Transformation of the Historical Positioning of the Reform and Opening-up Era in the CCP's Ideology under Xi Jinping

Skosyrev Vladimir Alekseevich ORCID: 0000-0001-6787-1773 Research Fellow, Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences 117997, Russia, Moscow, Nakhimovsky Ave., 32 mr.skosyrev@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Over the past 10 years, the CPC's approaches to its own historiography have changed. Xi Jinping presented a number of new historical concepts. The main innovation is the proclamation of a "new era" in the history of the People's Republic of China. Thus, the Communist Party recorded changes in its policy and outlined further directions for the internal development of the country. As a result, it required a revision of the previous period of reforms and openness, which China entered in 1978 following the results of the 3rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation.

The topic of the transformation of the CPC's approaches to its own history at the present stage is raised in the works of a number of domestic researchers. First of all, it should be noted the articles by B.O. Khubrikov ^{[1, 2]} on how party theorists construct a homogeneous historical narrative about the past and future of the country. K.E. Kuzmin considers certain aspects of regulating the historical policy of the People's Republic of China at the legislative level ^[3]. Changes in official approaches to the history of the CPC are highlighted in the works of Yu.M. Galenovich ^{[4, 5]}. The problems of the "new era" and related changes in the party course are analyzed in detail in the articles of A.V. Vinogradov ^{[6, 7]}.

Separately, it is worth mentioning the recent work of D.A. Smirnov ^[8] on the context of the adoption of three "historical resolutions" of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945, 1981 and 2021. The author comes to the conclusion that the modern version of party history justifies the key role of Xi Jinping in completing socialist modernization by 2049.

The article by I.E. Denisov and I.Yu. Zuenko ^[9] on new moments in the historiography of the CPC after the adoption in November 2021 of the "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and experience of the centennial struggle of the party" (hereinafter referred to as the "Decision") is directly related to the topic of this study. The authors note that the emphasis in the document on the special role of Xi Jinping is accompanied by a revision of the achievements of his predecessors: "First of all, the periods of the rule of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1989-2012) were re-evaluated, which now appear as a time of increasing negative trends in the party and the state." It is concluded that the beginning of the "new era" has de facto drawn a line under the period of reforms. Meanwhile, researchers leave open the question of the year of the beginning of the "new era" in official historiography. Allegedly, it will be either 2012 — the year of Xi Jinping's coming to power, or 2022 — the year of his re-election as head of the party for a third term.

Foreign sinologists also pay attention to how the current Chinese leadership relies on history to strengthen the legitimacy of the CPC ^{[10, pp. 46-52]}. At the same time, not many works are devoted to the problem of historical positioning of the period of reforms and openness in the context of the proclamation of a "new era". As a rule, this topic is indirectly touched upon in articles on Xi Jinping's domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, the analysis is often carried out within the framework of the paradigm established in the West that in recent years China has abandoned political liberalization, which allegedly acted as a logical continuation of economic reforms ^[11]. It is concluded, they say, that the current Chinese leader is "curtailing" the measures of his predecessors to promote openness and expand the role of the market ^[12]. Only some authors indicate that many trends of the Xi Jinping era were manifested even in the reform period ^[13].

The theme of transformation of the image of the era of reforms and openness in the historiography of the CPC is partially touched upon in the works of the American political scientist Pei Minxin. In one of the articles ^[14], the researcher analyzes the content of the speeches of three Chinese leaders on the occasion of the round anniversary of the beginning of the reform and openness policy in 1998, 2008 and 2018. Conclusions are drawn about the more personalistic nature of Xi Jinping's power compared to his predecessors. The most obvious gap between the "new era" and the period of reforms, according to the author, is observed in the block on Chinese foreign policy, which is positioned as "much more ambitious and proactive."

In another article ^[15], Pei Minxin compares three "historical resolutions" of the CPC of 1945, 1981 and 2021. It is noted that in the "Decision" of 2021, compared with the 1981 document, there are significantly fewer indications of Mao Zedong's mistakes and the danger of a "leftist bias". In general, the author comes to the conclusion that the document is intended to affirm the significant position of Xi Jinping among other leaders of the CPC and to justify the fidelity of his political course against the background of the breakdown of the established norms of the transfer of power over the years of reforms.

Despite the existence of these studies, the topic of transformation of the historical positioning of the era of reforms and openness in the modern historiography of the CPC remains insufficiently studied. As I.E. Denisov and I.Yu. Zuenko rightly note ^[9], the change in the CPC's approaches to its own historiography after the adoption of the "historical resolution" in 2021 did not receive adequate coverage either in Western or domestic science. This is due to the novelty of the topic. The currently available research is mainly journalistic in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to partially fill this gap.

The purpose of the study is to trace the transformation of the historical positioning of the era of reforms and openness in the historiography of the CPC, to identify aspects of continuity and break points between the reform period and the "new era". As sources selected the most representative texts: performance of party leaders on the occasion of the round anniversary of the beginning of the policy of reforms and openness 1998, 2008 and 2018, and "Resolution" 2021 ( // [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.reformdata.org/1998/1218/4590.shtml; ? // [Electronic resource] URL: https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJlku7 ; 4040 / / / // [[Electronic resource] URL: https://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-12/18/c_1123872025.htm; // [Electronic resource] URL: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.htm ).

In the noted speeches of Chinese leaders , common semantic blocks are distinguished:

— description of the transition to transformation and assessment of the Maoist period;

— a list of the successes achieved, confirming the correctness of the path chosen in 1978;

— basic guidelines for the development of the reform period, relevant for the current moment.

By changing the semantic content of these blocks, one can judge the changes in the strategic attitudes of the CPC development.

First, the speeches of Jiang Zemin in 1998 and Hu Jintao in 2008 are analyzed. They were uttered at the peak of the reform period. There are more elements of continuity in them. Then Xi Jinping's 2018 speech is considered. By that time, a "new era" had already been proclaimed. At the same time, the completion of the reform period has not yet been indicated. Therefore, many changes in the party's course were veiled. Finally, the "Solution" of 2021 is being considered. The document explicitly refers to the end of the era of reforms, and indicates the related changes in the CPC policy.

Speeches by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao

The speeches of Jiang Zemin in 1998 and Hu Jintao in 2008 give the same assessment of the beginning of the policy of reform and openness. It is claimed that at the 3rd plenum of the 11th convocation in 1978 there was a final reversal from the chaos of the "cultural revolution" to development. The Communist Party corrected leftist mistakes and "liberated consciousness." At the same time, a sharp break in party politics is positioned as a return to the Marxist line and "the original appearance of Mao Zedong's ideas." In this aspect, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao follow the spirit of the "Decisions on some issues of the history of the CPC since the formation of the PRC" in 1981 ^{[16, pp. 40-84]}, in which the "real" ideas of Mao Zedong were separated from the "erroneous" ideology of the "cultural revolution".

The speeches go on to list the successes achieved since 1978. Both leaders talk about the development of the economy, democracy and "advanced culture". Achievements of diplomacy and external openness are noted. The effectiveness of the "one country — two systems" model is pointed out, which allowed China to return Hong Kong and Macau under its control and in the future should ensure peaceful reunification with Taiwan.

At the same time, when presenting the successes achieved, the party leaders place different accents. Thus, Jiang Zemin lists the key points and decisions in the implementation of reform policy. There is a desire to theoretically substantiate and legitimize the course taken in 1978. Hu Jintao, on the other hand, appeals more to statistics: the growth rate of the economy and the income of the population. There is a thesis that economic construction strengthens the aggregate state power and promotes "national revival". In addition, in the 2008 speech, the achievements of the party are credited to several generations of collective leadership, including the first generation of Mao Zedong. There is no term "collective leadership" in the 1998 text. It is only noted that without the leadership of Mao Zedong, there would be no New China, and without the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, there would be socialism with Chinese specifics.

The main part of the speeches is a list of historical lessons and related long—term development goals. Both speeches focus on economic construction. At the same time, it is emphasized that China will be at the initial stage of socialism (NES) for a long time. The thesis about the underdevelopment of the socialist system justifies the presence of market mechanisms in it ^{[17, p. 197]}. As stated, at the current formational stage, they are necessary for the development of productive forces and the resolution of the key contradiction between "the constantly growing material and cultural needs of people and backward social production."

Together with the concept of the NES, it is said about the importance of an objective approach to socialist construction. The speeches of the leaders show caution in assessing their own understanding of the laws of social development. It is emphasized that the party "has no reason for arrogance and complacency." Such restraint stems from the dispute about the criterion of truth that preceded the reforms ^[18] and the thesis recorded in the 1981 "Decision" about the existence of objective and not fully known to the party laws of the transformation of socialism ^{[16, p. 62]}. Both leaders also urge party members to innovate and accumulate new experience. The inadmissibility of dogmatic thinking is noted.

In the speeches of 1998 and 2008, it is emphasized that the modernization of the country is impossible without preserving social stability. In this aspect, both leaders contrast the reform period with the "cultural revolution", during which China lagged behind in development due to internal chaos. At the same time, Jiang Zemin notes the importance of resolving new social contradictions that have manifested themselves in a market economy. It is proposed to strengthen ideological work with the population and use "various economic, administrative and legal instruments." Hu Jintao's speech concretizes that one of the main contradictions is social inequality. It is emphasized that the fruits of development should be enjoyed by all segments of society. It is proposed to improve the "income distribution system" and "follow the path of universal welfare". The practical implementation of these slogans should be the improvement of the social security system, education and health care, and the promotion of employment.

The speeches also talk about the improvement of socialist democracy. At the same time, Jiang Zemin notes that there is no universal democratic model in the world. China has formed its own unique system. Its key feature is that the Communist Party ensures democratic elections, decision-making and governance. Thanks to her, people enjoy broad rights and freedoms, human rights are protected. Hu Jintao emphasizes the importance of developing democracy as a political "superstructure" in the context of reforming the economic "basis". It should be noted that during his reign, there were lively discussions in China about possible forms of intra-party and grassroots democracy.

Both speeches emphasize the uniqueness of the Chinese way of development. Jiang Zemin uses the term "socialism with Chinese specifics", designated at the XII Congress of 1982 ("socialism with Chinese specifics"). Hu Jintao, on the other hand, uses the phrase "specifically Chinese socialism", put forward at the XVII Congress of 2007. Such a change in wording emphasizes the isolation of the Chinese way from other models of socialism.

The speeches give similar guidelines for conducting foreign policy. Jiang Zemin emphasizes that her main task is to provide a peaceful environment for the modernization of the country. External contacts should contribute to the accelerated development of the Chinese economy. China's entry into the "world economic arena" is called a significant achievement. Hu Jintao's speech contains essentially the same attitudes, but they sound more assertive. Thus, it is noted that "commitment to independence and self-sufficiency should be combined with participation in economic globalization." This directly confirms the foreign economic pragmatism of the PRC and its desire to extract maximum benefits from the process of globalization. At the same time, the important role of China in the transformation of the world order is emphasized. Jiang Zemin's modest recognition of the country's success in entering the international scene was replaced by theses about the relationship between the fate of the PRC and the world, its active participation in promoting multipolarity, "democratization" of international relations and opposition to hegemony.

A new moment for the 2008 speech was a greater emphasis on patriotism. If the phrase "national revival" is mentioned 2 times in Jiang Zemin's speech, Hu Jintao pronounces it 6 times. The 2008 text also adds a part about the history of "national humiliations" that began with the Opium Wars. More attention is paid to the role of the CPC in restoring historical justice. Three revolutions in the history of China of the XX century are listed, which set the nation on the path of revival: the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the beginning of a policy of reform and openness.

Xi Jinping's speech

Xi Jinping, in his speech on the occasion of the round anniversary of reforms and openness in 2018, continues the line of his predecessors in many aspects. First of all, this concerns the assessment of the period of the "cultural revolution". It is also argued that China's economy was on the verge of collapse, and reforms were necessary to correct mistakes. The 3rd plenum of the 11th convocation was called a significant turning point in the history of the party. In the spirit of previous speeches, it is noted that it "accurately captured the scientific system of Mao Zedong's ideas" and "restored" the Marxist line.

The successes and main ideological innovations of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are listed. Thus, in all three speeches, the gap between the era of reform and openness with the "cultural revolution" is confirmed, but not with the Maoist stage of the history of the PRC as a whole. The desire of the Chinese leadership to ideologically unite the pre-reform and reform periods of the history of the CPC is traced. The link between them gradually became the mission of the "great revival of the Chinese nation." There is an idea that at various stages of the history of the CPC, its leaders solved different tasks and found their own answers to the challenges of the time. At the same time, mistakes were made and even serious deviations from the correct course occurred. However, in the end, the Communist Party was returning to the path leading to national revival.

Xi Jinping then lists the achievements of the reform period: ideological, economic, domestic and foreign policy. In this part, he basically repeats the theses of his predecessors. At the same time, new paragraphs are appearing about "building an ecological civilization" and "cleansing the internal party political environment." It is noteworthy that both of these points are about the relief of negative phenomena that have manifested themselves over the years of reforms. In the first case, we are talking about reducing greenhouse emissions, which have increased significantly due to the economic recovery of the country. The second is about the fight against waste and hedonism, which have penetrated the party as a result of the fusion of officialdom with the business environment. Thus, the part of the speech about the successes of the reform period already contains hints of overcoming it. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the speeches of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao also contained indications of the contradictions that have manifested over the years of reforms.

In the speech block on the historical lessons of the reform era, Xi Jinping confirms the basic principles expressed in the speeches of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Mainly, the thesis of the CPC's commitment to the course of transformation and openness is repeated. The importance of advancing the concept of the NES is noted. It is emphasized that economic construction and strengthening of the total state power are the primary task and the basis of national revival. The position of Hu Jintao's speech on social equality as a guarantee of social stability is being developed. The uniqueness of the Chinese way of development is again emphasized: "There is no textbook that could be worshipped as a golden section and a jasper paragraph, and there is also no teacher who could arrogantly instruct the Chinese people." Attention is drawn to the Chinese leadership's wariness of borrowing external experience. Obviously, it is proposed to rely mainly on their own developments in the future.

At the same time, in this part of Xi Jinping's speech, he identifies a number of fundamentally new provisions that allow us to conclude that the time of his reign ends the period of reforms and openness. The main thing is that Xi proclaims the transition of the PRC to a "new era". This does not mean an automatic rejection of the policy of reform and openness. It is argued that the experience accumulated over the years of transformation will be in demand at the next stage of development. However, it follows from the text of the speech that the "new era" and the period of reforms are two different stages of the construction of "specifically Chinese socialism".

Further, when listing historical lessons, Xi, in fact, sets out the main provisions of the CPC strategy in the "new era", which contrast with the attitudes of the period of reform and openness:

— the emphasis is shifting from economic growth to curbing the negative phenomena that the era of reforms has generated. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao only noted the fact of the emergence of new negative trends in the development of society. The fight against them did not become the central point of the party's strategy. Xi Jinping, in his speech, once again notes the importance of improving the environment, combating social inequality and eliminating "systemic obstacles and interest groups" that hinder development. It is emphasized that only in this way "specifically Chinese socialism" will become more mature and formalized;

— a new key contradiction of Chinese socialism is being identified. During the reform period, this was a discrepancy between "the constantly growing material and cultural needs of people and backward social production." In the "new era", the gap "between the ever-growing needs of the people for a wonderful life and the unevenness and incompleteness of development" came to the fore. The nomination of a new key contradiction confirms the change of epochs and the shift in the emphasis of party politics. In the foreseeable future, it will not be aimed at enriching and achieving high rates of economic growth, but at improving the quality of life and improving the management system ^[7];

— the approach to reforms and governance of the country is changing. In the era of reforms and openness, the Chinese leadership proceeded from the thesis that the laws of socialist development are not fully known to anyone. Economic and political transformations were carried out on the principle of "crossing the river, groping for stones." In the absence of a unified theory of reforms ^{[19, p. 133]}, innovations from below and experiments on the periphery of the system were encouraged. In the "new era" of Xi Jinping, a new approach is taking root — the so-called high-level planning (). Further development should follow the principles developed "from above" ("five in one", "four comprehensive aspects"). The careful assessment of one's own understanding of the laws of socialist development has been replaced by the requirement to maintain full confidence in the Chinese way and system (the "four sureties"). At the same time, Xi Jinping calls for preserving the innovative spirit and integrating it with strategic and dialectical thinking;

— the transition to the concept of high-level planning coincided with the strengthening of personalistic tendencies in Chinese politics. In the ideological field, a figure has reappeared who has an understanding of historical patterns of development, can guide society and determine the change of epochs. In the text of the speech, this trend manifested itself in the disappearance of the mention of the concept of generations of "leadership teams". This paradigm reflected the intra-elite consensus on the regular turnover of the party leader and the inadmissibility of the formation of his personality cult;

— the approach to political construction is changing. Xi Jinping confirms his predecessors' commitment to improving democratic and consultative mechanisms. At the same time, there is a refusal to establish a reform period to delineate areas of responsibility between the CPC and government agencies. Experiments on the introduction of checks and balances at the grassroots level of public administration are being curtailed. Instead, efforts are directed at expanding the party's powers, increasing its effectiveness and resilience to external and internal challenges. At the same time, in order to preserve the "blood bond" between the CPC and the masses, it is proposed to work with the consciousness and behavior of officials, "put morality first" ().

In the block on the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China, there is a continuation of the tendency manifested in Hu Jintao's speech to emphasize the international role of the People's Republic of China. New concepts and initiatives — the "Community of the Common Destiny of mankind" and "One Belt, One Road" — have become the theoretical formalization of this trend. It is argued that over the years of reforms, China has contributed to world development and has become an example for developing countries. The course on external openness as the most profitable model of behavior for the PRC has been confirmed.

Xi Jinping's speech develops a nationalist theme. The term "national revival" occurs 12 times — twice as often as in Hu Jintao's speech. Added links to Chinese classical sources. The antiquity of Chinese civilization is emphasized. The historical "humiliations" of the XIX century are not mentioned. The three key events on the path of national revival are the founding of the CPC in 1921, the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the beginning of a policy of reform and openness.

"The decision of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and experience of the centennial struggle of the party"

The "Decision" of 2021 develops and consolidates the provisions of Xi Jinping's speech of 2018 concerning the assessment of the period of reforms and openness. The document finally confirms its completion and the beginning of a "new era". In the periodization of the history of the CPC, four stages are distinguished: the new democratic revolution before the founding of the People's Republic of China, the socialist revolution and construction since 1949, the period of reform and openness 1978-2012 and the "new era" after the XVIII Congress of 2012. The idea is repeated that at every stage the party made breakthroughs in social development and became closer to the goal of national revival. Unlike the speech of 2018, the document contains an excerpt about the historical "humiliations" of the XIX century. It is from them, according to party theorists, that the processes that led to the founding of the CPC and the modernization of China under its auspices begin.

At the same time, the document designates a new "formula" of "national revival" after 1949. Under Mao Zedong, the country got back on its feet. During the reform period, she enriched herself. In the "new era", China will become strong. Based on this, it can be assumed that it will last until 2049, when the completion of the construction of a "rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious modernized socialist state" is scheduled.

It is important to note that, unlike the speech of 2018, the "Decision" explicitly states that in the "new era" China will still be at the initial stage of socialism.

The document states that the policy of reform and openness refuted the "cultural revolution", but not the Maoist period as a whole. As noted, under Mao Zedong, the country built an independent and "relatively integral" industry. At the same time, it is emphasized that even at the VIII Congress of 1956, the party pointed out as a key contradiction the discrepancy between the people's need for rapid economic and cultural development and their inability at this stage to meet this need. Mao Zedong's statement is given that the construction of socialism is a long historical stage. Thus, Mao's "true" ideas are associated with the development guidelines of the reform period: a similar key contradiction and the concept of the NES. In this context, the "cultural Revolution" is a temporary "failure" of party politics caused by the difficult foreign policy situation, the subjective mistakes of Mao Zedong and the intrigues of the "counterrevolutionary" groups Lin Biao and Jiang Qing.

Three key achievements of the reform era are given: a breakthrough from relatively backward productive forces to the second economy of the world, a transition from food and clothing shortages to average prosperity, a leap from getting on your feet to getting rich. As a result, "systemic guarantees" and "material conditions" have been created for the great revival of the Chinese nation. Other ideological, domestic and foreign policy successes are also mentioned. However, in general, the emphasis is on the material component of the achievements of the reform period. Thus, the intermediate nature of its results and the need to balance the further course are indicated.

The "solution" indicates the break points between the "new era" and the period of reforms. If in the speech of 2018 they were outlined indirectly by presenting the historical lessons of 40 years of transformations, then in the document of 2021 the shortcomings of the reform period and the strategy for their correction are directly highlighted.

At the same time, there are no significant changes in development attitudes compared to 2018. The main message is that the country's economy will become more balanced. Allegedly, during the period of reforms, individual departments and regions "unilaterally" pursued high growth rates and relied on extensive development methods. As a result, structural and systemic contradictions have accumulated. In the "new era", the fruits of economic growth will be distributed more evenly and fairly. More resources will be directed to the social sphere to improve the system of income distribution, healthcare, education, employment and housing affordability. The key contradiction "between the ever-growing needs of the people for a wonderful life and the uneven and incomplete development" is again mentioned as an indicator of the change in the party's course.

The principle of "high-level planning" is also confirmed, according to which it is supposed to improve the management system. The most urgent task in this case is to "strengthen the long-term management capabilities" of the Communist Party. It is in this aspect that the most serious problems are fixed. Allegedly, in the era of reforms and openness, a "crisis of political beliefs" was revealed among some members of the CPC. There were manifestations of "formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and wastefulness" in the work of officials. The work of the party-state apparatus became disorganized, inefficient and difficult to manage.

The danger of the formation of "gangs and gangs", manifestations of nepotism and populism within the party is particularly noted. The text contains direct references to the cases of Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Sun Zhengcai and Lin Jihua. The importance of maintaining full unity within the party and the inadmissibility of "individualism, separatism, liberalism, localism, fawning" is emphasized. Obviously, the relative pluralism of opinions and "interest groups" manifested in the era of reforms, from the point of view of the current leadership, still creates obstacles to the creation of an effective vertical of power capable of coping with the challenges of the "new era".

The mentioned problems will be solved mainly by ideological re-education of officials. Allegedly, it is precisely because of the lack of beliefs that a "spiritual" lack of calcium" and "rickets" occur, which inevitably leads to political rebirth, economic greed, moral decline and a depraved life." At the same time, it is planned to improve the personnel policy and continue the fight against corruption. Meanwhile, the document confirms the curtailment of individual experiments on the introduction of consultation mechanisms, checks and balances within the party and at the grassroots level, which, according to the previous leadership of the CPC, were supposed to institutionalize complicated and fragmented socio-political relations.

As in the 2018 speech, the "Solution" lacks the concept of generations of Chinese leaders. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are called "the main representatives of the Chinese Communist Party." Meanwhile, Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping are referred to as the "cores" of the party leadership. According to the document, only they formulated their own "ideas" (), which are applied at certain stages of party history. Mao's ideas are the theoretical basis of the socialist revolution and construction. Xi's ideas are of a "new era". Deng Xiaoping's "theory" in this scheme turns out to be an ideological construct of a lower order. After all, it forms the ideological basis of the reform period not independently, but together with the "important idea of the three representations" and the "concept of scientific development". It is noteworthy that the last two concepts are mentioned in the text of the document and without the names of their authors at all — Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Thus, a hierarchy of Communist Party leaders emerges, in which only two figures — Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping — make "epoch-making" decisions about the direction of the country's development.

The thesis traced in previous speeches about the special Chinese way of development in the "Solution" of 2021 is framed in the ideology of the "modernization of the Chinese type" ()). It is claimed that over 100 years of struggle, the CCP has not just created a unique socio-political system in China, but has given birth to a "new form of human civilization." The civilizational paradigm allows party theorists to further emphasize the isolation of the PRC's social system from the Soviet and Western models of development and theoretically substantiate the appeal of the Communist Party to traditional culture ^[20]. At the same time, the possibility of "exporting" individual elements of the Chinese model is indicated. Allegedly, the CPC has contributed to global progress by presenting the Chinese modernization project to mankind. It is proposed to take a closer look at "countries and nations that hope to accelerate development and at the same time preserve their own independence."

The "Decision" of 2021 also contains a number of new provisions. They are connected with the complication of the domestic and foreign policy situation. Thus, failures in the implementation of the "one country — two systems" model are recognized. The document points to "ferocious activity to confront China and create chaos in Hong Kong." Allegedly, the country's leadership reacted to it with measures to "maintain the constitutional order of the special administrative region" and implement the principle that Hong Kong and Macau are "governed by patriots."

The "Solution" reflects the concerns of the Chinese leadership about the prospects for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. It is noted that in recent years, "the authorities of Taiwan have intensified separatist activities for its "independence", which seriously affected the pace of peaceful development of relations between the two sides of the strait."

The document draws attention to the complication of the foreign policy environment. If in previous speeches it was said about the international environment favorable for China's development, then in the "Decision" of 2021 it is noted: "Entering the "new era", the balance of international forces has undergone a profound adjustment. Unilateralism, protectionism, hegemonism and brute force policies pose an increasing threat to world peace and development. Anti-globalist tendencies are growing. The world has entered a period of turmoil." At the same time, the trend towards the activation of Chinese diplomacy, traced in previous speeches, remains. It is noted that China will promote "a new type of international relations", reform of the "global governance system" and economic globalization.

Conclusion

The proclamation of a "new era" means the end of a period of reform and openness. These are two different stages of the construction of "specifically Chinese socialism". The countdown of the "new era", in accordance with the "Decision" of 2021, should begin with Xi Jinping's coming to power in 2012.

The transition of the People's Republic of China to a "new era" is associated with the correction of the party course. The emphasis is shifting from economic construction to the relief of negative phenomena that have manifested themselves over the years of reforms: corruption, poor governance of the party-state apparatus, social inequality, environmental pollution.

The resolution of these contradictions presupposes the building of a rigid vertical of power, partialization and reideologization of society. A course has been taken to create a disciplined party-state apparatus that is able to implement the strategic guidelines of the leadership in accordance with the principle of "high-level planning". At the same time, mainly ideological tools are used to ensure the controllability of the system. At the same time, there is a rejection of the experiments of the reform period on the separation of powers of the party and the state.

One of the aspects of the re—ideologization of society is the reappearance in the Chinese ideological field of a figure who understands the principles of socialist construction and makes "epoch-making" decisions about the development of the country. This is a departure from the thesis of the reform period that the party leadership does not know the patterns of social transformation.

Another aspect of reideologization is the formation of a homogeneous historical narrative about the past and future of the country ^[1]. The emphasis is placed on fueling patriotic sentiments and emphasizing the isolation of the Chinese way. The various stages of the party's history are positioned as steps towards the "great revival" of China and the creation of a unique model of modernization.

Within the framework of such a scheme of historical narrative, the transition from one era to another can be described as continuity through a gap. The various stages of the party's history are consistent with each other, as they are united by the mission of strengthening the country. At the same time, each new stage corrects the mistakes of the previous one. Thus, the period of reforms and openness replaced the Maoist model of modernization, when critical contradictions accumulated in it. At the same time, in general, the Maoist stage is evaluated positively. Similarly, the achievements of the reform period are recognized. The contradictions generated by it should be resolved by the "new era".

China's entry into the "new era" coincided with the complication of the domestic and foreign policy situation. Failures in the functioning of the "one country — two systems" model are fixed. There is a crisis in international relations. As a result, the continuation of the "period of strategic opportunities" favorable for China's development is called into question.

At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind the elements of continuity between the "new era" and the period of reforms.

Xi Jinping has not abandoned the concept of the NES. This indicates the commitment of the current Chinese leadership to the course of continuing market reforms. A unique configuration is emerging when, while maintaining market mechanisms, total partialization and reideologization of society is carried out.

Continuity remains in the activation of Chinese foreign policy. Beijing's desire to participate in the transformation of the international order is indicated in Hu Jintao's speech. Because of this, it does not seem entirely true that Xi Jinping radically revised the foreign policy guidelines of the reform period. At the same time, it should be recognized that under Xi Jinping, Chinese diplomacy has acquired more confrontational features due to the increase in military and political tensions between China and the United States.

Finally, it is important to note that the public contradictions outlined in Xi Jinping's speech and the "Decision" of 2021 were also recorded in the speeches of his predecessors. Before he came to power, the CPC also took measures to combat corruption, improve the party-state apparatus and redirect resources to the social sphere. However, while the country's economy was growing at double-digit rates, these aspects did not become the central link of the party's agenda.