Being and givenness in the philosophy of M. Heidegger

Introduction: the mystery of being

Being in Heidegger's philosophy turns into a riddle, it is not defined and not explained, because it is indefinable and inexplicable. And although all the efforts of the philosopher were aimed at clarifying this concept, he still greatly confused the matter. On the one hand, everything that Heidegger says is about being, on the other hand, the conversation is constantly reduced to explaining the conditions under which this clarification is possible, that is, it is always about something else, just not about being. Undoubtedly, Heidegger made a great contribution to ontology, but he did it so confusingly and obscurely that the "thinking of being" began to acquire new problems and a whole mythology, which was initiated by Meister aus Deutschland himself. Be that as it may, it is possible to discuss his philosophy only in the light of a more or less clarified understanding of being, but this is precisely the main difficulty: Heidegger invites you on the road, without saying where to go from and what to guide you on the road. This was an almost insurmountable obstacle until the publication of the collected works was completed, after which Heidegger studies gradually began to reach a completely new level. In any case, it is now possible to see the long way of Heidegger's thinking as a whole and answer those questions that previously remained covered in a fog of uncertainty. What should serve as a guide to understand this complex philosopher? From what preliminary understanding of being should we proceed when talking about fundamental ontology, ontotheology or ontological differentiation?

It seems that these questions are premature: they come to an understanding of being in the end, it opens only at the end of the path, just as a traveler, passing through a forest thicket, comes to an opening. However, here the question arises, which in ancient times caused difficulties: how to look for what you do not know? And if Plato solved this problem with the help of the doctrine of the immortal soul, which has already seen everything in a past life, and therefore can remember it ^{[21, pp. 80-81]}, then Dasein does not have such existential capabilities: he does not have an immortal soul, more precisely, he himself is a soul, with that essential reservation that this soul is mortal. And this is not "the last smoke of evaporating reality" (Nietzsche), like a kind of cloud escaping from the body, but life itself, existence itself. As Heidegger says: " ["On the Soul" by Aristotle — A. G.] is not psychology in the modern sense, but deals with the existence of man (vom Sein des Menschen) in the world (or living beings in general)" ^{[30, p. 6]}. One could say: as for Dasein im Menschen, the soul is in the body, and as there is no man without Dasein, so there is no body without a soul (only an existing corpse, as opposed to an existing soul), and as the soul is not yet a man, so Dasein does not coincide with the concept of "man" (understood as animal rationale). It is clear why Heidegger translates Aristotle as das menschliche Dasein - human existence ^{[31, p. 21; 1, pp. 585-586]}. Therefore, an existing (Dasein) cannot simply remember what being is, what is the meaning of this concept, which makes it unclear what a lumen is, how to look for it and how to navigate in this area at all. And although we have some understanding of being (Seinsverst?ndnis), nevertheless "this average intelligibility only demonstrates incomprehensibility" ^{[28, p. 6]}. There is no Socrates nearby who would help to remember, so we can only hope for ourselves. An important methodological aspect of the hermeneutics of facticity is connected with this: "Philosophy is a way of cognition existing in actual life itself, in which the facticity of the existing (der faktisches Dasein) ruthlessly pulls itself back to itself and unconditionally puts itself on itself (auf sich selbst stellt)" ^{[26, p. 18]}. My own being is for me a fulcrum and a starting position in the comprehension of being and the construction of an ontology. Therefore, the meaning of being is read not from the existing in general, but from the concrete existing, from itself ^{[28, p. 10]}. This existing one is defined by existentials, according to which he understands himself as mortal and finite, and since his being is turned to death, it reveals itself as being to death ^{[28, pp. 314-354]}. This corresponds to a certain interpretation of being available to a mortal: "... being itself is essentially finite (das Sein selbst im Wesen endlich) and reveals itself only in the transcendence of the existing, pushed into Nothingness (in der Transzendenz des in das Nichts hinausgehaltenen Daseins)" ^{[29, p. 120]}. But what does it mean? How can existence itself be finite? Why is it of course? What is it in general that you can say that about it?

It is of course for the reason that this is how it is read from a finite being named Dasein: a finite being has a finite being. Hence the specific (claiming to be scientific and neutral) hermeneutics of facticity and the position of methodological atheism, which Heidegger voiced in his early texts ^[5]. Eternity is inaccessible to finite beings, and therefore not only time cannot be thought of from eternity (contrary to Plato and the entire subsequent philosophical tradition), but it is also unacceptable to consider a finite person sub specie aeternitatis, that is, as an immortal soul, since eternity is a "simple derivative of being-in-time". (See the report, which comes from from such a statement of the question: ^{[17, p. 139-163]}; and although Heidegger stipulates that here "nothing is decided about the otherworldly and immortality, as well as about the Hereafter, and no instructions are given as to how one should and should not behave in relation to death. Nevertheless, it can be said that this explication is carried out in the most radical way (in der radikalsten Diesseitigkeit) ..." ^{[18, p. 331]}). The destiny of the finite is finite, the mortal is mortal, therefore we cannot think of some eternal being, and even independent of us, it is simply inaccessible to us, because the existing one does not have such an experience. And since being still "must be read from being" ^{[18, p. 322]}, it must be read from what is really available to us, that is, from that "being that we ourselves are always" ^{[28, p. 10]}. And we are finite beings, we are time, Dasein ist die Zeit ^{[23, p. 81]}. This still says nothing about being, nor about time, nor about existing, everything so far remains in the field of average intelligibility, which "only demonstrates incomprehensibility." But at the same time, the most important "links of references" are indicated here, shedding light on the fundamental ontology. Existing is time, time is the horizon of being, being is understood only in the horizon of time, therefore being is time (das Sein... ist die Zeit) ^{[27, p. 442]}. But not the time "in general", but my time: "The question of what is time has become the question of who is time. More precisely: are we ourselves the essence of time? Or even more precisely: Am I my time? By doing so, I am getting close to him, and if I understand the question correctly, he has made everything serious. So, such questioning is a proportionate approach to time and treating it as always mine" ^{[17, p. 163]}. And if being is understood in the horizon of time, then everything that exists must be comprehended through time, everything bears the stamp of time. And first of all, I myself, existing, for this being is called existing because it is the time of being: I am the time of my being.

Thus, when Heidegger speaks of being, he does not mean being in general, but finite being, the being of the existing, das Sein des Daseins. This is being seen through the eyes of an existing, mortal man. At the same time, the concept of an objective being external to the existing one would only be an erroneous construction. As V. I. Molchanov notes: "According to Heidegger, the meaning of being is equal to the "understanding" of being, i.e. the self-projection of Dasein. Since being is "ourselves", the meaning of being is not attributed to being from the outside" ^{[9, p. 142]}. A similar point of view is held by E. V. Falev: "The question of being posed hermeneutically is the question of the meaning of being: the question that must be solved, ultimately, is not what "being" is, what it is and how it relates to being. There is no “objective” existence, as well as a purely “subjective" one. “Being“ is just one of the meanings that we (Dasein) put into our ”project" (sketch) of reality. Therefore, it would even be more accurate to say that we are not talking about the "meaning of being" as a certain thing that "has" meaning, but about the meaning of "being"" ^{[14, p. 60]}. In other words, "every being has its own being" ^{[11, p. 437]}. Accordingly, the being of the being named Dasein is of course, because the existing one is mortal, his being is time. However, being a human being is different from being a number, a tree, or an angel. How then to understand what the meaning of this word is at all? If being is my time, then what is being a tree, a number, or God? Or is it not there at all? Or is this meaning only for me? And what is this Babel of ontology anyway?

Boundless existence

Heidegger asserts as an undoubted fact that every person has some vague idea of being: "We don't know what 'being' means. But already when we ask: “What is ‘being'?”, we keep in a certain clarity of this “is”, without being able to conceptually fix what this “is" means. We do not even know the horizon in which to grasp and fix its meaning. This averaged and vague intelligibility of being is a fact" ^{[28, p. 7]}. This averaged and vague intelligibility is the basic ontological background from which the conversation about being and its subsequent concretization begins. Having fixed the presence of this background understanding, Heidegger did not explain what it is. However, the fact of the original being intelligibility is not at all something self-evident. How is it formed in humans?

This intelligibility, Seinsverst?ndnis, varies geographically and changes historically. For example, the vague ideas about being among the Pirakhan Indians, if they can be talked about at all, are most likely different from what W. Quine had in mind when he wrote "about what is", and the views of the ancient Egyptians on this topic, of course, were quite different from the insights of Aristotle. This background is culturally specific, although in general homo sapiens may have some general and very vague "ontology". Anyway, if we talk about the current situation, our being intelligibility is formed by education and life experience, which set a certain horizon of what we consider possible, distinguishing it from what, in principle, cannot be. Moreover, the views of people of the same culture can vary quite a lot. Thus, the ontological horizon of A. Minong was clearly wider than B. Russell could admit. And today there are many people who are ready to admit that Harry Potter exists, as well as those who consider such a statement an erroneous extension of the boundaries of ontology.

In Heidegger's case, this horizon is not only extremely wide, but also completely unclear. In the course of lectures in 1927, where it comes to ontological differentiation, existential intelligibility simply loses its distinct boundaries: "And what can be given (es geben), except nature, history, God, space, number? We are talking about all of the above, although in different senses, that it is (es ist). We call it being (Seiendes). Correlating with it, whether theoretically or practically, we enter into a relationship with the being. Apart from this being there is nothing. Perhaps there is nothing else besides the above being, but perhaps something else is given (gibt es), which, true, is not, but nevertheless, in a sense that has yet to be determined, is given. Moreover. In the end, something is given that must be given (gibt es etwas, was es geben mu?), so that we can have access to being as being and could relate to it, something that, although not there, must be given in order for us to experience and understand at all something like being. We are able to grasp existence as such, as being, only if we understand something like being ^{[24, p. 13-14]}. To what intelligibility of being does Heidegger appeal here? Why are nature, history, God, space, and number put in one row? Are these correlated concepts? What is it, a "stupid joke" ^{[13, p. 32]} or intentional sillepsis? Why, remaining within the framework of methodological atheism, Heidegger speaks about God without any explanations and can even include an angel among the beings? For example: "The being that exists in the way of existence is a person. Only man exists. The rock exists, but it does not exist. The tree exists, but it does not exist. The horse exists, but it does not exist. An angel exists, but he does not exist. God exists, but he does not exist" ^{[15, p. 32]}. And about everything "listed, we say, although in different senses, that it is (es ist)" ^{[24, p. 13]}. It is precisely about the fact that there is a God, an angel, etc. But then the question arises: does the rock exist in the same way as an angel or God exists? What is the difference between being a human being and being a horse? Why is the existence of the rock not different from the existence of God? And in general, how can we talk about the existence of an angel or God, while remaining in the position of methodological atheism? How to understand all this?

Apparently, there is some vague and most general understanding of being behind this, because we are "able to grasp being as such, as being, only if we understand something like being." But this being is so general that it loses its horizon, because there is nothing that does not include this concept. In other words, such an understanding corresponds more to what is called a given in phenomenology, and not at all to what an average understanding of being implies. Something, anything, can be given. For example, given to consciousness (Husserl), given to the existing (Heidegger). There is no question of whether the given exists or does not exist. It is simply given. Anything can be given. But in Heidegger, every datum, whatever it may be, is called being, that is, it exists, it is (es ist), albeit in different senses: "However, we call many things in different senses "being" (seiend). Being is everything we talk about, what we mean, what we treat in such and such a way (Seiend ist alles, wovon wir reden, was wir meinen, wozu wir uns so und so verhalten), being is also what and how we ourselves are. Being consists in what- and so-being, in reality, presence, state, significance, existence, in "given" (Sein liegt im Da?-und Sosein, in Realit?t, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, im "es gibt")" ^{[28, p. 9]}.

This is puzzling: existence is everything we are talking about. But we are talking about Santa Claus and Baba Yaga. Should they also be called something that exists? Being is divided into a number of corresponding concepts and in some sense fictitious entities can be attributed to being. Hence, Heidegger assumes that something exists precisely as a given. Not only is there a given that something is given to me, that is, there is a fact that something is given to me, Heidegger says something more: what is given is what exists. He does not confine himself to the statement that God or an angel are given to consciousness, for example, are thought or imagined, that is, certain entities are given, he says that they exist, that is, that entities are essence for him. Why?

According to the phenomenological approach, "as much as there is appearance, there is so much "being" (Wieviel Schein jedoch, so viel "Sein")" ^{[28, p. 48]}. But you never know what a person thinks, or sees… And it is hardly to be expected from an atheist, even a methodological one, that he sees angels or God. Nevertheless, "we are talking about all of the above, although in different senses, that it is (es ist). We call it being (Seiendes). Correlating with it, whether theoretically or practically, we enter into a relationship with existence" ^{[24, p. 13]}. But theoretically, you can relate to anything at all, for example, to a unicorn and pegasus, Zeus and Hera, a round square and a wooden iron, but without considering them as something existing, existing. Therefore, the question naturally arises here about how Heidegger understands being, why is anything called being at all?

At this stage, it should be noted that this is not just conceivable, theoretical, but real, phenomenal: "Being is further away than everything that exists, and it is still closer to man than any being, be it a rock, an animal, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God" ^{[22, c. 331]}. God and the angel exist along with the rock and the beast. This means that the givenness of the given coincides with the being of the being. But are reality and being identical? Heidegger says only that being is given, but does not explain whether they are different or not, whether being and reality should be understood as something unified or whether there is some significant difference between them. Probably, the reason for this is due to the fact that the given in phenomenology remains uncertain, at least in Husserl and Heidegger, so in the latter's texts the difference between the given and being is not clarified. (Cf.: "The given is a metaphor. In phenomenology, a phenomenon is defined through a given, but the given is not thematized. It talks about what is given, how it is given, but it does not say what is “given”. The question of the given has not been raised in phenomenology" (10, pp. 286-287]; however, J.L. Marion will later create a phenomenology of the given, trying to justify the priority of the given over being, which again indicates a certain difference between these concepts ^[20]). Heidegger only says that being must be given (es geben mu?) in order for us to gain access to being as being.

A. G. Chernyakov correctly notes that V. V. Bibikhin mistakenly translates es gibt as "has a place", after which "I am forced to further call das Es — in Heidegger's not showing the instance of giving, giving, gift a "Place" (and besides - "with a capital letter"), which is already being "has", i.e., instead of "giving", "possession" appears, instead of the substantive pronoun "das Es" ("it" or "this") — loaded with a completely different meaning and binding noun "Place"" ^{[19, p. 27]}. But at the same time, Chernyakov himself finds himself on the verge of erroneous theologization of Heidegger's thought: "For Heidegger, behind every such morphology, behind every "is" or "given" (es gibt), there is a giver (das Es, das gibt), which escapes sight and naming, does not reveal a face, like every true the giver" ^{[19, pp. 26-27]}. This statement is true if one does not understand by the "giver" God, who "does not reveal His face." Heidegger persistently tried to get away from this kind of Christianization of ontology. das Es hardly has a face, rather, "it" is deliberately opposed to any personality. But what is the reality of being?

Much remains unclear here, and first of all — the being intelligibility, in the horizon of which history, an angel, a number are identified as existing. How is being understood here? Why is it so all-encompassing that it includes number and God? After all, if for G. Frege, for example, the world of ideas exists, as a result of which existence can be attributed to a number, then from the point of view of R. Carnap, it is also a characteristic example, it is only a metaphysical word that has no meaning. And if in the case of M. Scheler it can be said that God exists, then for Z. Freud's situation is the opposite. In all these cases, the question is about being: not about whether something is given to us, but about whether there is an object of thought or not, whether a given being has existence or it is only thought by us. What is the difference between the given and the existent? This needs to be clarified. However, Heidegger does not do this, he interprets the given as being, that is, the question of being remains within the framework of phenomenology, which implies a very specific ontology. And although it was Heidegger who drew attention to the fact that Husserl had missed the question of the existence of consciousness and thus, it would seem, had to go beyond the limits of phenomenology ^{[18, p. 109]}, nevertheless, before and after the turn, Heidegger continued to think about being as a given. Why?

Intentional being

His habilitation work, defended in 1915, can help illuminate this issue. The young philosopher focuses on ens logicum, or logical being. This term has an extremely broad meaning and means everything that can be conceived, or everything that is given. As noted by Sh . McGrath: "Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift revolves around a discussion about the concept of Cattle ens logicum — logical being, the being of everything that can be perceived, as well as the scholastic prototype of what in phenomenology will be called "given"" ^{[32, p. 67]}. According to Duns Scotus, every object, being known, has an intentional being (obiectum ut cognitum habet esse "intentionale"), and this being generally refers to everything that is somehow given to consciousness: "According to Duns Scotus, those who cognitively aim at something, they aim primarily at objects that have an "intentional" or "intelligible" being (esse intentionale, intelligibile). From time to time, Cattle also speaks of "reduced being" (esse deminutum), "objective being" (esse obiectivum) or "cognized being" (esse cognitum)" ^{[12, pp. 223-224]}. These concepts are used as synonyms and this series includes ens logicum. Heidegger writes: "Duns Scotus defines the absolute domination of logical meaning over all the cognizable and cognized worlds of objects (Objektwelten) like the reversibility of “ens logicum" with objects. Whatever the subject is, it can become "ens diminutum". Whatever is known, whatever judgments are made, it must enter the world of meaning, only in it it is recognized and evaluated. Only by living in the meaningful (im Geltenden) do I know about the existing (Existerendes)" ^{[25, pp. 279-280]} (on the concept of ens diminutum: ^{[3, pp. 7-8]}).

Here it is important to pay attention to the fact that everything cognizable, every logicum is at the same time ens, being, which presupposes the "reversibility" of ens logicum "with objects". In order for something to be known, it must first enter the world of meaning, it must be somehow identified, because only in this way can it have any meaning for me, only in this way can it be noticed by me at all, otherwise "I live blindly in absolute darkness," as he says Heidegger: "Just because I am consciously given something (Ens) in general, that I make something the object of my consciousness, the concept of definiteness (Bestimmtheit) has come into effect. What is an object is in clarity, even if only in semi-darkness, which allows you to see nothing more than something objective in general. If this first moment of clarity (erste Klarheitsmoment) were absent, then I would not have absolute darkness, because if I have it, it itself is already in clarity again. Rather, it should be said: I have no subject at all, I live blindly in absolute darkness, I cannot move spiritually, mentally, thinking stands still. With the help of Ens I acquire the first definiteness (die erste Bestimmtheit), and since every Ens is Unum, so is the first order (die erste Ordnung) in the manifold abundance of the subject. So, certainty is something ordered in the given (etwas Ordnungshaftes am Gegebenen), it makes it understandable, recognizable, explicable" ^{[25, p. 224]}.

Thanks to ens, I gain the first certainty, and since it is reversible with the transcendentals unum et verum (the one and true), the given acquires the first order, it becomes comprehensible. Without this primary certainty, "I have no subject at all." Heidegger suggests the following sequence: something is given to the rational soul, but this datum would be blind and disordered if it did not acquire certainty with the help of unum et verum: datum-being ? transcendentalia ? certainty ? comprehensibility. At the same time, Heidegger develops a phenomenologically oriented view of medieval philosophy and already here proceeds from the primacy of human existence, which is called the soul, performing acts of cognition, perceiving something. (As he noted in the preface of his research: "For a decisive penetration into this fundamental character of scholastic psychology, I consider the philosophical, or rather, phenomenological study of mystical, moral-theological and ascetic writings of medieval scholasticism to be especially relevant. Only in such ways can one penetrate into the living life of medieval scholasticism..." ^{[25, pp. 205-206]}). A given is the openness of being to the soul, the openness of being to the existing: "The existing has its own openness (Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit)" ^{[28, p. 177]}. More about openness: ^[7]. In other words, without the existing there is no openness, no datum, and hence all that follows — certainty and comprehensibility, because "... only as long as there is an existing (Dasein ist), i.e. the ontic possibility of being intelligible, being is "given" ("gibt es" Sein). If the existing one does not exist, then there is also no “independence” and there is also no “in-itself”. Such a thing then is neither conceivable nor incomprehensible. Also, the inner-world existence then cannot be revealed, nor lie in hiding" ^{[28, p. 281]}.

At the same time, this means that being here is understood through the figure of the knower, that is, phenomenologically, since it is understood in the sense of ens logicum, as logical, intentional being (recently published the most important work on mental being in late medieval philosophy, which explains subtle ontological distinctions useful for understanding, including Heidegger: ^[3]). To the existing one who is in the world, this world is somehow given, he perceives the surrounding. At the same time, the perceived is not a meaningless stream of sensations (as I. Kant said: "Without sensuality, no object would be given to us, and without reason, no one could think. Thoughts without content are empty, contemplations without concepts are blind" ^{[8, p. 90]}). For Heidegger, this is comprehensible only in the light of intentional being, which he here calls the first moment of clarity (erste Klarheitsmoment), and later — enlightenment. In the light of this primary clarity of being, everything acquires certainty, it is in the light of being that we understand what exists: "We are able to grasp existence as such, as being, only if we understand something like being" ^{[16, p. 12]}. The German philosopher begins the first chapter of his habilitation work with the following words: "Every subject area is a subject area. Even if we do not yet know anything about the areas of reality that the question is about, just because we talk about them as problematic in all respects, we are facing something, a certain subject. Everything and everything is an object (Alles und jedes ist ein Gegenstand). Primum objectum est ens ut commune omnibus [The first object is being, as common to everything. — A. G.]. This Ens is given in every object of knowledge to the extent that it is a subject. Just as every object of the visual sense, whether white, black or mottled, is colored, so any object in general, regardless of the content it represents, is Ens" ^{[25, p. 214]}.

This is important for Heidegger's understanding of being: any object, since it is an object, that is, given to the perceiver, regardless of the content, is being, or being (ens). Everything and everything is an object, a kind of being. It would hardly be appropriate to delve into medieval philosophy here, but it can already be noted that Heidegger proceeds from the traditional formulation of the question in scholasticism, within which the problem of the first object of knowledge was solved, which for Duns Scotus was univocal being. And since the very formulation of the question presupposed a complementary relationship between ontology and epistemology, preceding their separation in Modern times, it was about intentional being, esse intentionale. Hence Heidegger's statements, in which scholastic and phenomenological problematics unite, according to which "as much as appearance is so much being (wieviel Schein — soviel Sein), that is, wherever something pretends to be so and so, there this self—giving is in the possibility of becoming visible and thereby being determined" ^{[27, p. 189, 119]}. Therefore, ten years after defending his dissertation, Heidegger still, albeit in a slightly different language, speaks about the primary certainty and comprehensibility of existence. And as before, being and reality (or Schein — appearance, visibility), act as something unified: something seems to be itself and thus manifests its being, and as far as it manifests, so it exists.

It follows from this that being for Heidegger is intentional being, with the only difference that the one to whom something seems to be, was previously called an intelligent soul (animal rationale), and now is called existing, Dasein. The existing Dasein is the soul to which the existing is revealed: "The ontic-ontological advantage of the existing (des Daseins) was already seen early, without the existing itself (das Dasein selbst) in its genoine ontological structure could be grasped or even simply become a problem aimed at it. Aristotle says: ? — the soul (of man) is there some way of existence; “the soul”, a component of the human being (das Sein des Menschen), opens in their ways of being, and , everything (alles Seiende) in terms of its what - so-Genesis (Da? - und Soseins), i.e. always in his existence. Thomas Aquinas included this provision, referring to the ontological thesis of Parmenides, in a characteristic reasoning. Within the framework of the task of deducing “transcendences”, i.e., the properties of being (der Seinscharaktere), which lie even higher than any possible subject-content-generic definiteness of being (Bestimmtheit eines Seienden), any modus specialis entis, and necessarily belong to every something, whatever it may be, as one such transcendens must be verum was also detected. This is done through an appeal to a certain being (ein Seiendes), which, by the very way of its being, has the ability to “converge”, that is, to agree with any being. It is a distinctive entity, ens, quod natum est convenire cum omni ente — soul (anima). The advantage of "existing" over all other beings that appears here, although ontologically unexplained, obviously has nothing to do with the bad subjectivation of the universe of being" ^{[28, p. 19]}.

To the soul, which has an ontic-ontological advantage, all the diversity of intentional being is open: the "soul", which makes up a person's being, reveals everything that exists in his being. But once again: the soul here is not thought of as an immortal substance, but as a Dasein, that is, as a fundamentally finite, mortal essence of existing, as life and existence: "The 'essence' of existing lies in its existence" ^{[28, p. 56]}. Heidegger's efforts are aimed at describing the position of the soul in the world, in order to fix and reveal this peculiar being. The soul intentionally reveals everything that exists in its being and the very existence of being is revealed to it as a given, therefore being includes everything "from God to a grain of sand" ^{[15, p. 31]}. Being is everything that can be given, because we are talking about intentional being, about ens rationis.

Conclusion: time and being

And yet one question remains: what to do with centaurs and pegasus, Baba Yaga and Santa Claus? In other words, how to distinguish between the imaginary and the existing? How to distinguish between reality and being? Heidegger uses Husserl's solution, more precisely, this solution becomes a reference point for his project. In "Logical Studies" Husserl writes the following: "What is "in" consciousness is real to us in the same way as what is "outside". The real is the individual with all its components, it is here and Now. As a characteristic feature of reality, temporality is enough for us. Real being and temporary being, although not identical, are equal concepts in terms of volume. Naturally, we do not believe that psychic experiences are things in the sense of metaphysics. However, they are still involved in some material unity, if the old metaphysical belief is true that everything that exists temporarily is necessarily a certain thing or contributes to the constitution of things. If, however, everything metaphysical should be completely excluded, then reality should be defined precisely through temporality. For here everything boils down only to the fact that it is the opposite of the timeless "being" of the ideal" ^{[6, p. 119]}. What is "in" consciousness is real to us as well as what is "outside". This indicates a kind of datum, which is real for the person to whom this datum is given. It is a kind of mental being, or intentional being. It includes everything. But how to distinguish between the real and the imaginary? Husserl says that such a criterion is time, thanks to which the real is the opposite of the ideal. The real is temporary, the ideal is timeless. Despite Heidegger's critical attitude towards his teacher, this approach will be decisive for the project of fundamental ontology and existential analytics. The whole variety of intentional being that Heidegger is talking about, that is, history, God, number, angel, whatever — "from God to a grain of sand" — passes through the bottleneck of time, which is Dasein, the real soul. Being must be understood in the horizon of time, therefore Heidegger distinguishes existence — the being of a person. However, the time of my being is completely different from being a rock, a number, a round square, or a God. What kind of being is this? And is it existence at all? Existential analytics does not give an answer to this question.