French Soft Power and development policy in Africa under the presidencies of F. Hollande and E. Macron – a comparative analysis (2012-2021)

Khalilova Mariyam Shukhratovna ORCID: 0009-0009-9988-5411 Graduate student, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2 halilovam18@gmail.com

Introduction

The relevance of the research topic lies in the special role of the Fifth Republic in the development of many, especially Francophone, African communities that were once part of the French Colonial Empire. Statistics show that Africa is currently a permanent place of residence for more than a quarter of a million French citizens, and that more than a thousand French companies successfully operate in this territory. Many countries recognize French as the official language, and the number of Africans able to speak it exceeds 60% ^[1]. Due to the above factors, the development of the African region is directly dependent on the successful interaction of African countries and France, and therefore the political strategy chosen by the French government is decisive here: "soft power" or "hard power". From the point of view of French diplomacy, at the moment all world processes are subordinated to the democratic vector in both politics and economics, therefore, the doctrine of "soft power" is the only acceptable tool for progressive countries to influence their partners. This leads to the active use of "soft power" methods in the foreign policy of any state, including the French Republic.

However, in the case of France's foreign policy towards Africa, it is possible to observe not so much the hybridization of "hard" and "soft power" as neocolonial trends that are realized at the expense of the concepts described above. As one of the main European sponsors of the ODA program, the French Government is effectively making Africa dependent on its financial flows. Cultural influence can also be regarded as a way of directly influencing African political elites and, as a result, strengthening their presence in African countries.

In this study, the author adheres to the neoliberal school in the theory of international relations using a number of general scientific principles and methods due to the fact that the very concept of "soft power" presupposes indirect, cultural and educational influence, which is based on the promotion of certain institutional and value foundations, which corresponds to the neoliberal paradigm. The author used principles such as historicism, authenticity, objectivity and consistency. The principle of historicism made it possible to analyze the main vectors of France's foreign policy towards Africa in their development, to identify cause-and-effect relationships in the evolution of France's approaches to solving certain tasks in terms of promoting French "soft power". The principle of objectivity allows us to consider historical facts from the point of view of objective patterns, based on confirmed facts. The principle of reliability allowed us to be based on facts, their reliable content, which is important when studying conflict situations and obstacles to the implementation of French "soft power". A systematic approach was used to consistently study the role of France in Africa. The systematic approach proves that all processes and events not only have a causal relationship, but are also in constant contact with each other, which leads to their mutual influence on each other and ultimately leads to the emergence of a qualitatively new system.

"Soft power" as a tool for ensuring national security

The post-industrial era not only replaced science and information as the main production resource, but also modified the system of international relations, which was supplemented with such a foreign policy tool as "soft power". This term first appeared in scientific periodicals thanks to the American political scientist Joseph Nye in the second half of the 1980s. in contrast to the policy of "hard power", which implied military and economic coercion in matters of achieving political goals. J. Nye writes that "soft power is forcing others to want the results you would like to get" ^{[2, p. 7]}. Thus, "soft power" implies the ability to successfully influence allies and opponents using political tools attractive to the opposite side. The advantages of cultural influence and the implementation of the policy of "soft power" are especially vividly reflected in the example of France.

The French Republic effectively uses culture and language to protect and promote national interests. For France, the historian and researcher of international relations I. V. Chernov writes, "there is an inextricable link between the cultural agenda and national interests in foreign policy" ^{[3, 165]}. Thus, thanks to the competent policy of "soft power" and, in particular, Francophonie, France ensures its presence in territories that are of geopolitical interest to it. Moreover, the promotion of the French language is successfully taking place not only in the Maghreb countries, which were once French colonies, but also in countries that do not have a direct historical connection with the Fifth Republic - in Belgium, Canada, Switzerland ^{[4, 419]}. Also, the popularization of French culture and language serves as a solution to the long-term problem of terrorism and the integration of migrants, most of whom come from the Maghreb countries. Moreover, such a vector of "soft policy" allows France, in the absence of "hard power" tools, to maintain a dominant position in African countries. Thus, the indirect, culturological impact that the concept of "soft power" offers can not only help protect national interests, but also ensure strategic autonomy on the global political scene.

Analysis of the transformation of "soft power" into "diplomacy of influence" and its role in strengthening the position of the Fifth Republic in global governance

The classical concept of "soft power", which implies the ability to successfully influence political partners and opponents not through coercion and force, but with the help of cultural, economic and political instruments of influence, within the framework of the French geopolitical and diplomatic paradigm was transformed into "diplomacy of influence" (French "diplomatie d'influence"). For the first time, this term appeared on the pages of the "White Paper on French Foreign and European Policy for 2008-2020" ^[5], published in June 2008, during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. The authors of the White Paper, including Special Adviser to the French Minister of Defense Jean-Claude Mallet, appeal not only to the increasing threats (terrorism, cyber threats, natural and man-made disasters) that the era of globalization has brought with it and which require more coordinated cooperation between countries, but also to the problem of the emergence of new poles of influence, in particular in particular, in the Middle East and Asian regions ^{[5, p. 3]}. These new centers threaten to undermine France's role both in the global political arena and in the international market, and the Fifth Republic risks being on the periphery of the global economy. All the above-described risks, according to the authors, reveal the need for the Fifth Republic to return to NATO structures and develop the potential of counterintelligence special services ^{[5, p. 4]}. The authors of the White Paper also proclaim the need for a new political vector – "diplomacy of influence", which would be based on the ubiquitous presence of the French agenda in the media, the Internet, the corporate culture of French multinational companies, in the economic and political spheres ^{[5, p. 5]}. Maurice Weiss, a French historian who specializes in international relations and In matters of national security, he writes that such a modernized strategy, which appears to be a symbiosis of cultural, humanitarian, political, economic, social, informational and innovative technological influence, will contribute to strengthening the role of France in world governance ^{[6, p. 425]}.

The famous French journalist and political scientist Frederic Martel, who concurrently hosts a radio show with the revealing title "Soft Power", in an attempt to distinguish between these two concepts, comes to the conclusion that their difference lies in the figure of the main actor of such a policy. The traditional strategy of "soft power" is primarily implemented through the initiatives of the private sector, civil society, and individuals and assumes the absence of direct government intervention and a high level of autonomy, while the French "diplomacy of influence" implies the direct and active participation of the public sector, which is primarily represented by the diplomatic corps ^{[7, p. 71]}. So, "diplomacy of influence" definitely covers much more spheres of life and direct actors than the North American strategy of "soft power".

The strategy of "diplomacy of influence" is being implemented especially intensively in the countries of the African continent. Due to the fact that about a third of modern African States are former French colonies, they still retain the predominance of the French language. French is recognized as an official language in 21 African countries ^[8]. According to research by the International Organization of la Francophonie, by 2050 90% of Africans aged 15-19 years will be French-speaking ^{[9, p. 16]}. Despite such an impressive cultural and linguistic advantage, which already provides a higher trade turnover and can potentially guarantee successful military-technical cooperation, the Fifth Republic, after the publication of the White Paper in 2008, actively continued its policy of "soft power" in Africa: French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "Francophonie will be at the head of the French diplomatic agenda" and expressed the need to promote "digital francophonie" ^{[10, p. 132]}, which would correspond to the spirit of modern information technologies and encourage young people to study and actively use the French language. So, in 2011, the Government established a network of French institutes at French Embassies, which, in addition to organizing the educational process, select talented foreign students to study in France and conduct various cultural and educational events. In the countries of the African continent, the work of institutions is accompanied by the activities of the public organization Alliance Francaise, which, as of 2022, operates in 133 countries ^[11].

Also, as part of the "diplomacy of influence", the "initiative for distance learning of French-speaking teachers" was launched ^[12], and the academic exchange program received a new round of development - according to data for 2015. The walls of French universities have received more than 450 thousand African students ^[13]. These measures seek to form political elites loyal to France in Africa as a long-term goal. Following the concept of "diplomacy of influence", the French government also included information and economic levers of influence: with the help of state subsidies, French-language media appeared in the global information space (TV5, RFI, CFI, France 24), as well as on the territory of African Francophone countries, France sponsored the mass construction of cinemas in which a quota for screening was introduced French-made films. Thus, in 2007-2013, the viewing of French films by Africans doubled ^{[14, p. 28]}.

Thus, it can be concluded that the strategy of "diplomacy of influence", the spectrum of which covers almost all spheres of public life, has played a decisive role in foreign policy since the time of Sh. De Gaulle, who did not consider it necessary to reduce the instruments of influence exclusively to cultural and educational ones.

Fundamentals of the foreign policy course of the Government of F. Hollande (2012-2017) and E. Macron (2017-2021) in Africa

France's foreign policy strategy in Africa was outlined by F. Hollande at the stage of the election race: in 2012, the Socialist Party, from which the future president was nominated, published a policy document outlining the basic principles of the future development of diplomatic relations between France and African countries. In it F. Hollande, like all his predecessors, starting with F. Mitterrand promised to finally put an end to the neo-colonial policy of Francafric. The document also emphasized increasing the transparency of financial assistance and a radical reorientation from "hard power" tools to "soft power" methods, the functionality of which would ensure not only sustainable democratic development of African countries, but also security and stability in the region ^{[15, p. 23]}. Later, researchers from the Paris Institute of International Relations A. Leboeuf and H. This is how Cuno-Suare formulated the three pillars on which F.'s African policy was based and developed. Hollande ^{[16, p. 2-3]}.

The first one boils down to the slogan "Africa to Africans", voiced by the President himself during his first visit to Senegal in 2012. This thesis highlights the final transition from paternalism to an active economic and political partnership between the Fifth Republic and Africa and reinforces the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the African region. Unlike his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, who repeatedly focused on the lack of a proper level of statehood and independence in African countries, F. Hollande emphasized that Africa is the "cradle of humanity" ^[17] and, therefore, the legitimate successor of all the political benefits he created. The second fulcrum of African politics is F. Hollande began to actively support the state system in the face of domestic political threats such as terrorism and destructive opposition activities. It is this foreign policy dimension, which will be discussed in detail in the next paragraph, that has been most developed during Hollande's presidency. The last pillar is enhanced economic and cultural cooperation, which is evidence of presidential preferences in favor of tools of modernized "soft power", or in other words, tools of "influence diplomacy".

A striking innovation in the construction of a rethought African policy during the government of F. Hollande was involved in the administrative restructuring of the department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for the African direction. Thus, the staff of this unit under Hollande was limited to a political adviser, whose position was taken by Helene de Gaulle, who for a long time studied the specifics of the world order of the countries of English-speaking Africa, and his deputy. Such personnel changes, as well as an active negotiation process with all African leaders, indicated the President's clear intention to expand the sphere of French influence beyond the African French-speaking community and establish both political and economic ties with English-speaking African countries such as, for example, South Africa and Nigeria, which are responsible for a large share of regional GDP.

In 2013, the Franco-African summit, which had previously been an ordinary meeting of the metropolis with the leaders of its colonies, brought together more than 40 heads of State of continental Africa and put global issues on the agenda - the problem of security and sustainable development of the entire region. At this summit, for the first time, the issue of creating an independent and Western-independent rapid reaction force within the framework of the African Union, which would make it possible to quickly stop crisis situations on the continent ^{[18, p. 519]}.

The foundations of E. Macron's foreign policy in the African direction became a logical continuation of his predecessor's policy: the newly elected president similarly emphasized reducing both the political and military presence of France in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. In his speech in November 2017, which took place at one of the universities of Burkino Faso ^[19], the leader outlined his intention from now on to continue to conduct a dialogue with Africa on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of the interests of all parties. In practical terms, E. Macron planned to reinforce the theses expressed, at least by making public secret documents of the special services and, at most, by completing the military operation "Barkhan", which would stimulate the governments of the Sahel Five countries to independently ensure stability and security in their countries.

In his dogmatic speeches on potential policy in Africa, E. Macron paid special attention to the French language and "Francophonie", which for a long time have been one of the main mechanisms of "soft power" for the Fifth Republic. In 2018, speaking at the summit of the International Organization of la Francophonie, the French leader emphasized the merits of African countries in internationalizing and expanding the spheres of influence of the French language ^[20]. This role cannot be overestimated, and therefore African citizens should become full participants in the further promotion of the French language and, as a result, French culture, which would jointly acquire the status of a "culture of creation". As a reinforcement of the stated theses, Paris supported the appointment of L. Mushikiwabo, a native of Rwanda, as the new Secretary General of the OIF. The final evidence of the reorientation of the paternalistic vector towards a balanced partnership was the decision to gradually abandon the use of the West African CFA franc and the abolition of the condition for storing half of the foreign exchange reserves of West African countries in the Central Bank of France, which obviously aims to provide the former French colonies with more economic freedom and independence ^[21]. However, it should be noted that the former currency should be replaced by a new "eco", which, despite its significant name, will also be linked to the euro.

Summarizing the above, both presidents in their policy speeches postulated the idea of restarting Franco-African relations: both Macron and Hollande stressed that African countries are no longer the "pré carré" of France, and therefore relations with them should be based on mutually beneficial partnership. France should act not as a gendarme of the African continent, but as a guide who would contribute to the sustainable political and economic development of the Black continent. As noted by experts on the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic K.P. Zueva and P.P. Timofeev: such a rethought approach will probably allow the French government to avoid accusations from the world community of the revival of colonialism and at the same time maintain its influence in the region ^{[22, p. 85]}. Nevertheless, such a foreign policy in Africa, outlined by the latest French leaders, if fully implemented, is still fraught with a loss of authority that other states such as the United States, China and Russia can intercept. Recently, these major political players have a strong interest in this region, which is rich in both natural and human resources. The French government is well aware of the increasing competition, which leads to the preservation of France's military presence on the continent.

The fight against terrorism as the basis of F.'s security policy Hollande

Despite the declared policy of non-interference, France during the presidency of F. Hollande, driven by her own pragmatic economic and political interests, continued to actively interfere in the internal affairs of African countries. It is important to note that the intervention was not limited to standard diplomatic levers of influence, and even more so to the policy of "soft power". The French contingent took an active military part in eliminating the terrorist threat on the continent, which was imaginary somewhere, and in some matters extremely real. The official motivation of the Fifth Republic, which was to ensure the stability of states vulnerable to external shocks (English: "fragile states"), was considered by many experts as a disguise for the ongoing neo-colonialism in Africa. So, the French political scientist J. Batu described the African policy of F. Hollande as a "failed humanitarian mission of the left forces", emphasizing the inconsistency of the president's programmatic sayings with his real activities in the region ^[23].

The White Paper published in 2013 focused on reducing military spending ^{[24, p. 160]}, which led to a reduction in the permanent French contingent and military bases in African countries: according to 2017 data, the number of French military personnel in countries such as Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, Ivory Coast, on average, it decreased by 2.5-3 times ^[25].

This policy fit neatly into the given F. At the beginning of his presidency, Hollande set the "Africa for Africans" policy, which implied not only greater independence in the political sphere, but also in the defense sphere. However, the wave of terrorist attacks that swept the region, and then spread to Europe, became a legitimate basis for France to conduct a military operation in the Sahel region. Terrorist attacks, such as the hostage-taking in 2013 in Algeria in the natural gas production zone, were fraught not only with economic losses, but also with human losses - mostly French employees of the mining company were taken hostage. Terrorist acts in France itself, the number of which reached 10 in the period from 2012-2017, were a direct threat to the national security of France itself. The Government of F. Hollande decided to launch a series of military operations on the African continent. In 2013, the French leadership launched two military operations: Serval in Mali (2013-2014), which aimed to support the central government in the fight against the ultra-Islamist separatist movement, and Sangaris in the CAR (2013-2016), which involved combating terrorist and looting acts of opposition blocs. It is important to note that Operation Serval was not directly authorized by the UN Security Council - it was assumed that a military operation in Mali could take place only having the character of an international operation and only under the auspices of African governments ^{[26, p. 9]}. However, the French side motivated the introduction of troops by the fact that in this way it performs the role of a mediator in the interaction between the state authorities, the separatists and international organizations. In 2014, the Malian operation Serval, due to the lack of significant success, turned into a full-scale counter-terrorism operation Barkhan (2014- present), which has already covered the entire Sahel region - Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, which have already suffered. In addition to military operations, Paris during the presidency of F. Hollande, having decided to strengthen his position as a guarantor of security both inside the country and in Africa, began the fight against the Nigerian terrorist organization Boko Haram.

Thus, despite the fact that the African policy of F. Hollande fits into the framework of his second thesis on ensuring security in the region - in fact, in Mali and in the CAR, France contributed to the preservation of territorial and state integrity, it completely denies his concept of African autonomy and independence and reduces French foreign policy mainly to instruments of "hard power", which resemble typical methods of colonial policy.

The dilemma of the nationalist and rationalist foundations of "soft power" in Africa during the presidency of E. Macron

The activities of President E. Macron in Africa, despite the ongoing military operation in the Sahel region, have shown themselves to be more balanced. While his predecessor, F. Hollande, despite the economic cooperation agreements signed, for example, with a number of African countries, could not achieve high-quality results due to excessive emphasis on military operations, Macron paid special attention to diversifying relations with Africa. Economic cooperation received a new impetus and the mechanisms of the "soft power" policy were significantly expanded. In addition to the indicated steps – the introduction of African representatives into the structures of the MOF, the abolition of the CFA, the abolition of the requirement to keep 50% of all reserves in the Central Bank of France, the publication of secret archival data, the French leader also launched a program to return African cultural values to their historical homeland, which aims to smooth out the painful moments of the joint past and be a kind of indicator of France's recognition of its mistakes and her aspirations to build relationships on an equal and mutually beneficial basis from now on. In 2020, as part of this program, France ratified the law on the restitution of cultural heritage sites of the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Benin ^[27]. In addition, Paris actively advocated a review of the deadlines for debt payments by African countries, arguing for a significant disparity in economic well-being between the Black continent and developed countries ^[28], and also actively supported the initiative to accelerate access to funds to combat COVID-19 for developing countries.

Within the framework of the France—Africa summit, which took place in October 2021 and in continuation of the tradition laid down by F. Hollande brought together representatives (it is important to note that there were no statesmen at the summit, among those present were large entrepreneurs, representatives of civil society and the intellectual elite of African countries) In both Francophone and English-speaking Africa, a number of measures have been developed to promote the development of a democratic progressive society with a sustainable economy ^[29]. First, it was decided to provide French financial support in the amount of $30 million to non-profit organizations that would promote democratic values and stand up for them. Secondly, the goal was set to revive the Digital Africa project to support young and ambitious African startups and small businesses. Thirdly, it was agreed to open the "House of African Peace and Diasporas", which would become a cultural hub and mecca for African migrants and all those interested in a peculiar and vibrant African culture.

The military vector of French policy in Africa during the presidency of E. Macron ceased to be a central component of African policy. Nevertheless, Operation Barkhan in the Sahel region is still ongoing. Despite the new strategic plan codenamed "three D", which are responsible for protection, diplomacy and development (French: "Défense, Diplomatie, Développement"), the French side did not witness any visible successes – in 2020-2021, two coups d'etat took place in Mali, despite the efforts of French diplomats and the military. The lack of stability in the region began to outweigh all the victories of French troops over terrorist cells, which attracted new players to the region, who, in the opinion of the heads of state of the Sahel Five, would be more effective in ensuring stability. Thus, Russian private military campaigns began to actively act as stabilizers in the region. Paris reacted extremely negatively to such modifications, which indicates that France's paternalistic tendencies in the African region still persist. Going beyond the scope of the study, in February 2022 it became known that Paris intended to withdraw its military units from Mali. The thesis of the activation of neo-colonial policy also demonstrates that the Fifth Republic actively contributed to the arrival of a government loyal to it in Gabon by severely suppressing the opposition movement ^[29]. A similar situation developed in Côte d'Ivoire: France did not express any doubts about the legitimacy of the re-election of its protege A. Ouattara for a third term and facilitated the elimination of all dissenters ^[29].

Summarizing the above, it can be concluded that E. Macron's African policy took into account the mistakes of F.'s political course. Hollande has placed greater emphasis on the development of "soft power" tools, which is not only a modern, but also a humane way to expand its spheres of influence. Under Macron, assistance to African countries has shifted from an exclusively military plane to a cultural and economic one.

Conclusion

Thus, in a comparative analysis of African politics, F. Hollande and E. Macron can conclude that, despite the almost complete identity of the initially announced political programs for the development of relations with African countries, the practical activities of the two presidents differed significantly. While F. Hollande focused on ensuring security in the region, which resulted in an active French military presence in the Sahel region and limited its political tools, E. Macron chose a more balanced path of development. Inheriting the military conflicts of his predecessor and not denying them as an important component of French influence in the region, E. Macron placed special emphasis on the development of economic and cultural cooperation.

F. Hollande failed to achieve the same results due to the energy consumption of military operations. Moreover, the tools of "soft power" in the context of active military intervention in the political fate of African states turned out to be simply superfluous. During the presidency of E. Macron, the situation on the military front has changed somewhat, new major players such as Russia have appeared, which have seized control levers. Consequently, the French leader, driven solely by rational and pragmatic interests, was forced to resort to other ways to strengthen France's position in Africa. Thanks to his "soft" measures, Paris embarked on the path of eliminating a shared traumatic past and began to interact not so much with the corrupt and totalitarian African elite, but with young people and people who are actually responsible for the political and economic development of the region.