyone must justify themselves in him" ^{[7, p. 189-190]}.

It seems that from Heidegger's side, this is generally universal advice. Years later , he gives his students this advice:

"From all this it could become clear that Nietzsche cannot be read in uncertainty… Therefore, it would be advisable if you put off reading Nietzsche for the time being and first study Aristotle for ten or fifteen years" ^{[8, pp. 118-119]}.

At the same time, Heidegger could not immediately move on to Plato and continued to study Aristotle for almost half of the semester — one can only guess how strong the involvement in the thought of the Stagirite was, since the teacher was unable to stop and start dealing with the topic of the announced course. This explains why he views Plato through Aristotle, and not the other way around, which would be more in line with historical realities. The formal basis for this castling is Plato's words about ? , starting from which the German philosopher explores the ontology of the "Sophist" ^{[9, p. 219b],[7, p. 269-270]}. In this case, it is important for Heidegger to emphasize the dynamic aspect of being, since this allows him to link Plato's ontology with the idea of movement () and thereby give it an Aristotelian interpretation, which hides the hermeneutics of the facticity of Heidegger himself, because movement in existential analytics is understood in connection with the category of concern ^{[7, p. 578]}. According to Heidegger, who thinks through his hermeneutics with an eye to Aristotle's "Physics", mobility is the main theme of facticity ^{[10, pp. 117-124]}. As Heidegger writes in Natorp-Bericht:

"The main meaning of the mobility of actual life is caring (Sorgen) (curare). In the directed, caring “striving for something” (“Aussein auf etwas”) — “for what" (das Worauf) the cares of life here (da), the given world. The mobility of caring has the character of treating (Umgang) actual life with one's world. This “on-what” of care is “with-what” (das Womit) of treatment. The meaning of the actual being (Wirklichsein) of the world and here-being (Dasein) of the world is based and determined through the character of the world as a “what” caring treatment. <...> The mobility of the preoccupied arrangement (Besorgen) shows numerous ways of performing and correlating-with (Bezogensein auf) with-what treatment: equipping, harvesting, manufacturing, securing, mastering and using, mastering, preserving and omitting" ^{[2, pp. 57-58 with ed.]}.

It is obvious that people, being living beings, move to ensure their existence, i.e. this is their way of being, unlike, for example, stones. Aristotle says that "everything that exists by nature has in itself the beginning of movement and rest" ^{[11, p. 192b20–21]}, however, this movement is not aimless and meaningless, it is aimed at maintaining life, which is called caring. Since human existence is such, it is from here that the meaning of being should be read, Heidegger believes. Aristotle's thought about the connection between being and action, or deed (), becomes fundamental here. Heidegger notes: "T? — how and "what" — fundamentally: "Nicomachean Ethics" I 7, 1168a5–9" ^{[1, p. 249]}. Here Aristotle says the following:

"... being for everyone is chosen and loved, we exist in activity (i.e., living and doing things), but the creator of activity is, as it were, an act: he loves an act precisely for the same reason as being. And this is natural, because the fact that he has the opportunity to act is actually (... , ? ( ), ? : , . : ? , )» ^{[12, c. 1168a5–9]}.

This idea is developed by Heidegger when interpreting a fragment from Metaphysics (E 2, 1026b3–10), where Aristotle, after listing the main meanings of existence, stops at and gives an example of building a house: the concomitant cannot be the subject of metaphysics, the Stagirite believes, since it does not matter at all whether someone likes a built house or not, whether it will be useful to someone or not - all this is only related and has nothing to do with the house itself and the art of house building ^{[13, p. 1026b3—10]}. However, Heidegger draws from this completely different and at the same time incredibly large-scale conclusions, as if this is not an example illustrating the main idea of Aristotle, but the very purpose of his explanation.

Heidegger asks the question, in general, what is the essence of the difference between being and inherent, or what is considered genuine being (eigentliches Sein) as opposed to what is only concomitant (mithaftes ist). He says in this regard: in order to see the meaning of this difference, it is necessary to imagine the possession (Vorhabe), i.e. the background within which Aristotle is faced with the need to distinguish between these types of being. (It probably won't be superfluous to explain: "Dasein is already located or oriented towards what it imperceptibly "takes for granted", i.e. "pre-judgments" (Vor-urteile), "assumptions" (Vormeinungen, SZ 150) and "presuppositions" (Voraussetzungen, SZ 232). Heidegger uses the term “pre-structure of understanding” to reflect this pre-disposition, analyzing it in relation to three interrelated points: “pre-possession” (Vorhabe), which is our holistic understanding of the pre-given context from which we interpret; “pre-discretion” (Vorsicht), which is private interests or concerns from the point of view of which we interpret; and "pre-apprehension" (Vorgriff), which is a special language and concepts with which our interpretation is framed and expressed" ^{[14, pp. 325-326]}). In other words, you need to look at the world around you through the eyes of Aristotle in order to understand what in this world he treats as being. Heidegger reads into the Greek texts and very specifically describes the vision of Aristotle, who appears not as an aristocrat and a theorist, who was joked about that his house looked like a library, but as a craftsman and builder accustomed to making something with his hands (in a word, the son of not a doctor, but a cooper ...). (According to the late-antique evidence, which is considered reliable enough, Aristotle's house was perceived among fellow academics as the "reader's house", which was atypical for that time: "And in communicating with Plato, he (i.e. Aristotle) showed such diligence that his house was called the reader's house, because Plato often said: "let's go to the reader's house ( o)", and when he was not at the lecture, he exclaimed: "there is no reason, the audience is deaf"" ^{[15, p. 428]}; more details: ^{[16, p. 137-144]}). Anyway, Heidegger saw the world around Aristotle as the world of industrial relations.

The reason for this is that in the 20s Heidegger persistently sought to internally dissociate himself from Husserl. He finds in Aristotle a more thorough understanding of human life, contrasting it with Husserl's theoretically oriented subjectivity. As noted by F. Volpi, Heidegger distances himself from transcendental subjectivity, "since it was unilaterally deduced from the description of theoretical acts," building a critique of theoretical-cognitive phenomenology, because "theory is only one of the ways of revealing behavior by which a person relates to existence. In addition to theoria, there are, for example, praxis and poiesis, which are also ways of relating a person to existence. <...> If we now look at the three ways of being that exist, distinguished in "Being and Time", namely, available-before-hand, improvisability and existence (Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit und Dasein), then we can draw an amazing parallel with the Aristotelian ways of behavior theoria, poiesis and praxis" ^{[17, p. 29-30]} (more about the parallels between "Being and Time" and "Nicomachean ethics", as well as about the ontologization of : ^[18],[19]). It is clear that Heidegger did not seek to become a good historian of philosophy, objectively recording the development of ancient thought. He rethinks Aristotle's position in accordance with his hermeneutics of facticity, bringing to the fore precisely the practical activity of man. F. Volpi continues: "With all the correspondence, these definitions are strongly reinterpreted by Heidegger. First of all, they are ontologized, i.e., from the ways of human behavior, they turn into ways of being existing. In other words, Heidegger extrapolates the ontological embodiment into theoria, poiesis and praxis, and also absolutizes them to the modes of being available-at-hand, improvisability and existence. In addition, it changes their hierarchical order. Theoria is no longer considered the highest human activity. Rather, praxis rises to the basic definition of the way of being of man, to his ontological structure" ^{[17, p. 30]}. Through this optics, Heidegger examines Aristotle's ontology.

In fact, if the main characteristic of a living being is mobility, which makes practical sense, then this activity can be understood, not without reason, as arranging care. A person initially treats himself not in an objectifying way, which is an independent and neutral observation, but from the very beginning shows interest in himself, a person is interested in his being. Considering all these details, Heidegger gives a certain specificity to the interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy. So, he asks the question of what is the essence of the difference between being and inherent, genuine being and concomitant.

"From here it becomes clear what is different from being as a concomitant (das Sein im Wie der Mithaftigkeit), more precisely, what is considered as a genuine being (als eigentliches Sein) in contrast to the other, which only (only) accompanies (mithaftes ist). In order to see the meaning of this difference and what is distinguished, it is necessary to imagine a Vorhabe in which Aristotle encounters such differences. How Aristotle sees the world around him (Umwelt), more precisely: what does he see in it as existing? The making (Herstellung) of a house as an arrangement (ausrichtender Umgang) brings the house into authentic being (das eigentliche Sein). Existence (Dasein) is a certain being-become (Gewordensein), o () [cf. 1026b6 et seq.]; “to be” means: to be made, formed, to be brought into shape; thereby, in the end, to be—ready (Fertigsein) and to be-brought to that, “because of what” it's authentic. The material of wood and stone in the course of a certain execution acquired the shape and appearance of the house, now it looks like this — “here” (“da”). The meaning of existence (Dasein) is not as vague and indifferent as it may seem at first glance, and also in accordance with the uncertainty that this concept has in philosophical discussion. The meaning of actual being (des Wirklichseins), the reality of the house, correlates with a certain way characterized, leading to the formation of the treatment (Umgang), or accompanying it, guiding orientation clarification (review (Umsicht) — ). The treatment according to the method of is in a broader sense. As manufactured and thus truly existing, the house is introduced (hineingestellt) into the surrounding world (Umwelt); as such, it is at the disposal and available for various suitable, caring tendencies that treat it. ( [ ...] [1026b4 sq.], any clarification (Erhellung) and treatment is not taken care of). But according to Aristotle (and throughout the Greek philosophy expressing itself conceptually), these ways of accessibility, designating the environment, do not relate to the existence of the house (zum Dasein des Hauses). (Basically it says in Phys. B 6: [ ...] ' [198a7 sq.]: this kind of pre-possession (Vorhabe) — basic solution). Existence exhausts itself in being-produced, being-made as such (Das Dasein ersch?pft sich im Hergestelltsein, Gemachtsein als solchem). And at the same time, the careful treatment of manufacturing is understood so narrowly that the “what” (das Worauf) of this arranging preoccupation includes only the appearance of what should be taken care of, not even that the house will become comfortable, adapted to certain requirements and urgency, etc. Thus, even the “how” of the existence of the house (das Wie des Daseins des Hauses) in the nearest field of view (Umsichtskreis), in which the manufacture itself moves, is not included in the "what"" ^{[1, pp. 250-251]}.

I will not quote further. This is a very thoughtful and attentive reading of Aristotle, or rather even some kind of meditation. Heidegger consistently and unhurriedly unfolds his argument. Here it is only important to pay attention to the fact that the understanding of being is interpreted through the idea of being produced, manufactured: existence, or being (Dasein), is a certain being—become, and it exhausts itself in being-produced, being-made as such. Thus, from Heidegger's point of view, a person finds himself in being, and this being is not indifferent to him, therefore a person is all in motion, cares about his existence, and this activity determines how he understands being; since movement and caring determine the existence of an existing person, insofar as he initially understands the world through practical activity, which most thoroughly reveals itself in the manufacture, which means that being is understood as being-manufactured. In a brief Natorp-Bericht, the philosopher summarizes his achievements of the previous years and especially of the summer semester of 1922, in which he formulated his interpretation of Aristotle's ontology for the first time:

"What does being mean for Aristotle in general, how is it accessible, comprehensible and definable? The subject field, which provides the original meaning of being, is a <field> of manufactured objects used in the circumvention of objects. Therefore, the “what” (Worauf), in relation to which the original experience of being is directed, is not the existential field of things (Dinge) as such a kind of <thematic> object, grasped theoretically in a real (sachhaft) way, but the world that occurs in the manufacturing, performing and using treatment. What has become-ready (das Fertiggewordene) in the mobility of the circumvention of manufacture (Herstellen) (), which has come to its being-available (Vorhandensein), suitable for the tendency of use (Gebrauchstendenz), is what it is. Being means being-manufactured (Hergestelltsein) and, as manufactured, meaningful (Bedeutsames) in relation to the tendency of being-at-disposal (Verf?gbarsein). <...> In his objective questioning, leads the being to be preserved in its commensurate appearance of being (o). However, o has an initial meaning, preserved by Aristotle himself, as well as subsequently having the circulation of “household”, “available property”, circumferentially “available-for-use". It means possession (Habe). That which, in relation to being, <is> as the being of this being comes to be preserved by the way of handling, what characterizes the being as possession is its being-manufactured. In the manufacture (Herstellung), the object of treatment acquires its own appearance. The existential field of objects of treatment (, , ) and the method of treatment of treatment ... denotes possession (Vorhabe), from which the main ontological structures and at the same time the methods of treatment and definition in relation to such an object as "human life" are drawn" ^{[2, pp. 105-105 with ed.]}.

The previous course of lectures, delivered a little earlier in the winter semester of 1921/22, was devoted to methodological issues: how can one, with the help of the hermeneutics of facticity, delve into the world of Aristotle (see ^[10]). As it is clear from what has been said above, this is important already because Heidegger is trying to look at the world around him through the eyes of Aristotle, so that one can see where he draws his existential vocabulary from, from which understanding of being the greatest philosopher proceeds. — The enterprise is very worthy, but here I must note, although it sounds somewhat strange, that all these reflections of Heidegger do not reflect what Aristotle said at all, since the young private professor is more busy developing his own conceptual schemes, for which the philosophy of Stagirite serves only as auxiliary material. Heidegger's attitude to the real Aristotle is exhausted by his famous phrase uttered at the beginning of the summer semester of 1924: "In the personality of a philosopher, only this is of interest: he was born then and then, worked and died. The figure of a philosopher or something similar is not considered here" ^{[21, p. 5]}.

Just in case, it is worth saying the obvious: Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle are very far from Aristotelian studies or the history of philosophy, as evidenced by the fact that these lectures are not involved in ancient studies and are of interest only to Heidegger studies (however, for classical philologists, Heidegger's interpretations are very interesting ^{[22, p. 4]}). What Aristotle rejects as completely insignificant, and after him the whole medieval exegesis up to F. Brentano ^{[23, pp. 15-30]}, Heidegger presents as something fundamental. This is a very free interpretation of Aristotle, and yet it is on it that Heidegger bases his understanding of all ancient and medieval ontology, and then his concepts of existential history, technology and ontotheology. In the future, Heidegger's interpretation of being as a fabrication was refined and detailed in various ways, but essentially did not change, so it is important not so much from the point of view of the history of philosophy, as in the context of the destruction of the history of ontology undertaken by Heidegger and having its own philosophical significance today. This interpretation is fundamentally important for understanding Heidegger's thought, and therefore it is necessary to consider this topic more carefully.

***

The first two courses on Aristotle, which Heidegger taught in 1921/22 (61-62 volumes of collected works), are "phenomenological interpretations". This means that Aristotle's thought is included in the context of already established theoretical practices and is understood not from itself, but based on these practices. Throughout the winter semester, Heidegger develops and justifies his approach to the history of philosophy, within the framework of which he suggests engaging not in detached observation, but as if getting used to the subject of research ^{[10, pp. 1-78]}. This approach has its strengths and in general can be considered an important contribution of Heidegger to the methodology of research, which allows updating historical and philosophical material. As he pathetically notes: "To understand means not just to take into account the confirmation, but also to initially repeat what was understood in the sense of the most appropriate situation and for this situation. <...> “Engaged” in history! instead of "being" it!" ^{[2, pp. 52-53]}.

This leads to the need to fix the main phenomenological categories (being, life, world, care, movement, fall), in which "actual life" is revealed ^{[10, pp. 79-156]}. However, these categories, which are universal enough to open access to factuality and thereby understand the human situation, are borrowed not from Plato and Aristotle, but represent the framework of Heidegger's own phenomenology, developed by him earlier under the influence of Luther, Kierkegaard and Husserl (lectures 1919/20, volumes 56-60 of the collected works). As Heidegger said in 1923, describing his journey: "The companion in [my] search was the young Luther, and the model was Aristotle, whom the first hated. Kierkegaard gave me impulses, and Husserl became my eyes" ^{[24, p. 5]}. N. A. Artemenko notes in this regard: "And here it is revealed, however, only with such an interpretation, which proceeds from the problems of factuality, that Aristotle interpreted being as being manufactured" ^{[25, p. 55 (italics of the central phrase are mine — A. G.)]}. In other words, only after Aristotle's philosophy is integrated into the hermeneutics of facticity, it becomes possible to assert that the Greeks perceived being as fabrication. But is it so? What is the essence of this interpretation in general?

This issue is discussed in detail in sections 11-12 of the course "Basic problems of phenomenology" ^{[26, pp. 130-160]}. Heidegger here says that the concept of existence, i.e., "actual realization", goes back through agere and agens to and , respectively, existentia and actualitas refer to activity and the pre-hand, i.e., to what is-before-hand (das Vorhandene) ^{[26, pp. 132-133]}, in this is the meaning of the ancient and medieval understanding of being: reality arises from the action, from the producing behavior of the doer. In other words, the concept of existence is read from the activity of the existing and therefore means reality. If F. Brentano and A. Marti considered existence to be an abstraction from the activity of judgment ^{[27, p. 45 et seq.]}, then Heidegger interprets it as a derivative of practical behavior. A person acts one way or another in the surrounding world and through this turns out to be in reality. It seems quite logical: the reality of the action, because ? ( ), ? , as noted above: ESMI action, living and doing figure in action, is like the act.

Here Heidegger brings different concepts Greek (actually, the only Aristotelian) and Latin ontological lexicon: , (forma), (quod quid erat esse), , (natura), , (definitio), (essentia), (substantia) as all of them, according to the philosopher, arise in connection with the manufacture something, and it is in this sense-making is the horizon of interpretation of Genesis ^{[26, c. 139 to 143]}. Hence, Heidegger does not just create an image of homo agens, i.e. a person acting, but reveals his main activity, which is considered to be the manufacture (das Herstellen), i.e. we are talking about homo faber, the person producing. This is influenced not only by Aristotle, but also by A. Bergson, whose publications Heidegger closely followed.

"To what time do we refer the appearance of man on Earth? By the time of the production of the first weapons, the first tools. <...> If we could discard all conceit, if, in defining our species, we adhered exactly to what historical and prehistoric times present to us as a permanent characteristic of man and intelligence, we would say, perhaps, not Homo sapiens, but Homo faber. So, intelligence, considered at its starting point, is the ability to fabricate artificial objects, in particular tools for creating tools, and infinitely diversify their manufacture" ^{[28, p. 151, 153]}.

Subsequently , the homo faber theme will be developed by X. Arendt ^[29]. Obviously, this approach is not without reason: one can hardly doubt that the ancient Greeks and medieval Christians, as well as modern people, did something, cared about something. The category (later — the existential) of care is quite universal in order to cover a person's life at various stages of his history. It is through this category that Heidegger justifies his interpretation of ancient ontology: a person cares about something, moves in the world, respectively, acts this way and that, as a result of which he finds himself inside reality, in a certain way interpreted being ^{[10, p. 89-99]} (about the central meaning of the Aristotelian category of movement for the Heidegger interpretation ^[30]). Thus, Heidegger reveals an important dimension of ontology and its original structure.

However, he goes too far when he equates fabrication, reality, cash and existence. More precisely, when he offers a kind of genealogy of existential vocabulary, reducing the ambiguity of being in Aristotle and in general in all ancient and medieval ontology to a single source, which he calls das Herstellen, production, work. This is doubtful already because such an interpretation does not find any textual confirmation, which Heidegger himself admits: "We are faced with the task of showing that essentia and existentia have a common source in their interpretive elevation to producing behavior (das herstellende Verhalten). In the ancient ontology itself, we do not find any clear evidence of such an erection" ^{[26, p. 145 with ed.]}. (It should be noted that A. G. Chernyakov prefers to translate das herstellende Verhalten as "producing relation", however, it is completely unclear how something can be produced in relation, so I believe which would be more accurate to say exactly about behavior, i.e. such activity, or behavior in which something is manufactured, produced). In other words, there is no evidence that the understanding of being is derived from producing behavior, from which it then spreads to the entire ancient ontology and through it enters the medieval intellectual culture. But then how can we even talk about it? Heidegger's answer is quite simple, but it's hardly a good answer.: "We not only want, but also need to understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves" ^{[26, p. 147]}. The Greeks understood the matter naively, Heidegger sees the essence. It is clear that with this approach, you can find anything at all from the Greeks… Nevertheless, this is too general a remark, the details are much more important here.

Heidegger builds the following conceptual series: die Hand — das Vorhandene — das Herstellen — das Hergestelltsein, respectively: hand—available-before-hand —making—being-made. As noted by A. G. Chernyakov: "It has already become generally accepted to transmit "das Vor-handene" in Heidegger's translations as “cash”, in contrast to “das Zu-handene" — “handy". For Heidegger, these are strictly different ontological terms. Thus, the development of the root (or "root") theme of "Hand" as a tool of tools (Aristotle) in the Russian language is lost in this place" ^{[26, p. 133, note 42]}. This is a fair remark, and since it is of fundamental importance for Heidegger's reasoning, I pass das Vorhandene not as cash, but as available-before-hand or even pre-hand (which in meaning means cash: as cash in your pocket and as what is available). Alas, it sounds completely un-Russian, but here we have to sacrifice stylistics: the manual is a literal tracing paper with Vorhandene, respectively, Vorhandensein — to be—handy, to be-pre-hand, i.e. to be available to the hand, or to be available, to have something. Heidegger contrasts the handy (Vorhandene) and the handy (Zuhandene), using the prefix vor- as an indication that the material is accessible to the hand, is in front of it, lies as a lying, instead of the traditional lying.

"From here comes the Greek designation , the predicate (das Vorliegende). What is present first of all and constantly in the immediate circle of human actions (Verhaltungen) and thus constantly available is the totality of things used..." ^{[62, pp. 152-153]}.

Heidegger talks very freely about , reinterpreting it from the subject into the present. However, it is worth noting that the prefix - still has the meaning of sub-, unter-, sub-, but not pre-, vor-. That is why it is necessary to transfer Heidegger's das Vorhandene not as cash, but as a pre-hand, pre-hand — here the nuances on which the German philosopher plays are important, otherwise his logic becomes incomprehensible.

This is based on the Aristotelian notion of action-in fact, , which is understood as a kind of movement, , because it is the Central concept of Aristotle's physics, and in a category of concern as well and hermeneutics of Heidegger factuality: "Treatment by way is in a broader sense. <...> Existence exhausts itself in being-produced, being-made as such" ^{[1, p. 250]}. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the history of mankind, which would not act, not move, producing something: things, tools, actions, events. Undoubtedly, there is a great thoroughness of Heidegger's approach in this. But if we compare this picture with what is known to antiquity about the ancient Greek cosmos, then Heidegger's interpretation loses credibility. Here is a very representative passage in which the position of the German philosopher is clearly presented (here Her stellen letters. — here-to put, in Russian: you put from the possible into the real, from darkness into light, i.e. about lime, from cooking):

"Formation, formation, production — all this in its meaning is permission-to appear, permission-to happen-from. All these actions (Verhaltungen) we can denote through the basic behavior of the existing (Grundverhaltung des Daseins), which we briefly call manufacturing (das Herstellen). <...> However, from cooking (Her stellen) means at the same time — to bring into a narrower or wider field of what is available, here, here, in “here” (in das Da), so that what is made in itself stands for itself and as permanent for itself (an ihm selbst f?r sich steht und als f?r sich St?ndiges) remains detectable and lies (vorliegt). Hence comes the Greek designation , prepositive (das Vorliegende). What is present first of all and constantly in the immediate circle of human actions (Verhaltungen) and thus constantly at our disposal is a set of used things with which we constantly deal, a set of existing things that are in their own sense worked with each other, used utensils and constantly involved products of nature (Erzugnisse der Natur): house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and warmth. The fact that there is such a thing-before-hand (vor-handen ist), in everyday experience, has meaning as that which is primarily existent (das in erster Linie Seiende). The good that is at the disposal, property, is existing as such, in Greek, o. This expression, o, denoted even in the time of Aristotle, when it already had a solid philosophical and theoretical terminological meaning, at the same time nothing more than property, property, fortune. The pre-philosophical real meaning of o was still retained. Thus, being meant nothing else than being-at-hand, being-at-disposal (vorhandenes Verf?gbares). Essentia is only a literal translation of o. This expression, essentia, which is used for something, for reality, expresses at the same time the specific way of being of being, its being-at-disposal (Verf?gbarkeit), or as we also say, its handedness (Vorhandenheit), which is inherent in it on the basis of its manufacture (Hergestelltheit)" ^{[62, p. 152-153]}.

Perhaps such a description would be suitable for the era of industrialization and the industrial Revolution, even more so for modernity, but not for the static cosmos of Aristotle and previous thinkers. It is by no means accidental that Heidegger's interpretation of ancient existence coincides in essential details with his own interpretation of Marx and Hegel:

"The essence of materialism lies not in the assertion that everything is matter, but in a metaphysical definition, in accordance with which everything that exists appears as the material of labor. The New European-metaphysical essence of labor is thought out in detail in Hegel's “Phenomenology of Spirit” as a self-organizing process of all-encompassing fabrication, i.e., the objectification of reality by a person who felt the subject in himself" ^{[31, p. 207]}.

H. Arendt points out the inevitable connection in Marx between violence and the understanding of man as a producer, which is very interesting in the context of Heidegger's biography and philosophy from the 33rd and in subsequent years. She writes, in particular: "It was this humanistic side of Marx's teaching that led him to insist on the violent nature of political action: he considered history in terms of production; historical man was for him mainly Homo faber. The production of all things manufactured by man necessarily involves some violence against matter, which becomes the source material of the manufactured thing. It is impossible to make a table without killing a tree" ^{[32, p. 616]}.

First of all, it should be noted quite an obvious and fundamentally important circumstance: there is a big difference between activity in general and manufacturing, and therefore Heidegger's supposed genealogy of ontological concepts is based only on a generalization of a particular case. A person acted in one way or another at all stages of his history, but this was far from immediately and did not always involve manufacturing. Therefore, Heidegger rightly notes that is only a special case of . But this means that, within the framework of Heidegger's logic, reality and existence should go back to more primordial kinesthetics, and not to manufacturing or producing behavior (about kinesthesia in the context of human creative activity ^[33]). And why not consider "muscular feeling" as such in general, or, for example, such a kind of it as dance, which gives rise to a feeling of freedom? It is unlikely that a person started dancing later than he learned how to make utensils. Nothing is produced or manufactured in dance, but at the same time it expresses the essence of life, it communicates something, a person can read certain ideas from it. Singing does not need either an assistant or a pre-assistant, and therefore such creative activity goes beyond the interpretation of Heidegger. Of course, all this could be called a very general name of creation, as well as every action, every act can be interpreted in the sense that they produce something in the world (wiggled his little finger - "produced" an action), but in this case it should be said without limiting the wide field of activity something specific, which is the manufacture associated with the processing of pre-made material. Therefore, das Herstellen, production is a narrower concept than the reality of action, , T?tigkeit, Aktivit?t, and therefore it is unlikely that it was production that determined Aristotle's understanding of being. In any case, the texts of Aristotle himself do not confirm this.

We are not talking about the denial of producing behavior, but about the fact that it cannot be recognized as something constitutive, i.e. exclusive and the only thing that feeds thinking. In the genealogy of philosophical concepts, one should take into account the embodiment of consciousness as a whole: "Our most sacred beliefs, what is unchangeable in us in relation to the highest values, are the judgments of our muscles. <...> However, even today a person still hears with his muscles, even reads with his muscles" ^{[34, p. 189, 441]}. The existing (Dasein) by no means exhausts itself in production, in producing behavior, and hence existence, reality-action is not exhausted in being-produced, being-made as such (im Hergestelltsein, Gemachtsein als solchem). (The concept of proprioception fits well with the later topics of Ereignis. By the way, T. Sheehan considers it unacceptable to convey this concept as an "event" or "assignment event", because it means only "assignment" in Heidegger, appropriation ^{[35, c. XVII, 231 et seq.]}, and this appears in Heidegger himself when he turns to topology genesis. On space and physicality in the context of Heidegger's criticism: ^[36]). A person not only wields a hammer, but also prays, rejoices, contemplates and generally does a lot of other things, but most importantly — thinks, counts, imagines. And if a sense of reality, a sense of life and its tragedy can be born aus dem Geiste der Musik (see Nietzsche's early works collected in the first volume of the complete works: ^[37]), then the everyday vocabulary in its origins should go back to the rich and diverse human activity, and not be reduced to artisan behavior. Therefore, it is hardly possible to say that manufacturing is the main behavior of the existing (Grundverhaltung des Daseins), because it is only one of many ways of action in the world, and it does not even concern all people, but only artisans: the great ontologists — Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle — being aristocrats, were not engaged in the manufacture of utensils and the like, but they and their entourage did not refuse singing and dancing, as well as various sacred rites.

Heidegger develops a specific variant, so to speak, of artisan-existential behaviorism. Striving to elevate the basic concepts of existence to facticity, to the daily activity of man, he blurs the line between the sacred and the profane, between thinking and needlework, although specific philosophical vocabulary acquired its status precisely when it was withdrawn from everyday use, when it was opposed to the common and average understanding. Since the Greeks thought that philosophy bore the imprint of the language of the gods, its vocabulary was significantly different from the profane language ^{[38, p. 391d],[39],[40]}, on which Heidegger bases his genealogy. This follows from his methodology, because the explication of the basic concepts "is carried out in the most radical way" ^{[41, p. 331]}. Accordingly, the dimension of the sacred, which for the Greeks was real and fundamental, early Heidegger, postulating the fundamental atheism of philosophy, simply misses (see: ^[42], on the evidence of religious experience among the Greeks: ^[43]; however, it should be noted that such a methodology is characteristic of early Heidegger, his later reflections, for example, about the presence of gods in Heraclitus, are no longer burdened with methodological atheism ^[44]). His genealogy is existential behaviorism, a profane derivation of concepts, proceeding only from producing behavior, which essentially trivializes Greek thought. And if in the case of some later concepts such a derivation is quite adequate (especially in Aristotle, who himself pronounces it, for example, in the case of matter or energy), then this cannot be said about being, because it is fundamentally pre-conceptual and constitutes not only theoretical, but also pre-theoretical experience. In contrast, for example, the concept of reality, , first appears only in Aristotle, before whose arrival the ontological lexicon was significantly poorer, is really artificial ^{[45, p. 23]}. Therefore, when Heidegger in the 20s analyzes the ontological lexicon of antiquity (in fact, only Aristotelian), he not only ontologizes the relevant concepts within the framework of his hermeneutics of facticity, but also extrapolates later concepts to earlier Greek thought, mixing the oldest linguistic layer with artificial terminology. (By the way, this problem has been misleading historians of ancient philosophy for a long time, since the doxographic evidence in the surviving fragments of early thinkers often includes late vocabulary, which is especially typical for Aristotle, as a result of which it is quite difficult to establish the authenticity of a fragment).

***

The fact that Heidegger makes mistakes from the point of view of the history of philosophy and extrapolates Aristotle's thought to the previous tradition is not at all a secret, but he himself declares it:

"In the light of the indicated problem of facticity, Aristotle acts as the completion and concrete formalization of the preceding philosophy ... <...> Proceeding from Aristotle, Parmenides' doctrine of being is definable for the first time and becomes understandable as a decisive step that determined the fate and direction (Sinn) of Western European ontology and logic" ^{[2, pp. 101-12]}.

However, the original sense of being is only expressed in later concepts, and is not derived from them. Nevertheless, Heidegger explores the later forms of expression of beingness, trying to understand through it what the Greeks heard in the word being, thereby endowing this concept with a certain interpretation, projecting the later layers onto the original experience. But as C. Kahn once remarked: "The concept of being, as formulated by Parmenides, apparently came from nowhere, like a philosophical meteor without a historical past, but with profound historical consequences. It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of this new concept" ^{[46, p. 109]}. Beingness and its semantics were clearly not derived from producing behavior. On the contrary, when genesis was first revealed to the Greek ear, the immobility and immutability that Parmenides tried to fix was clearly felt in this concept. It was not by chance that the Elean sage presented the case in such a way that being, like Prometheus fire, was given to people by a mysterious goddess, as a result of which true knowledge allowed overcoming the opinions of "mortals who know nothing, wandering about two heads" ^{[47, 28B6]}, i.e. caring about their existence. For it is known that philosophy requires leisure and it is in this freedom that philosophical concepts are born. In a word, Heidegger's interpretation lacks aristocracy. About Parmenides said that he "rescued thinking of cheating imagination ( )" ^{[47, 28À1.20]}, and it is no coincidence that the discoverer of Genesis is talking about Petrochem and manufactured, and static and unchanging, , says Parmenides.

"Because there was no (), in addition to being ( ) as Moira bound to be dense and immobile (). [Only] name will be all set mortals, convinced of the truth: arise and disappear ( ), to be ( ), change ( ) and change the bright color" ^{[47, 28B8]}.

Something is expressed here that is the opposite of what Heidegger says about the Greek understanding of being. Parmenides does not deduce being from producing behavior, but refers it to revelation and speculation. Generally speaking, before the emergence of philosophy, people made different things for many centuries, but the discovery of being did not happen — it was caused by something else that is not related to craft activities. We are talking about a different beginning, a different source of ontology, which does not go back to everyday experience, but points to something exceptional, to the depth that was revealed to the Greek genius.

As noted above, Heidegger proceeded from the desire to overcome the approach of Brentano and Husserl, and therefore proposed a different genealogy of concepts, not theoretical, but practical. Striving to surpass his teachers and wondering about the existence of consciousness — a question that they missed — Heidegger is also looking for another source of conceptuality. So, if F. Brentano says that all our concepts originate from certain concrete visual representations that relate not to the physical, but to the mental contents of consciousness ^{[48, p. 48, 87]}, which is quite consistent with the description of being in Parmenides, then Heidegger raises the source of conceptuality to the productive activity of man, which no longer has no textual confirmation, no sufficient persuasiveness. According to Parmenides, Heidegger "wanders about two heads" when he tries to elevate the ancient understanding of being to handicraft activity. This also applies to the central concept of ancient ontology — essence. Here's what Heidegger says about it:

"'Essence' is very harsh and unusual (because artificial) a linguistic expression that appears only in philosophical reflection. However, what can be said about the German “Seiendheit” cannot be said about the corresponding Greek word. After all, o is not an artificial, not a special expression that appears only in philosophy: The Greeks use this word in their everyday language and speech. Philosophy has only adopted this word from the pre-philosophical language. <...> o implies existence, but, true, not everything, but one that is marked in a certain way in its being — that existence that belongs to someone: property, house and yard (possession, estate), something that can be disposed of. Someone can dispose of this existence — the house and the yard — because it is solid and immovable, always achievable, always at hand, always present in the immediate environment. <...> Property is always achievable, accessible. Being this constantly at your disposal, it is nearby, lies nearby, “on a tray”, constantly provides itself. It is the closest and, being constantly the closest, it is emphatically present at hand, is here, is present. Since the house and the yard, since the property is presented in a special way, is present, we call them — that is, what the Greeks mean by the word o — the word das Anwesen. By “usia” (o), in fact, it means nothing more than a constant presence, and this is what is meant by essence. This constant presence, the present constancy, we mean by being. <...> So, we must not forget: in everyday meaning, a certain property, a house and a yard are always meant by a.. Understanding and using this word, the Greeks mean exactly the latter, but they mean it because they already have a concept of permanent presence in advance. The Greeks have the concept of a permanent presence in their pre-understanding, and they themselves do not thematize this presence in any way. This basic meaning, embedded in the everyday use of the word o, taken for granted and therefore not formulated further in any concrete way, has passed into the philosophical use of this word. This basic meaning gave "usia" the opportunity to exist as a term, and not for everyone, but one that denotes what was sought, discussed and already understood in the leading question of real philosophizing" ^{[49, pp. 70-74]}.

It is already quite expected that in his profane methodology (a kind of outrage) Heidegger pays attention only to the common use of this word in the meaning of property. The only problem is that there was no everyday meaning of this word.

Firstly, it comes into use only in the third quarter of the fifth century, i.e. shortly before it turns into a philosophical concept in Plato. At the same time, this word is absent in Homer, Hesiod and Pindar ^{[50, p. 41]}. As noted by Ch . Kahn, regarding o: "Abstract nominalization, or noun actions for , apparently originally came into use in connection with the compound forms of the verb. So, “no” (from -) and presence (-) occur in Aeschylus, whereas simple to Herodotus not sousvide-testowana. Nominative education based on the participle o is unusual" ^{[51, pp. 457-458]}. Therefore, to speak of its "everyday use" is a great exaggeration: it was not used in everyday speech, at least until the end of the fifth century. Already on this it would be possible to put an end to this issue.

Second, "some compound words , the value of which generally refers to the modalities of the idea of being that are more ancient and sometimes more frequency than simple word: — "presence", "the fact of being here," — "lack of", "the fact of existence here," — "the fact of co-existence of General existence," "acquaintance"" ^{[50, p. 41]}. And this means that it is not the idea of permanent presence that is derived from the concept of property, but just the opposite — this latter meaning is secondary and derivative: it arises as a generalization, as an abstract noun, because other and much more common lexemes were used for property in the Greek language, which are fixed since Homer and denote various aspects of property. For example, (acquired property), (used property), as well as (economic property): "The word o, used almost always in the singular, denotes the same things, but does so in the form of a collective singular, the specificity of which is precisely to designate by one name things that are by their nature plural and diverse. This is the primary form of abstraction" ^{[50, pp. 41-42]}. So, contrary to Heidegger, o is the same artificial word as essence. Philosophy did not accept "this word from the pre-philosophical language", on the contrary, it could appear as a word and as a concept only in a philosophical culture already accustomed to generalizations and abstractions.

These circumstances force us to reconsider what Heidegger says about the semantics of o. The point is not at all that "the Greeks have the concept of a permanent presence in their pre-understanding, and they themselves do not thematize this presence in any way." On the contrary, having in their lexicon such words as , and , i.e. presence, absence and presence (a generalization of the plural, literally meaning "existing"), which are quite clearly thematized, the Greeks only after Herodotus, i.e. from the third quarter of the fifth century, begin to use an abstract noun o, which covers various property values. Therefore, it cannot be said that "in everyday meaning, a certain property, a house and a yard are always meant by ".

In addition, property, property, possession by no means express existence as such, but fix only a certain kind of it, namely the one that belongs to someone: I have = I have. Essence, essence is like having: o as property means a kind of inherent, that is, what is inherent in me, what I have, or the presence of something in me, therefore, the dual meaning of this word implies an internal opposition of essence/inherent, essence/property (like an olive seed, which is inherent in/accompanied by pulp). And it is precisely out of this duality that the distinction between essence and inherent, or concomitant, substance and accident grows, for the latter is nothing else than belonging, having. But then the idea of "permanent presence" in the Heideggerian sense cannot go back to in the sense of property, because there is instability and impermanence, situativeness and temporality in the possession of something. The aspect of the estate expresses the accidental being (flesh), as opposed to the essence as the basis (bone).

Heidegger says: "Someone can dispose of this being — the house and the yard — because it is solid and immovable, always achievable, always at hand, always present in the immediate environment" ^{[49, p. 72]}. However includes value , which has a tinge of priobretennogo, but because is not always achievable, not always at hand, but today is, tomorrow. Heidegger forgets that o refers not only to houses and courtyards, or to what is "solid and immovable, always achievable," but also concerns absolutely momentary things that are not solid and immovable at all, but are exchanged, acquired, broken and lost, therefore there is no constancy of presence in property as such. On the contrary, the Greeks were well aware that people have been acquiring for centuries, fussing and not caring about the immutable, their houses are built on sand…

Only later Plato in the dialogue "Kratilus" will clearly connect the concept of essence with stability and constancy ^{[38, p. 386a–387a]}, but already proceeding from his own ontology. And although the property of the Greeks could really be associated with the security of the hearth and inheritance (and just not in the sense of an abstract one, but quite concrete ones, "their own good"), the ancient Greek sages questioned this very thing, contrasting the possession of the external and the true essence ^{[50, p. 42]}. Since no one can be called happy before his death, as Solon replied according to legend to the Lydian king Croesus, famous for his riches, then property for the wise, i.e. philosophers, could hardly mean something like a permanent presence. Aristotle tells an instructive story about Thales, who proved that "philosophers can easily get rich if they want, but this is not what they care about. This is how, they say, Thales showed his wisdom" ^{[47, 11A10]}. There is no doubt that essence and possessiveness are connected in o, but this should not be misleading, because there is not only what I or someone else has, but also what we do not have, and therefore the following statement is hardly true: "The good at our disposal, property, is being as such (das Seiende schlechthin), in Greek, o" ^{[62, 153]}. This sense of inherent, that is, the presence of certain entities in me, appears after Parmenides discovered being as such, or being. Probably, only because it appears that this discovery has happened. This means that it is not from them that the meaning of being should be read, but the very concept of essence could be born for the reason that the mystery of being was revealed to the ancient Greeks.

Of course, the pre-philosophical meaning of o was still retained in the time of Aristotle, but this does not imply the large-scale conclusions that Heidegger suggests. Firstly, Plato introduced this concept into philosophy, i.e. a little earlier than it became known to Aristotle, and therefore it is quite natural that it still retained a pre-philosophical meaning. Secondly, by starting to use it philosophically and contrasting it with everyday experience, which is labeled as inauthentic, as an area of delusion and opinion, Plato thereby separates it from use in the sense of property, whereas Heidegger's interpretation moves in the opposite direction, as if the philosophical meaning of this concept was drawn from its everyday use, which was not at all as noted above. (As noted by Ch. Stead, "Plato, although not its originator, became the first significant writer who used the term o in a philosophical sense, as distinct from the terms "wealth" or "property". In early works, he rarely introduces it, prefixing it with some alternative expression including the word , or adding a note of apology; in later works, starting with the "State", this term occurs quite often and without explanation" ^{[52, p. 25]}, see also: ^{[51, c. 457-462]}). In addition, Plato reserves for the "heavenly region", which "none of the local poets sang" ^{[38, p. 247c]}, therefore, it can in no way relate to "the totality of things used, with which we constantly deal", because this totality for Plato is something imaginary and inauthentic, i.e., the opposite of what truly exists, and therefore not at all "the totality of existing things". Therefore, Heidegger never examines Plato himself, but always and only Aristotle, i.e. Plato through Aristotle. For these reasons, it seems absolutely incredible to extrapolate the idea of being-as-manufactured to Plato's philosophy, even though at a late stage, i.e. in an already established ontology, he includes the figure of the demiurge.

***

It's time to take stock. Through all the texts of Heidegger, one way or another concerning ancient ontology, and in fact these are all Heigger's works, the idea runs through the red thread that being in antiquity, and then in the Middle Ages, is understood as being manufactured. However, Heidegger develops this topic only in early lectures, whereas in all his subsequent studies he relies on this interpretation as something already self-evident (for him, at least), in the future he does not stop at this specifically and does not further explain.

Generally speaking, this is a very characteristic feature of Heidegger, whose collected works are a continuous stream of thought that moves from year to year, from semester to semester, for almost seventy years, from his earliest experiments to his latest publications. Heidegger, especially in the early period, confidently goes forward and it is clear from the texts that he often did not repeat the reflections that he himself had long understood and already understandable to his closest students, the result of which was quite complex terms that were completely incomprehensible out of context. Therefore, outside readers, starting to study Heidegger's texts, for a long time simply did not have the opportunity to see his thought in development, and therefore many topics seemed incomprehensible, since they are mentioned in passing in the text, but in fact they are of fundamental importance. Heidegger's vocabulary is very rich, it has been developed for many years, but in later works, only the result recorded in specific terminology can be preserved from long reflections and bold interpretations. This is how the image of one of the most inaccessible philosophers arises, although if you read Heidegger consistently, starting from the early texts, you can observe the formation of his thought, which no longer seems impenetrable. As E. V. Melnikova notes: "The need to conceptualize the question of the meaning of being is defined by Heidegger as the main goal of his work "Being and Time". The treatise, however, definitely demonstrates the results of the previous work, as a result of which the conceptual structure of fundamental ontology was formed, which, in particular, is indicated by the fact that the conceptual language of "Being and Time" is impenetrable without explication of the range of problems to which this treatise refers" ^{[54, p. 159]}. (The topic of impenetrability does not accidentally appear in various texts about Heidegger. To an even greater extent, this applies to the Heidegger language of the middle and late periods. As A. B. Patkul writes, "the style of Heidegger's later works as a whole is impenetrable to the consciousness accustomed to consider itself scientific" ^{[55, p. 6]}). However, this applies not only to "Being and Time" and later works. Starting from the early and still quite simple texts, i.e. since 1912, one can see how Heidegger's thought and language become more complicated, become multilayered. The specific vocabulary multiplies, the topics change, but the philosopher's thought moves further in the same direction, without lingering on explanations. And this is quite understandable, why stand still… That is why Heidegger should be read sequentially, starting from the very beginning.

In this regard, it is somewhat strange (and very instructive) that in our fatherland Heidegger began to be read from the end. Thus, A.V. Mikhailov and V. V. Bibikhin in the era of perestroika began with the publication of late works ^[56],[57]. However, such a reception of Heidegger was ubiquitous (as the Canadian historian of philosophy Sh. McGrath, researchers have long ignored Heidegger's habilitation thesis, although it is a very important source: ^{[58, p. 89]}) and only in recent decades, after the publication of a significant part of the collected works, especially early texts, this trend began to change. As a result, Heidegger appeared to the reader as something almost impenetrable at best, and at worst - as simple nonsense (and this applies even to German—speaking readers). But it is thanks to this that Heidegger in Russia also acquired loyal adherents who have been painstakingly studying the strange texts of the "secret king of German philosophy" for decades. At the same time, V. V. Bibikhin, after reading the first volume of the collected works, notes in his notes: "The impression is as if some well-wisher wished to translate the late dark, not everyone understands Heidegger into the accepted academic language" ^{[59, p. 472]}. However, Bibikhin himself did not want to offer such a Heidegger to the domestic reader, limiting himself to an abstract for his lecture course. Whatever it was, the merits of A.V. Mikhailov and V. V. Bibikhin are very great, with this remark I do not want to underestimate their really important and very difficult work for their time. Therefore, it is time to return to the actual topic of this conclusion.

Heidegger considers Aristotle as a phenomenologist and integrates his philosophy into his hermeneutics of facticity. On the one hand, it gives great opportunities and opens up the history of philosophy for modernity: you don't need to deal with history, you need to be it! But on the other hand, this is what makes his position very vulnerable, because the actualization of tradition is accomplished by including it in modern problems, which implies a certain violence towards ancient authors. Heidegger reads into Aristotle what his own agenda dictates. Moreover, for himself, Heidegger sets the task of seeing the ancient cosmos through the eyes of Aristotle, which is necessary for the destruction of ontology, or genealogy of existential vocabulary. How successful is it?

From the point of view of the history of philosophy, this work is no more successful than Heidegger's dissertation, which became irrelevant for medieval studies almost immediately after publication, when M. Grabmann showed that "Speculative Grammar" does not belong to Duns Scotus, as previously thought, but to Thomas of Erfurt ^[60] (Heidegger did not know this and built the text of the study accordingly). However, from the point of view of philosophy, apart from historical validity, Heidegger's interpretation is undoubtedly very fruitful and very interesting. Apparently, in this case, the words of J. L. Marion, on whom Heidegger had a huge influence, are appropriate:

"Finally, I do not consider it my duty to enter into a false debate about whether the authors to whom I refer had the "intentions" attributed to them by the interpreter. Thinkers have no intentions, and when they do, they are rarely at the height of their thoughts; the history of philosophy quite convincingly testifies to this. The only criterion of interpretation is its fruitfulness. Everything that gives the opportunity to think does honor to the giver — of course, provided that the one who accepts the gift thinks" ^{[61, p. 12]}.

It is clear that from the point of view of the history of philosophy, such an approach is completely unacceptable. But if we consider it as a free play of thought, as philosophizing, then fruitfulness can serve as a good criterion, if, however, we immediately put everything in its place so that what we want is not given out as real.

In this article, I tried to show that the interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of being, which Heidegger proposed, does not meet the criteria of historical and philosophical research (the extrapolation of Aristotle's ontology to the entire ancient and medieval philosophy is erroneous, as is Heidegger's interpretation of the concept of essence). But as a philosophical gesture, as a certain method, this interpretation gives reason to think and reconsider some existing ideas.