Some aspects of F. Brentano's ontology and its influence on the philosophy of M. Heidegger

Gaginskii Aleksei Mikhailovich ORCID: 0000-0001-9412-9064 PhD in Philosophy Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, Moscow, Goncharnaya str., 12/1, office 412 algaginsky@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

As F. Volpi noted at the time, thanks to Franz Brentano's dissertation "On the ambiguity of Things according to Aristotle" (see: ^[3],[4]), Stagirite's research has reached a new level: "Brentano's dissertation, therefore, is crucial for the interpretation of Aristotle's teaching on categories, not least because that after this work, published in 1862, in the secondary literature on the interpretation of genesis, Aristotle has almost a century-long break" ^{[6, p. 256]}. In addition, in the future, Brentano will use the theoretical resources of scholasticism, including in his empirical psychology the topic of intentional inexistence (intentionale Inexistenz), as a result of which very fruitful directions of philosophical searches arise in the Brentano school (for more information, see: ^{[7],[8],[9],[10],[11],[12]}). As R. A. Gromov writes in this regard: "Brentano proves that the subject area of true judgments, and therefore the field of scientific knowledge, is not limited by the framework of reality, the object and correlate of a true judgment can be not only real things, understood as a thing. This theory became the most important source of a long series of new ontological projects that will arise in the Brentanov school at the turn of the century — the theory of Minong subjects, Husserl's formal ontology, the concepts of Sachverhalt by Stumpf, Marty, Twardowski. All these concepts can be called new types of ontology, in them the object of research will no longer be what really exists as such — the object of traditional metaphysics, but all possible objects of scientific knowledge, they will affirm the diversity of forms of being, they will refuse to identify the subject area of science with reality and develop qualitatively new morphologies of objects" ^{[2, c. LII–LIII]}. There can hardly be any doubt that Heidegger's ontology was formed precisely by this movement: the German philosopher knew well and thoroughly thought through these "new types of ontology", and we are talking not only about Husserl, which is quite obvious, but also need to pay attention to the discussion about ens rationis in the Brentano school, which influenced Heidegger's philosophy.

In short, the essence of this discussion is that the students of F. Brentano, such as A. Hoefler and A. Mainong, K. Tvardovsky and E. Husserl, on the basis of the "rediscovery" of intentionality and clarification of the question of being, which includes the problematics of , began to develop an ontology of mental being (ens rationis), or what was called intentional being (esse intentionale), object being (esse objectivum). (The latter concept is often referred to as "objective being", which introduces considerable confusion, as a result of which, following G. V. Vdovina, I prefer to convey it precisely as an object being, i.e. being as an object of reason, and not an objective being external to the subject; more about esse objectivum: ^[13]). In the most vivid and partly even provocative form, this ontology was presented in the developments of A. Mainong, which caused an extremely negative reaction from Brentano. The fact is that Brentano was originally a supporter of empirical philosophy and in accordance with this methodological attitude, as well as following the scholastic commentatorial tradition, already in his dissertation in 1862, he accepted the concept of o (essence, substance, thing, reality) as the main meaning of existence, while he considered the meaning of as secondary and derivative — "it, like being as an incoming, is not suitable for scientific development" ^{[4, p. 53, 241-242]}. Brentano was quite consistent in his views, and therefore always remained a supporter of empiricism and realism, which, of course, did not prevent him from studying the theory of cognition and the problems of intentional inexistence. However, after getting acquainted with some of the views of his students, he was confused, because he did not expect that his developments could lead so far from his own views. Already after A. Hoefler formulated the difference between the content and the immanent object ^{[14, p. VII]}, and K. Tvardovsky, E. Husserl and A. Mainong published their extensive studies in which a new philosophical direction was developed ^{[15],[16],[17]}, Brentano in a letter to his faithful disciple A. Marty expresses bewilderment about the development of his developments: "What you report regarding Hefler's words about the "content" and "immanent object" of the representation seems to me extremely strange. <...> I protest, therefore, against the nonsense attributed to me" ^{[18, p. 145-146]}. But it was too late: the research program of new types of ontology had fully developed by that time and the direction of rheism, which Brentano began to develop as an updated version of his ontology, could no longer change anything (more about rheism: ^[19],[20]).

In order to clarify how this issue influenced subsequent philosophy, including Heidegger, it is necessary to consider Brentano's views in more detail. It is worth noting that the topic of "Heidegger and Brentano" has not been studied as well as one might expect. There is an unspoken opinion that Heidegger is not of great interest to Brentan studies, and Brentano is not for Heidegger studies. As an illustrative example, we can refer to the fact that T. Sheehan, a very conscientious Heidegger scholar, considering in his recent book the early Heidegger and the influence of Aristotle on him, does not even mention Brentano ^[21]. The most thorough study of this topic was published half a century ago and has not been discussed in detail since then (see: ^[22]). In Russian science, there are only formulaic mentions that the question of the meaning of being was awakened by Heidegger thanks to Brentano's dissertation, but I could not find at least some developed research on this topic (the attention of researchers is focused on the topic "Heidegger and Husserl", which is quite understandable, of course).

Meanwhile, the question of Brentano's influence on Heidegger is not as unambiguous as it seems at first glance. In particular, the Romanian historian of philosophy J. Tenesescu claims that Heidegger misinterpreted Brentano. He writes, in particular: "If Heidegger's analysis of the categorical being and its four meanings in Aristotle can be clearly linked with Brentano's reflections on this in his dissertation, then it is difficult to find any indication that Brentano's interpretation of the veritative being in his first essay played any role in Heidegger's discussion of the same problem.". Despite the fact that the existence of the copula is the central theme of Brentano's reflections on existence as true in Aristotle, and an entire chapter in Heidegger's “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” is directly called “The Existence of the Copula”, the latter does not mention Brentano in a single word. I interpret this as an indication that, in relation to this problem, both young thinkers still initially held two fundamentally different metaphysical positions. In addition, Brentano developed the question of the homonymy of being much further than Aristotle in the direction of the medieval "simply existing objectly in the spirit" — a direction that cannot be found in Heidegger and which at the same time indicates that Brentano was influenced by both Thomas Aquinas and the neo-scholastic literature of his time" ^{[23, p. VIII]}. Voicing this point of view, J. Tenesescu does not take into account Heidegger's early works, in which the influence of Brentano is very clearly manifested, whereas the noted silence in the "Main Problems of Phenomenology" fully corresponds to the methodology once outlined by Heidegger in the margins of his manuscript: "Do not stick out thoughts that were thought by others!" ^{[24, p. 50]}. From the early works of J. Tenesescu discusses only the paragraph criticizing the doctrine of Brentano's judgment in Heidegger's dissertation ^{[23, pp. 127-131]}, and of course it is useless to look for parallels in the texts of the middle period. In this regard, it is sometimes very difficult to trace someone's influence on Heidegger, but this does not mean that it was reduced to zero. To carry out a detailed analysis and comparison of the positions of Brentano and Heidegger would require much more volume than the article can afford, nevertheless, some important points need to be fixed (Volpi's book remains the most thorough research so far: ^[22]). These include, in particular, the interpretation of truth and the associated understanding of being in Heidegger. In a word, the Romanian researcher's statement seems extremely doubtful: "If the analysis carried out here is correct, then the concept of truth outlined by Brentano in his dissertation did not play any role at all (gar keine Rolle) in the formation of Heidegger's concept of truth" ^{[23, pp. 128-129]}. It will be shown below that this is by no means the case.

Aristotle and the basic meaning of Being

The epigraph to Brentano's dissertation was the famous phrase of Aristotle: — existence affects in many ways, or it is said about existence in different ways, existence is ambiguous ^{[25, p. 1028a10]}. This key thesis, perhaps, could become an epigraph to the collected works of Heidegger. According to Aristotle, whose methodology is reproduced by Brentano, "every science begins with an explanation of its object," but in the case of the first philosophy, the situation is different:

"... it, as a higher science, not obeying any other and, moreover, standing above all of them and pointing out their subject to them, cannot receive a definition of its object from any other science... its object admits definition in the proper sense least of all others. After all, an entity taken in general is not a species for which it would be possible to specify a genus and a distinctive feature (Differenz). Moreover, Aristotle, as we will see later, does not even agree that existence should be called a genus" ^{[4, p. 8-9]}.

Heidegger justifies the advantage of the question of being in a similar way: since being is something ultimate, it cannot be brought under any domain or category, the question of being is an a priori condition of all sciences, as well as all possible ontologies ("Being and Time", § 3). Therefore, it is necessary to approach the question of being differently, says Brentano, as Aristotle does: "So, here we should look for another way to reveal its meaning; Aristotle does so, establishing various meanings that cover, according to his observations, the name of being, separating proper meanings from non-proper ones (die eigentlichen von den uneigentlichen) and excluding the latter from metaphysical consideration" ^{[4, p. 9]}. The next step is to distinguish between different linguistic expressions, between synonyms and homonyms, since "the difficulty of identifying homonymy (Homonymie) increases with the growth of abstractness and generality of the concept, and therefore the possibility of error should be greatest in the case of the this, as we have already seen, is the most general predicate" ^{[4, p. 10]}. This is the formulation of the question, followed by a very detailed analysis of the various meanings of existence. Nevertheless, one important methodological detail should be noted: "The dissertation has the form of a historical and philosophical reconstruction, but, in essence, Brentano, relying on the teachings of the Stagirite, develops his own justification of metaphysics, integrating Aristotle's ideas into an actual philosophical discussion" ^{[2, p. XLV]}. Indeed, Brentano works not only as a historian of philosophy, although his research is carried out at the highest level, but also as an independent philosopher, weaving his own ideas into the material, many of which were drawn from the medieval commentatorial tradition, primarily from Thomas Aquinas. As he later recalled: "First of all, I had to become a master's disciple. But since I was born when philosophy was in the most deplorable decline, I could not find anyone better than the old Aristotle. In order to understand him, which is not always easy, I resorted to the help of Thomas Aquinas" ^{[26, p. 291]}.

According to Brentano's interpretation, Aristotle identifies four meanings: 1) existing as accidents, 2) existing as true, 3) existing in possibility and in reality, 4) existing according to the figures of categories. And although points 1 and 4 are related, since what exists in the sense of accidents is expressed precisely with the help of categories, with the exception of the first (this is clearly seen in the diagrams drawn by Brentano, see: ^{[4, p. 197, 199]}), nevertheless, Aristotle himself identifies exactly four meanings:

"Since about things in General (... ) referred to in many values ( ), of which ^[1] one is, as mentioned, is that exists as a parallel ( ); ^[2] other — things as true ( ), as well as non-existence as false ( ); in addition, ^[3] there are shapes of categories ( ), for example, stoinost, kakovosti, SKOLKOVO, glasnost, Magdacesti ( , , , , ), and some others, which are marked thus; in addition, ^[4] more — things of the possibility and reality ( )" ^{[25, c. 1026a34–b1]}.

In the corresponding four chapters of the dissertation, Brentano analyzes each of these values. A fundamentally important methodological feature of his approach was that he sought to find in Aristotle one meaning (die leitende Grundbedeutung, in Heidegger's language) that would most correspond to the concept of being. In fact, if a single multivalued same as being what Aristotle says repeatedly ^{[25, c. 1004a22, 1005a7, 1018a35–36, 1052a15, 1054a13–16, 1061b12]}, and various kinds of unity back to one ^{[25, c. 1005a6–8]}, it follows, as a single being, the essence gerolymatos ^{[25, c. 1003b22–25]}, and in Genesis it is possible to allocate a certain base value, which ultimately back the rest. This is exactly how Aristotle argues in "Metaphysics" when he says that the various meanings of existence relate to one basic:

"About things said in different ways ( ), but in relation to one and only one nature ( ), and not the homonymous ( ), but, for example, and all of them are healthy in relation to health… And things affects multivalued ( ), but always in relation to one early ( )" ^{[25, c. 1003a33–b6]}.

It is the question of which of the meanings of existence is the original and how the others correspond to it that becomes fundamental for Brentano (and subsequently for Heidegger). (In Aristotelian studies, the question of the focal meaning of being is still being discussed: ^{[27],[28],[29]}, on the relevance of this topic in the context of analytical philosophy: ^[30]). The fact is that traditionally, from the Middle Ages to the present, the question of the unity of being was solved through the concept of analogy, which assumes the central meaning of essence ( ). Of course, there were reasons for this, because Aristotle himself repeatedly said that among all the meanings of existence, the essence is the main one:

"So, about the primary being ( ) and what are all the other categories being ( ), — of the essence, and now it is written (because other things to be affected according to the concept of the essence... ( )" ^{[25, c. 1045b27–30]}; "...the essence of the original is things, not some things, but things in General ( ' ? )" ^{[25, c. 1028à30–31]}; "And now before, and always sought, always causing trouble: "what exists" means "what is the essence" ( , ? )" ^{[25, c. 1028b2–5]}.

For this reason, already in the Middle Ages, Aristotle was credited with the view that the essence is just die leitende Grundbedeutung, to which the other meanings of existence relate by analogy. The subject matter of analogia entis itself becomes extremely important for medieval ontology and then for neo-scholasticism up to our time (see: ^[31],[32]). In accordance with this traditional understanding, it is the essence, Brentano believes, that should be recognized as the main meaning of existence, because it is the substance that is the essence par excellence. In the conclusion of the dissertation research F. Brentano writes:

"The topic of this work can be considered exhausted. We gradually ascended from less being to what is called being in the proper sense of the word. Of the four main meanings of , the most important is that according to which is divided into figures of categories. But since in the course of the last chapter it was shown that all categories bear their name in connection with one being (ein Sein), in connection with the being of the first category, and the rest are more about being than being (eines Seienden als ein Seiendes), then it is substance that is essentially being, which is not just there something, but it is there; and since the “first” is spoken of in different senses, then of all things, it is substance that is the first in every sense, both in concept and in cognition and in time. Its being is the term in relation to which the analogy of everything else is established, just as health is the term in relation to which everything healthy is called healthy ..." ^{[3, p. 219]}.

This conclusion is extremely important in the context of the subsequent discussion about ens rationis, since theology is at the foundation of Brentanov's rheism. For if the basic meaning of being is essence, then ontology is the ontology of essence, i.e. things, because essence is understood as something concrete. Thus, for Brentano, die leitende Grundbedeutung is an o that forms a unity with reality, or , because both "have a being outside the spirit", which corresponds to his empirical attitude ^{[4, pp. 55-56]}.

Heidegger, on the contrary, saw the dubiousness of such an interpretation quite early. As F. observes Volpi: "Quite quickly he rejected Brentano's thesis that the fundamental meaning is the meaning of substance and, thus, categories, thereby rejecting the idea that being can be interpreted in the sphere of categorical, and in the 1920s Heidegger matured to the conviction that this basis should rather be sought in being understood as true, i.e., as truth is not logical-epistemological, but ontological" ^{[33, pp. 43-44]}. The fact is that Heidegger was influenced by phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, which suggested a different ontology, built with the help of and very far from Brentano's positivism and empiricism ^[34].

In fact, you may notice that the existence of Aristotle does not mean a thing and not reduced to the essence, as "being nothing is not the essence, for being not a genus ( ?' · )" ^{[35, c. 92b10–14]}, moreover, "a single or things may not be of the essence of things ( )" ^{[25, c. 1040b18–19]}. In other words, the essence is the being of a thing, but being is not the essence, being is not at all (for more details: ^{[36, p. 10-50]}; Brentano, although he outlines such a statement of the question, but essentially misses it: ^{[22, p. 47-73]}). In this regard , I will allow myself to quote here a rather large and very important quote from the article by F. Volpi, which reveals the Heideggerian direction of Aristotle's interpretation:

"After Aristotle argues diverse sasivimol things, he adds, . This means that categories (and other meanings of being) serve to denote various existential ways and levels of “reality”, however, they must always be associated with this reality, i.e. with the reality of o, which is, so to speak, of all possible predications. Being is multiple and multi-valued in exactly the same way as objects and objects. As they always have their uniformity in objectivity and objectivity, so being is based on being (so beruhen Seiende auf Sein). But being itself is not an entity, just as subjectivity is not an object (Sein selbst ist aber, wie Gegenst?ndlichkeit kein Gegenstand, kein Seiendes). Being is not “is" (Sein “ist” nicht). For Aristotle, being only holds beings together in their being and unity (die Seienden in ihrer Seiendheit und Einheit). But to the extent that being is separated from individual beings and hypostatized, it is an abstraction. On the contrary, existence is “indefinite” to the extent that it is not expressed in its multiplicity through categorical definitions. Being as indefinite and being as hypostasis express practically nothing. Aristotle says: , . This is what Brentano calls the co-signifying function of being (synsemantische Funktion des Seienden), i.e. the function of being as a bundle in an utterance. Being only with separate entities becomes equivocal. Otherwise, being is unique to itself. Its uniqueness is not unconditional, but it is such that it carries with it the possibility of explication in equivocal values (in ?quivoke Bedeutungen). This indefinite unity is not yet differentiated. For Aristotle, being names something as long as it is perceived as something, as being, in a substantial sense, as being subject to investigation . The ambiguity of being is nothing but a linguistic form of reflection of the ambiguity and multilevel nature of the world of existence, phenomena in their various concretisations and realizations. Although the meanings of being are , the intentionality of being—meanings (die Intentionalit?t der Seinsbedeutungen) is always directed at reality. Being as the first concept and ut commune omnibus refers to a categorically not yet differentiated reality. Therefore, it is the most general concept, as Heidegger reminds us in the introduction to "Being and Time" ^{[6, pp. 258-259]}.

Unfortunately, Aristotle himself does not explain what this mysterious being is, which affects everything ( ) ^{[25, p. 998b20]} and at the same time is nothing of existence. In essence, the question of being as such is not articulated by Aristotle: he distinguishes between the meanings of being, points out what unites them, identifies different meanings of the verb "to be" and its substantive form, but does not further develop this problem, since for a Stagirite being names something concrete, but as such it is it remains an empty abstraction, as F. rightly points out. Volpi. In other words, it makes sense only when the existence of being is considered, but not being in itself. As Heidegger will say: "Being is always the being of being" ^{[1, p. 9]}. And if Brentano, a certain way of interpreting Aristotle solves this problem by using the teachings about the nature and categories, thus remaining within reitsma ontology, then Heidegger is seeking an existence, which is not being, or substance, or thing, . Therefore, it is not necessary to reduce Aristotle's ontology to the doctrine of substance too hastily, following the established tradition.

In the course of lectures on Aristotle's "Metaphysics" delivered in the summer semester of 1931, Heidegger will say the following about this:

"However little all this may be clear in the end, we see the direction in which Aristotle positively seeks unity for plurality. And so the unity of the domain of questioning must be determined, i.e., how, according to which is - . However, we remember that Aristotle uses both in a broader and in a narrower sense. What we were talking about just now was in a narrower sense, in which we mean a plurality of categories. All categories, however, together with the first one, constitute only one meaning within the broader as . <...> already in the Middle Ages, it was concluded that the first leading basic meaning of being in general (die erste leitende Grundbedeutung des Seins ?berhaupt) is equal for four ways together, and not just for one and its multiplicity — it is o, which is usually translated as “substance". As if being in possibility, being in reality and being as true should also be reduced to being in the sense of substance. In the XIX century (especially Brentano), they were all the more inclined to this, since at that time being, possible being and actual being, were identified as categories. Therefore, it is widely believed that the Aristotelian doctrine of being is a “doctrine of substance”. This is a mistake, partly resulting from an incomplete interpretation of ; more precisely, they overlooked that only one question was prepared in it. (V. Yeager's reconstruction of Aristotle is also based on this fundamental error)" ^{[37, pp. 45-46]}.

Thus, Heidegger refuses the interpretation of Brentano: not limited to ambiguity categorical statements, which is the essence, but suggests that understanding things, which represents only one of the values. At the same time, Heidegger does not reject the category system, but rethinks it within the framework of existential analytics.: "Existentials and categories are the two main possibilities of existential characteristics. The entity responding to them always requires a different method of initial questioning: the entity is who (existence) or what (cash in the broadest sense)" ^{[1, p. 45]}. Heidegger holds the understanding of being as , but because it brings together and , which reveals who and what exists. In other words, he wants to get away from impersonal categorical analysis, in which existence only exists, but does not exist. Instead, he seems to turn the question inside the person, revealing the temporal nature of his being, as well as combining the categorical and truth values of existence in the concept of Dasein. As F. writes Volpi: "In this sense, the young Heidegger turns Brentano's question about the unity of the manifold into a question about the existence of being. And what if this polysemous entity were existing (vieldeutige Seiende Dasein w?re)? There is a meaning in general for the being that exists (das Dasein ist). The existing one becomes the pivot point of multiple semantic constellations and the manifold sayability of the being thereby increases ad ihifitum in the human-sized being (am daseinsmigen Seienden). The apophantic field of meaning becomes hermeneutical" ^{[6, p. 263]}.

Hence, in Aristotle's , it is not necessary to single out any one meaning, but it is necessary to give space to each of them, taking into account all aspects of this ambiguity. Nevertheless, every ambiguity is comprehended as a kind of unity that grasps and holds the ambiguity of existence, which Heidegger tries to fix by raising the question of the meaning of being. As he recalled afterwards:

"In 1907, my father's friend from my native lands, later Archbishop of Freiburg in Breisgau, Dr. Konrad Graeber, presented me with Franz Brentano's dissertation "On the Ambiguity of Existence according to Aristotle" (1862). Numerous, mostly lengthy Greek quotations replaced the still missing edition of Aristotle, which, however, a year later lay on my desk from the gymnasium library. The question of the unity of the plural in being (nach dem Einfachen des Mannigfachen im Sein), which at that time only vaguely, shakily and helplessly stirred in me, despite many reversals, mistakes and perplexities, remained an unrelenting stimulus for the treatise "Being and Time", which appeared two decades later" ^{[38, p. 56]}.

Heidegger's italics are quite remarkable here, which it would even be more accurate to convey as follows: blieb ... der unabl?ssige Anla? — "remained ... the main unrelenting stimulus." Hence, the question of nach dem Einfachen des Mannigfachen im Sein is central up to "Being and Time". However, as J.-F. Kurtin notes, this question remained valid even after the turn. Despite the fact that Heidegger rejects analogia entis, understanding it not as a solution, but rather as a sign of aporia ^{[1, p. 3]}, in which ancient philosophy and the entire metaphysical tradition following it were locked up, the question of the unity of being persists: "Indeed, right up to the thematization of Ereignis and the History of Being in the second half of the 30s, Heidegger did not abandon the search for unity that could form the basis for the articulation of differentiated meanings, or even broadly differentiated ones. The central question is: “What is the single focus of the meanings of being?”, remains Brentanovsky in its origin, even if Heidegger's answer defining time as the horizon of interpretation of the meaning of being is, of course, completely new. <...> But in a more general sense, does not the very fact of talking about the “meaning” of being or about the meaning of “being” imply from the very beginning the assumption of possible uniqueness? Does the later Heidegger finally abandon this structure of thought when he still emphasizes that Sein or rather Ereignis is a singulare tantum...?" ^{[32, pp. 29-30]}.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the question of welches ist dann die leitende Grundbedeutung, this Stab und Stecken of Heidegger's philosophy, was not forgotten even after the turn of the late 20s, when the search for the meaning of being is replaced by the question of the truth of being, as a result of which Heidegger has to put a lot of effort in order to clarify the nature of , understood as uncovered. This turn looks like something quite natural, since it directly grows out of the problematic of . This should be discussed in more detail.

Being as

According to Aristotle, the concept of truth is v: "true or false is a tangle of thoughts", i.e. the truth is not in things, but in the mind, or in the soul ^{[39, pp. 432a11-12],[25, pp. 1012b8-9, 1027b20-26]}. Nevertheless, it is also one of the meanings of being, i.e. truth is connected with both cognition and being. Aristotle does not speak about the identity of being and truth, but the connection between them is quite obvious: ""Being" and "is" mean true, and "non-being" means not true, but false", "to the extent that something has being, in such and truth" ^{[25, c. 1017a31–32, 993b31]}. In this regard , Aristotle says the following:

"About being and non-being it is said… as true or false for things ( ) means coupling or the disunity, so instinctual () consider disconnected disconnected connected connected and and having the opposite situation [opinion] is fooled… Now, Genesis is being connected and the common and not-being — not being connected, but greater [than one] ( , )" ^{[25, c. 1051a34–b13]}.

It is clear that being and truth here act as complementary concepts. The truth is understood as a bound, bound as one, unified — existence, since existence and uniform — gerolymatos ^{[25, c.1003b22–34]}. Truth takes place when what is connected in reality is also connected in judgment. For example, the judgment "Plato is a man" indicates the unity of the two members of this statement, which in fact are something unified. And if you say "Plato is a horse", then it would mean to connect (in judgment) the disconnected (in reality), i.e. to fall into error, or to say "is" about what is not. This is the traditional understanding of the truth, understood as adaequatio rei et intellectus. However, Brentano draws attention to the fact that Aristotle's position is more thorough, it also takes into account such situations that do not imply judgments about reality:

"We will not believe, as some foolishly do, that wherever the truth is known, the real thing is compared with the judgment (ein reales Ding mit einem Urteil vergleichen). They do not even suspect that in judgment it is not always about real things (nicht immer um reale Dinge), nor do they notice that in this case, in order to compare a real thing with a judgment, the real thing as it is (das reale Ding, wie es ist) must already be known by me. This theory, therefore, leads to infinity. And finally, we will not, as it happens again and again, succumb to the temptation to confuse the concept of the real with the concept of the existing (den Begriff des Realen und den des Existerenden). A couple of thousand years have passed since Aristotle explored the various meanings of existence (die mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seienden), and although it is regrettable, the truth is that to this day most have not benefited from his research" ^{[41, p. 28]}.

In order to compare something with something (adaequatio rei et intellectus), this something must already be given, i.e. in order to make a judgment about a thing, this thing must already be given, there must be some idea about it. Otherwise, in the absence of representation, there is nothing to compare and nothing with. In addition, true judgment refers not only to things, i.e. to reality, but also to what "exists only in representation" (for example, a centaur or Jupiter) ^{[42, pp. 368-369]}; truth can refer to negative or temporal modal judgments, as in the example of Aristotle about the future of the sea in battle or in the statement "non-being is non-being" ^{[43, p. 18a27–19b4],[25, p. 1003b6]}. In short, a thing "can be talked about and judged even when it does not exist (wenn sie nicht ist)", and such a judgment may well be true, "because there are not only true affirmative, but also true negative judgments", because not only statements about the existence of a thing are true, "but also those who report that it was or will be," although what they report may or may not already be ^{[45, pp. 131-132]}. That is why true and false, according to Aristotle, are primarily in thoughts, because is much broader in scope than just the real, limited by the present and the material. This approach is clearly stated in Brentano's dissertation:

"There is also no doubt that the "to be" of the verb-bundle does not mean the energy of being (nicht eine Energie des Seins), not a real attribute (ein reales Attribut), since we also speak affirmatively about negations and deprivations (Negationen und Privationen), about purely fictional relationships (von rein fingirten Relationen) and on other completely arbitrary constructions of thought (Gedankengebilden), as does Aristotle in the passage of Metaphysics quoted above (Metaphh. D, 2): “... that is why we say that non-existent is non-existent,” or when we say: “every quantity is equal to itself,” whereas in the nature of things, of course, it is impossible to find any in general and equality in particular; or when we say: “centaurs are fabulous monsters,” “Jupiter is an idol,” etc. After all, it is quite clear that in all these statements there is no knowledge of any reality (keinerlei Realit?t). So, “is” here means only “something is true.” <...> Thus, the existence of a bundle is nothing else than … It immediately follows from this that the scope of is wider, since not only judgments belong to it, but concepts are also involved in this area, since it is possible to form an affirmative judgment about them and thereby attach the being of a bundle to them (das Sein der Copula). Even the non-existent, in so far as it is something non-existent, is thus “existing as non-existent” (ein Nichtseiendes seiend) and, therefore, being . And in general, any object of thought (Gedankending) will belong to this domain, that is, everything that objectively exists in the spirit can become the subject of a true, affirmative judgment. Nothing that arises in our spirit is so devoid of reality as to be completely excluded from the realm of being, as evidenced by Aristotle..." ^{[4, pp. 50-51]}.

If is the broadest concept, then any object of thought is included in it, while acquiring a certain reality, or being, because it is about one of the meanings of being. What kind of beingness is this? In what sense is it possible to talk about it at all? It should not be forgotten that at this moment Brentano had not yet formulated his reist position — on the contrary, he is engaged in the study of intentional inexistence, and therefore his students took the task of developing an ontology of immanent objects quite seriously. This is the key moment when the views of Brentano and his students begin to diverge, and the ground for this was prepared by the teacher himself: although he protested against being attributed to "stupidity", as noted above, nevertheless Brentano discussed the difference between the immanent object and the content of the presentation in his lectures. As A. Hrudzimski writes: "Already in the "early" period, which finds its expression in the works of 1862-1867, Brentano takes into account the idea that every mental act has its own object. However, at this time he considers speech about such objects as devoid of ontological obligations (ontologisch unverpflichtend). Whenever we talk about a psychic act, we can also talk about the object of this act. According to the scholastic usage adopted by the young Brentano, such an object exists objectively (objektiv) in the mind of the subject, however, such an object existence (objektive Existenz) cannot be taken strictly ontologically as a mode of existence (Existenzweise). The speech about a certain ens obiectivum is simply a facade de parler, which does not imply ontological consequences" ^{[46, pp. 7-8]}; more details: ^{[8, pp. 60-122]}.

Thus, initially Brentano simply discovers object existence as a subject area, which corresponds to the position he held in the 60s-70s, including in "Psychology from an empirical point of view" ^{[47, pp. 395-405],[48, pp. 167-182]}. However, subsequently, according to A. Hrudzimski, Brentano's point of view on this issue becomes more complex: he faced the problem of "ontology of concepts", his early conceptualism contained the danger of regression to infinity ^{[8, pp. 119-122, 174-175]}, which forced him to move further and further in the study of immanent objects, so that in in the lectures of the 80s-90s, which had the greatest impact on his students, Brentano develops an approach that already allows certain ontological obligations for mental existence, says Hrudzimski: "In these lectures we find an ontology of intentional relation, in which the speech about immanent objects is interpreted as ontologically obligatory. <...> Brentano talks about non-existent subjects (von den nicht-existerenden Gegenst?nden), which he accepts at this time into his ontology and which play a prominent role, for example, in his lecture “On the concept of truth” ... <...> Around 1890, Brentano expanded his ontological universe in such a way that both existing and non-existent objects can be found in it" ^{[46, p. 8, 30-31]}. It was at this time, as noted above, that the difference between the content and the immanent object was formulated in the book by A. Hefler and A. Mainong ^{[14, p. VII]}, which was then picked up by K. Tvardovsky and E. Husserl ^{[49, p. 9-12]}.

The question of the assumption of intentional objects assuming certain ontological obligations resulted in a big discussion about whether Brentano actually accepted the ontology of immanent objects or whether he had no distinction at all between object and content, and therefore there were not even prerequisites for the ontology of mental being. Nevertheless, contrary to O. Kraus, A. Castil and F. Mayer-Hillebrand, today it is already quite confidently possible to assert that Brentano had grounds for this (see: ^[50],[51]). A detailed discussion of this problem goes beyond the scope of this article, for the purposes of which it is sufficient to establish that already in Brentano himself, starting with his study of Aristotle's ontology, the question of the existing and its boundaries is interpreted quite broadly, in accordance with . At the same time, it is important to pay attention to the fact that Brentano separates the concepts of real and existing, respectively, the first is equivalent to a thing, an entity, and the second refers to the realm of mental being, to which any object of thought belongs. In Scholasticism, such an entity was called differently: esse intentionale, ens logicum, ens rationis, esse objectivum. In this regard , R. A. Gromov notes: "Brentano thereby divides the sphere of being in the sense of the true and the sphere of the real. The first is much broader than the second and coincides with everything that can be the object of thinking. At the same time, Brentano interprets the Aristotelian with the help of the scholastic concept of intentionality and actually identifies it with the scholastic concept of “objective being" (esse objective). In particular, speaking of universals, he designates them with the scholastic term "second intentions" and immediately calls them pure , meaning something that exists exclusively in the spirit" ^{[2, pp. XLVII-XLVIII–. On the first and second intentions and some problemativeness in Brentano's position: [52, pp. 143-158]}. Thus, the true is connected with the existing, , while things and concrete entities are covered by the concept of reality, which Brentano considers primary and fundamental ^{[53, p. 457]}. Nevertheless, as follows from the above, in the 80-90s. the area of could be considered as allowing certain ontological obligations, which implies going beyond the existing exclusively in the spirit.

So, before moving on, it is necessary to fix once again the main points in the teaching of Brentano, who (1) identifies various meanings of being, (2) of which he considers the essence to be the first, (3) which leads him to distinguish between two spheres of being: real and true, which correlate as narrower and broader, (4) where the first is substantial, and the second is objective, having intentional inexistence, in view of which Brentano (5) connects the sphere of essences and things with the concept of reality, which he considers fundamental, and the sphere of the true and objective with the concept of existence. This last point is extremely important in connection with the interpretation of the truth that Brentano offers:

"We use the expressions "true" (wahr) and "false" (falsch) in many senses: first we denote true and false judgments in this way, and then (somewhat modifying the meaning) also objects when we say “true friend” (“ein wahrer Freund”), “fake money” (“falsches Geld"). It is hardly necessary to specifically stipulate that when using the words “true” and “false” in the report, I associate with them not the first and proper meaning, but [the second] — transferred to objects (auf die Gegenst?nde). True is what is; false is what is not. As Aristotle said: “ ”, so we could say: " ”. <...> The concepts of existence and non-existence (der Existenz und Nichtexistenz) are correlates of the concept of truth (uniform) of affirmative and negative judgments. Just as a judgment presupposes what is judged: affirmative — in an affirmative way, negative — in a negative way, so the correctness of an affirmative judgment presupposes the existence of what is judged in an affirmative way, the correctness of a negative one presupposes the non—existence of what is judged in a negative way; and whether I say “the affirmative judgment is true” or “its subject is existing” whether I say "a negative judgment is true" or "its subject is non—existent" - in both cases I say the same thing" ^{[54, pp. 59-61]}.

Thus, the concepts of existence and non-existence is the essence of the correlates of the concept of truth that corresponds to the thesis of Aristotle, who cited above: ""Being" and "is" means true, and "not-being" — not true, a is false ( , )", "to what extent something has being in such and truth ( , )" ^{[25, c. 1017à31–32, 993b31]}. And if Aristotle spoke about , understanding the being as true, then Brentano can say , true as being. The equivalence of being and true is very important: hence Heidegger's interpretation of being as truth.

Reality, existence, intentionality

In this article, it is not possible to consider Brentano's philosophy in detail, but some ideas still need to be touched upon, since his interpretation of truth is not only connected with research in the field of the history of philosophy, but is organically included in his own philosophical searches, which lead to the emergence of "new types of ontology". Moreover, much of what Heidegger claims about being may remain unexplained if we do not take into account the achievements of the Brentano school. In particular, when Heidegger asserts that existence is everything we are talking about. What does he mean by that? What does it mean? What exists is the opposite of what does not exist, which means that some objects of thought do not exist, i.e. it is quite obvious that not everything we are talking about can be called existing. Nevertheless, Heidegger claims the opposite:

"However, we call many things in different senses "being" (seiend). Being is everything we talk about, what we mean, what we treat in such and such a way (Seiend ist alles, wovon wir reden, was wir meinen, wozu wir uns so und so verhalten), being is also what and how we ourselves are. Being consists in what- and so-being, in reality, presence, state, significance, existence, in "given" (Sein liegt im Da?-und Sosein, in Realit?t, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, im "es gibt")" ^{[1, p. 6-7]}.

It is clear that what exists here is synonymous with the concept of givenness and denotes everything that can be given in one way or another, or everything that we mean. However, we can talk about centaurs and unicorns — are they really something that exists? It seems that Heidegger's concept of being is close to A. Mainong's concept of an object. But what does the thesis that Sein liegt im Da?-und Sosein mean in general? Why is genesis mentioned here? I think it would be quite difficult to answer this question without taking into account the discussion about the difference between reality and existence that took place at the Brentano school.

The difference between the two types of phenomena that stand out in "Psychology from an empirical point of view" became decisive on this path: "The whole world of our phenomena (Erscheinungen) is divided into two large classes — the class of physical and the class of psychic phenomena (Ph?nomene)" ^{[55, p. 22]}. Everything we are dealing with, everything that is given to consciousness, is a phenomenon, since both classes are precisely phenomena. Is there something beyond the world of phenomena, reality itself? Yes, the external world exists, but it is given in consciousness. In other words, Brentano builds philosophy from the first person: phenomena are "what is given to us in experience" ^{[57, p. 46]}. This attitude defines the subject area, which is further analyzed in "Psychology from an empirical point of view." Moreover, it should be noted that the task at this stage is not to separate the existing from the fictitious, but first of all to clarify how and what is given to us, and only after that it will be possible to deduce the meaning of existence, which in Brentano is derived from the function of judgment.

As examples of physical phenomena, Brentano mentions the following: color, figure, landscape, audible chord, felt heat, cold, smell ^{[55, p. 24]}. In accordance with the above, physical phenomena interest Brentano in the way they are given to consciousness: they are not the things themselves, but the data of consciousness (respectively, natural science is a science that seeks to explain physical phenomena given in sensations ^{[55, pp. 42-43]}). Consciousness acts here as a point of reference, or as it were a point of evidence, just as it was with Descartes. Mental phenomena, according to Brentano, are not what is seen, heard, felt, but mental activity itself: seeing, hearing, feeling, i.e. mental phenomena are acts of consciousness. They cover an extremely wide range of phenomena, which includes not only sensory perception, but all mental activity: fantasy, thinking, judgment, memory, expectation, inference, conviction, opinion, doubt. In addition, the philosopher includes in the field of psychic phenomena "every movement of the soul": "joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hatred, lust, desire, intention, surprise, admiration, contempt, etc." ^{[55, p. 24]}.

Brentano analyzes various signs of psychic phenomena, of which the most important is the intentional attitude, because "nothing distinguishes psychic phenomena more strongly from all physical phenomena than the property that something is inherent in them in an objective way (etwas gegenst?ndich in?t)" ^{[42, p. 349]}. We are talking about the famous "rediscovery" of intentionality, although, "to be precise, this merit should be attributed to the early German neo-enthusiasts of the XIX century. Brentano operates with a concept that was actively used by them in constructing their own theories of cognition and in criticizing the concepts of German idealists" ^{[2, p. XLIX]} (See also: ^{[58, p. 442-454]}; on the scholastic roots of Brentano's ontology: ^{[59, p. 335-362]}; on Brentano and medieval theories of intentionality: ^[60],[61]). In turn, neosholasts relied on the theoretical developments of the Jesuits, who distinguished between two modes of life — physical and intentional, as a result of which the latter played an important role, defining the subject area of psychology ^[62],[63]. As G. V. Vdovina writes in this regard, and it is important to note this because the difficult problem of consciousness is often considered precisely in a post-Cartesian perspective: "In the mind-body problem, starting with Descartes, the physical is identified with the material, and the mental with the immaterial: with the "spiritual substance", spiritual, consciousness. But the Scholastics of the XVII century drew the dividing line in a completely different way. Their basic distinction is the distinction of the physical and intentional. At the same time, the physical can be both material and immaterial: the main thing is that it is supposed to exist as an extra-mental reality, independent of the intellect that knows it. From this point of view, the soul, including the intellect, its acts and the cognitive qualities produced in these acts are concepts, is just as physical as the body, although it represents a different, immaterial, kind of physical reality. The intentional is understood as something that exists as the object content of cognitive acts and is by definition unreal, that is, not physical" ^{[62, p. 13]}. Therefore, Brentano relied on a rich tradition, which he mastered over the years of training and subsequent priestly ministry (albeit for a short time). His approach organically combines scholastic and Cartesian paradigms. Therefore, his most important merit can be considered that he transferred the scholastic narrative to the very center of scientific discussions of his time, making them relevant in the context of empiricism and positivism of the second half of the XIX century. Moreover, he presented scholastic developments as a fully working theoretical model that led to the "discovery of consciousness" ^{[57, p. 47]}, since "the very concept of consciousness, which is somehow close to modern, and there was no term for it in scholasticism" ^{[62, p. 14]}. Of course, we are not talking about the discovery of the concept of consciousness, which appeared in the German language long before Brentano, but about the understanding of consciousness as a mental activity, as something that is characterized by intentionality.

In fact, although the concept of the soul in the second half of the XIX century. it has already lost its clear meaning, because it was not quite clear what was behind this word, but it is very difficult to deny the reality of consciousness, since "there is a soul or not, psychic phenomena, in any case, are always present" ^{[55, p. 20]}. Accordingly, it is precisely what the Scholastics of the XVII century considered specific to the soul that Brentano makes the central characteristic of psychic phenomena. In this regard, it is necessary to cite his famous definition, without which no serious study of Brentano's philosophy can do without:

"Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the medieval scholastics called the intentional (or, perhaps, mental) inexistence of the subject (die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes), and what we, although in somewhat ambiguous terms, would call the relation to the content (die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt), orientation on the object (die Richtung auf ein Objekt) (by which reality should not be understood here), or immanent objectivity (die immanente Gegenst?ndlichkeit). Every [psychic phenomenon] contains something in itself as an object, although not every one in the same way. In a representation, something is presented, in a judgment, something is affirmed or denied, in love, it is loved, in hate, it is hated, etc. This intentional inexistence (intentionale Inexistenz) is peculiar exclusively to psychic phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like this. Thus, we can define psychic phenomena by saying that these are phenomena that intentionally contain an object (welche intentional einen Gegenstand in sich enthalten). <...> Here is another characteristic feature common to all psychic phenomena: they are perceived only in the inner consciousness (nur in innerem Bewu?tsein), whereas for physical phenomena only external perception is possible (nur ?u?ere Wahrnehmung)" ^{[56, pp. 124-125, 128]}.

So, mental activity, or the field of psychic phenomena, is characterized by intentionality and refers exclusively to inner consciousness. Moreover, we should not forget that external and internal perception are physical and mental phenomena, i.e. we are talking about the sphere of consciousness. Moreover, only internal perception has an undoubted evidence, whereas with respect to external perception, i.e. with respect to physical phenomena, error is possible ^{[55, pp. 35-36]}. And this means that the status of reliability refers specifically to the field of psychic phenomena, the whole theory of cognition in fact should be built on this basis. And indeed, the difference between true and false, existing and non-existent in Brentano is revealed precisely in the sphere of inner consciousness, i.e. refers to the sphere of psychic phenomena. It is here that the theoretical center of gravity, or the fulcrum that can explain (or turn) the world, is located.

Brentano reveals a three-part structure of mental phenomena that consist of representations, judgments and emotions. Of these, the primary and fundamental is the representation that can be given by itself, whereas judgments and emotions are based only on the representation, because "affirmation and denial, love and hate, desire and disgust, follow the representation and relate to what is represented in this representation" ^{[55, p. 34]}. Therefore, psychic phenomena are defined "as representations and as such phenomena that are based on representations", all other phenomena relate to physical ones ^{[55, p. 40]}. As a consequence, the representation is interpreted as a kind of , because "the representation (even if not in time, but by nature) is earlier" ^{[42, p. 376]}.

"The example of psychic phenomena gives every representation (Vorstellung) through sensation or fantasy; and I understand here by representation not what is represented (nicht das, was vorgestellt wird), but the act of representation (den Akt des Vorstellen)" ^{[56, vol. 1, p. 111]}. "We are talking about presenting (Vorstellen) wherever something appears to us (etwas erscheint). If we see something, we imagine a color, if we hear something, a sound, if we fantasize about something, we imagine images of fantasy. In view of the universality with which we use this word, we could say: it is impossible that the activity of the soul in any way relates to something that is not represented. If I hear and understand a name, then I imagine what it means; and in general, this is the purpose of names — to evoke representations. By judgment we mean, in accordance with the usual philosophical usage, acceptance (Annehmen) (as true) or rejection (Verwerfen) (as false)" ^{[56, vol. 2, p. 34]}.

The field of representation is so wide that everything that appears to us is included in it. This is a kind of basic function of consciousness, since there are no mental phenomena in which something would not be represented. Representation, therefore, characterizes the activity of consciousness as a whole, and it does not yet contain any information about whether the object of representation exists or does not exist, because representation is only a kind of reality in the broadest sense of the word, a kind of openness, or openness of consciousness to the outside and to itself. One can make such a comparison: as being is always the being of being, so representation is always the representation of what is represented, and as Heidegger distinguishes das Sein und das Seiende, so Brentano distinguishes das Vorstellen und das Vorgestellte. Since mental phenomena in Brentano are acts of representation, representation, they have a clear verbal sound, because consciousness is given to us in actu, in action. In addition, since representations are of a primary nature, i.e. they precede judgments and emotions, there is "no virtue, no moral evil, no knowledge, no delusion in them. All this is intrinsically foreign to ideas" ^{[42, p. 372]}. Representation, therefore, is on the other side of good and evil, true and false, it is simply any phenomenon, or a given in the broad sense of the word. Therefore, representation "takes place wherever something appears in consciousness (etwas im Bewu?tsein erscheint): whether it is experienced in hostility, lovingly, or indifferently; whether it is affirmed, or denied, or, with the utter passivity of judgment —I cannot put it better — it appears (vorgestellt werden). Since we use the word "to represent" (vorstellen), then "to be represented" (vorgestellt werden) means the same as "to appear" (erscheinen)" ^{[56, vol. 1, p. 114]}. At the same time, Brentano goes very far in interpreting the representation, believing that it exists not only in humans, for example, in newborns, but even in animals: "When a worm is cut, each fragment often gives the most unambiguous signs of arbitrary (willk?rlicher) movement, and therefore also feelings and representations (Gef?hl und Vorstellung)" ^{[56, vol. 2, p. 236]}. It follows from this that the representation reaches the vegetative level, which means that it is not so much a conscious action in which the object is put before the mental eye by volitional effort, i.e. it appears, appears before him, as the original activity of consciousness in general, or rather, even to say — mental activity or, so to speak, vital energy. In short, although Brentano rejects the concept of the soul, he still interprets psychic phenomena in this sense. It is necessary to fix this fundamental extremely wide spectrum of representation, reaching all the way to the muscles, so that the body here, apparently, is part of consciousness. It is interesting to note in this regard that for Heidegger Dasein is nothing but a soul: " ["On the Soul" by Aristotle — A. G.] is not psychology in the modern sense, but deals with the existence of a person (vom Sein des Menschen) in the world (or living beings in general)" ^{[65, p. 6]}. In view of this, it is clear why Heidegger translates Aristotle as das menschliche Dasein — human existence ^{[66, p. 21]}. In this respect, Brentano's influence on Heidegger may be much deeper than is usually assumed.

Now we need to pay attention to how Brentano distinguishes representation from judgment and how he generally interprets the latter. If representation is the fundamental activity of consciousness, the primary reality, the openness of existence to the soul, it has a completely neutral character and is neither true nor false, then judgment is already a different attitude to what is presented, which consists in accepting (as true) or rejecting (as false) what is presented. Thus, the indefinite and immediate reality of the subject of representation acquires more concrete features. Brentano interprets them as two ways of being aware of an object:

"If we say that representation and judgment are different basic classes of psychic phenomena, then we thereby believe... that they are two fundamentally different ways of consciousness about an object. At the same time, we do not deny that any act of judgment (alles Urteilen) has as a prerequisite an act of representation (ein Vorstellen). We, on the contrary, assert that every object about which a judgment is made is perceived in consciousness in two ways: as presented and as acknowledged or rejected. <...> Nothing can also be an object of judgment without being represented. But we affirm that when the object of representation becomes the subject of an admitting or rejecting judgment, consciousness enters into a completely new kind of relationship with it. In this case, it is perceived (ist aufgenommen) in consciousness in two ways — as an object presented and as an object accepted as true or denied" ^{[42, pp. 352-353]}.

Representation and judgment differ not by the subject, not by the content of the representation, but by the relation to the immanent object: there is no difference between them "in terms of content", therefore, the distinctive property of judgment is exclusively "in the peculiarity of the relation to the immanent object" ^{[42, pp. 370, 371]}. In other words, in the representation, the object is simply presented, in the judgment it is accepted or rejected. In addition, their difference is not that the subject of the first is something simple and given, and the second is composite and connected. This gives rise to a revision of the traditional point of view, according to which judgment is a binding or separation of subject and predicate. As R. A. Gromov writes in this regard: "A two-part structure in which a predicate is attributed to a subject does not express a universal and necessary property of judgment. Judgment is a special and simplest kind of mental attitude to the objects of consciousness, namely, the recognition of something as existing (true) or the denial of something as non-existent (untrue). The simplest and basic form of judgments are existential (tetic) judgments of the form “A is” and “A is not”, in which there is no binding of the subject and predicate. An example of such judgments is the belief in the existence of sensory data contained in sensation, or the recognition of the existence of one's own actual mental states contained in internal perception. Existential judgments are the primary and basic form of judging activity, since all the various judgments of other types can be reduced to them" ^{[42, p. 614]}. It is important to emphasize that existential judgments are the basis of judging activity for Brentano, since, as noted above, "the concepts of existence and non-existence (der Existenz und Nichtexistenz) are correlates of the concept of truth (uniform) of affirmative and negative judgments" ^{[54, p. 61]}.

This is the key point, because it turns out that the concept of existence is derived from the function of judgment: representation ? judgment ? truth/existence. Many philosophers mistakenly held the view, Brentano believes, according to which the concept of existence "cannot be borrowed from experience," but in reality the situation is quite different, because "it, of course, stems from experience, but internal experience, and that we get it only by taking into account the judgment (nur im Hinblick auf das Urteil)" ^{[56, vol. 2, p. 52]}. It follows from this that existential problematics is fixed in the field of and we get the very concept of existence only with an eye to judgment. This point of view releases a boundless field of ideas that are earlier in relation to judgments, which means that they belong to a more primordial experience, or to a pre-existential inner perception. Apparently, it can be said that through judgment, inexistence becomes existence. Of course, the projects of Husserl's formal ontology and Minong's theory of objects are directly related to this interpretation of existence.

Considering what has been said, Brentano concludes, "that the "is" and "is not" of an existential statement are nothing but the equivalent of a bundle, therefore ["is"] is not a predicate and taken exclusively by itself is completely devoid of meaning (g?nzlich bedeutungslos)" ^{[42, p. 366]}. In this Brentano follows Aristotle, who says that, as noted above, that "to be or not to be — not marking things like if I say just "being", because it is nothing ( ), although some sosnet binding ( ), which is not conceived without the terms" ^{[43, p. 16b22–25]}. Accordingly, being in itself, or pure being ( ), under such an interpretation loses its independent meaning (g?nzlich bedeutungslos), and therefore the question of being within the framework of this interpretation cannot be posed, at least in the sense that Heidegger does it (although the latter's approach is a continuation and the development of the issues outlined by Brentano).

So, the verb "is" in an existential sentence is the equivalent of a bundle, and taken by itself, it is completely devoid of meaning. It follows from this that being is not at all the main issue. Moreover, according to the late Brentano, this is a pseudo-concept, and therefore the question of being is the result of an erroneous understanding of the function of names in a sentence.

"Thus, the imaginary concepts of imaginary names became the reason for the repeated distortion of the most important psychological fact, according to which all our concepts originate from sensory contemplation. In fact, the concepts of being (Sein), non-being (Nichtsein), necessity (Notwendigkeit), possibility (M?glichkeit), even the concepts of beauty (Sch?nheit), magnitude (Gr?sse), etc. do not originate from sensory contemplation, but this is only because such concepts do not exist at all and the corresponding nouns in general they are not real names" ^{[64, p. 456]}.

Nevertheless, if we talk about general concepts, there is still one among them that deserves Brentano's trust, namely, the real one ^{[53, p. 457]}. In Brentano, this concept means everything that really exists, has a being outside of the spirit, i.e. a set of things and real processes. If intentional existence covers the realm of the conceivable, then the real is the realm of the material, as well as the processes associated with it. As noted above, the philosopher says, in accordance with his "critical realism", that one should not "confuse the concept of the real with the concept of the existing (den Begriff des Realen und den des Existerenden)" ^{[40, p. 113]}. As O. Kraus explains in a note to this text: "The concept of the real (des Realen) should not be confused with the concept of the existing (des Existerenden). This means: we get the concept of the real from every contemplation of internal or external perception. The real is equivalent to the thing, the essence, the material (Sachhaltigem), in general, the highest concept. On the contrary, we speak of existing, existing (Existerendem, Seiendem) when we assert about something that it is; accordingly, this term is associated with a judging attitude and, above all, with an assertion. We will not go into the verbal games that some contemporaries play with the terms being, being, existence (des Seins, Daseins, Existerenden), etc. If the theory in question can really say something new, then it is unacceptable to use established and ordinary terms in a different sense" ^{[45, p. 176]}. Thus, the real acts as the fundamental for Brentano, whereas the existing is derived and applicable to everything imaginable, i.e. to the real and unreal.

Conclusion

From all that has been said, it can be concluded that the positions of Brentano and Heidegger are very closely related. Of course, there are fundamental differences between them, but the similarities are quite large. In particular, if Brentano, highlighting the real and true areas, gives preference in favor of the former, then Heidegger's ontology is built on the second member of this opposition. In particular, Heidegger's efforts are aimed at describing the position of the soul in the world, in order to fix and reveal this peculiar being. The soul intentionally reveals everything that exists in its being and the very existence of being is revealed to it as a given, therefore being includes everything "from God to a grain of sand". Being is everything that can be given, because we are talking about intentional being, about ens rationis, or . The fact that Heidegger's position remains phenomenological, i.e. indirectly Brentanian, says T. Sheehan: "... long before 'Being and Time' Heidegger accepted the Copernican revolution under the banner of phenomenology. He took a decisive step away from the naive realism of the Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology, into which he was immersed in his youth, to instead focus on the correlation of man and being in what he later called “phenomenological ontology". This means that entry into Heidegger's work is possible only through phenomenological reduction. Above the door of his Academy engraved , which translates as follows: “No phenomenological reduction? Don't even try to enter"" ^{[21, p. 10]}.