Analysis of the First Positivists’ (A. Comte, H. Spencer) Views of Mankind’s Moral Development

Semukhina Elena Aleksandrovna ORCID: 0000-0001-8560-0707 PhD in Philology Associate Professor, Department of Translation Studies and Intercultural Communication, Yuri Gagarin State Technical University of Saratov 410008, Russia, Saratov region, Saratov, Polytechnic str., 77 semuh@rambler.ru Other publications by this author

The problem of the genesis of morality, as well as the problem of moral consciousness, has now acquired completely new features. The boundaries of the moral and immoral have become so blurred that in some cases it is difficult to draw a demarcation line between these two concepts and the corresponding socio-psychological phenomena. All this leads to disorientation of a person, to his inability to separate good from evil, normal from abnormal, etc. In this regard, the purpose of this work is to analyze the concepts of two representatives of early positivism, a philosophical doctrine, in the research field of which ethical issues fell. Recall that representatives of the "second wave" of positivism (Machism, empirio-criticism) were entirely focused on the problems of the methodology of science, while logical positivism tried to adequately solve a number of problems related to scientific language.

Within the framework of this goal , it is assumed:

1) to identify the ideas of O. Comte and G. Spencer about the development of morality;

2) to determine the specifics of the views of these thinkers on society;

3) present their views on human nature;

4) to conduct a comparative analysis of the concepts of Comte and Spencer for their similarities and differences;

5) to carry out constructive criticism of the provisions that seem to be the most controversial.

First of all, let us recall O. Comte's teaching about the three stages of the development of human consciousness and, accordingly, the specifics of the dominant forms of knowledge in a particular period. Comte calls the first stage theological or fictitious. At this stage, initially, "external bodies" appear as the causes of various phenomena, to which the imagination attributes a life similar to a human one. This initial stage is called fetishism.

At the second stage of the first stage, fetishism is replaced by polytheism: about which the philosopher writes the following: "The majority of our kind has not yet emerged from this stage, at which it stubbornly continues to remain now..." ^{[1, p. 147]}. Finally, at the third stage, the most perfect form of theological knowledge arises, namely monotheism.

Comte defines the second stage as metaphysical or abstract, in which the dominant form of knowledge is philosophy, which builds metaphysical concepts based on the concept of essence. And if the theological stage is compared by the philosopher with the childhood of mankind, then: "The metaphysical state should ... ultimately be considered as a kind of chronic disease naturally inherent in the evolution of our thought – individual or collective on the border between infancy and manhood" ^{[1, p. 152]}.

The third stage of the development of consciousness is the positive or real stage, the formulation of the basic law of which sounds like "the constant subordination of imagination to observation." This means that imagination loses its dominant position, giving way to the study of laws or, better to say, stable connections between observed phenomena. Subsequently, having radicalized this research strategy, the founder of psychological positivism, E. Mach, will designate it with the concept of studying "functional relationships, identifying the dependence that exists between our experiences" ^{[2, p. 49]}. Unlike Mach, O. Comte did not limit science to the analysis of sensory data, but highly appreciated the ability of scientists to rational generalizations.

The founder of sociology supported and developed the idea that the quality of society as a whole directly depends on the level of development of an individual ^{[3, p. 25-26]}. That is why it was important for him to demonstrate that human consciousness and his thinking in particular is developing progressively, gradually moving to a positive (positive) stage: "He wrote about the influence of climate and racial composition of the population on the development of society. However, the main influence on the development of society is, according to the Contour, the intellectual evolution of mankind as the evolution of its consciousness" ^{[4, p. 34]}. Thus, it is not needs (as in the teachings of K. Marx), but consciousness that turns out to be the decisive factor determining the development of society.

However, human consciousness also has needs, the main of which are the needs for order and progress. And positive philosophy, from Comte's point of view, satisfies them more fully than was possible at the theological and metaphysical stage.

The provision on order and progress, on the harmonious development of all spheres of public life is the first in a series of those that have been severely criticized by representatives of Marxism. In their opinion, "the main conservative idea of social statics consists in the statement about the impossibility and uselessness of a revolutionary transformation of bourgeois society. "Love as a principle, order as a foundation, and progress as a goal," according to Comte, is the highest norm for evaluating social phenomena. This formula is one of the typical examples of bourgeois-liberal phraseology" ^{[5, p. 197]}. History has shown that the French philosopher's point of view turned out to be quite sound, since Western "bourgeois-liberal" society was never transformed through a social revolution, despite the presence of a clearly pronounced revolutionary situation in many European countries (for example, in Germany) at the beginning of the XX century.

Since moral ideas have the strongest influence on the development of society, according to Kont, the second chapter of the cited work is devoted to the "systematization of morality". We emphasize that the "social statics" mentioned above by the Contour is a harmonious state of society as an integral organism, while social dynamics is its development due to the influence of moral ideas ^{[6, p. 5]}. Appreciating the Catholic morality of the Middle Ages, Comte, nevertheless, notes the harmful influence of metaphysics on it, as a result of which morality suffered serious losses for five centuries. In the words of the philosopher himself: "Metaphysics, which has so often sought to actively destroy morality, and theology, which has long lost the ability to protect it, both, nevertheless, persist in the desire to make it a kind of eternal and exclusively their own property, regardless of the attitude of public opinion to these empirical claims" ^{[1, c. 173]}. Comte quite correctly notes the tendency to a rational re-evaluation of morality, to the gradual loss of its sacred character given by Catholicism. The French thinker believes that morality, in view of the fact that theology and metaphysics are gradually losing their significance and can no longer support it, should finally be freed from their influence ^{[8, p. 212]}. In this regard, the philosopher argues that a new philosophy, positive thinking, can become the basis for creating a morality that can "restrain the onslaught of passions."

Comte considers the main task in this aspect to be the elimination of the contradiction between intellectual and moral needs, which should be facilitated by the spread of positive thinking: "From now on, on the contrary, all real speculations, properly systematized, will continuously contribute to, as far as possible, to deliver a universal predominance of morality, since the social point of view will necessarily become a scientific link and a logical regulator of all other positive views" ^{[1, p. 180]}. In fact, as we know, the rejection of the sacred character and attempts at rational justification led to the fact that European morality lost its ontological basis and became, as it were, optional, situational, which F. Nietzsche convincingly proved at the time.

It seems interesting in Comte's views that, probably for the first time in the history of thought, he saw in the nature of religious morality a kind of egoism, manifested in the fact that the earthly life and all the actions of each individual believer are directed exclusively to his own salvation. According to Comte: "human society ... represents only a cluster of individuals ... each of whom is concerned about his own personal salvation and who consider participation in the salvation of another as a powerful means to better deserve their own salvation by obeying the prescriptions that impose this duty on them from above" ^{[1, p. 182]}. It is hardly possible to fully agree with this provision, but the moment of egoism is most likely present here and is a consequence of the requirement to love "your neighbor as yourself." In the history of thought, the latter has often been interpreted in such a way that one must first love oneself, and then one's neighbor, and although this interpretation leaves some obvious doubts, nevertheless, it had and has the right to exist.

In the foundations of the new morality, it is important for Comte, first of all, a sense of social solidarity, the organic connection of the individual with the social whole, with society. Happiness for him lies in intelligent activity, the basis of which is sympathy. The human mind must pacify animal passions by connecting an individual with the entire human race. A special role in the spread of positive reason and new morality is played by universal, popular education.

Turning to the analysis of Mr. Spencer's views, first of all, we point out that he found the foundations of morality in the animal world. Currently, this kind of biologism is hardly possible, but if there are no commandments sanctified by the presence of God, then either the human mind or the animal world can act as a basis. In this regard, reason loses, since the moral norms it justifies turn out to be nothing more than human institutions that can be revised ("overestimated") at any time, depending on changes in socio-political realities.

Justifying the derivation of social morality (first of all, the sense of justice) from animal morality, Spencer argues that they have a kind of continuity: "From an evolutionary point of view, human life should be considered as a further development of pre-human life; it follows that from the same point of view, human justice should represent the further development of pre-human justice" ^{[9, p. 15]}.

To begin with, in the animal world, Spencer notes the presence of two kinds of actions, one of which is dictated by self–care, and the other kind is concern for the welfare of others. In the words of Spencer: "Two kinds of actions – altruistic, or inspired by love for others, and egoistic, or selfish – point us to two main and opposite principles of morality in animals" ^{[9, p. 4]}. Continuing the intentions laid down in this thesis, Spencer points out that in the natural world the greatest "benefit" is received by those who are most adapted to exist in the environment ^{[10, p. 100]}. This provision is subsequently practically unchanged and extrapolated to the human social environment, as will be discussed below.

All animal behavior is actually limited to one goal – concern for the preservation of the genus. Spencer deduces several general laws from this provision: firstly, the animal community cares about preserving the best, the fittest individuals, to the detriment of the worst; secondly, investments in childhood are inversely proportional to the value of the children themselves, which encourages parents to some "self-sacrifice"; thirdly, on the basis of this self-sacrifice arises and parental "self-restraint". The philosopher stipulates that these provisions relate primarily to higher animals, which have the most developed care for offspring.

Since the main share of benefits falls on the set of the fittest individuals, a law arises from this, according to which: "each individual must be subjected to the consequences of its own nature and the behavior resulting from this nature" ^{[9, p. 8]}. In this aspect, Spencer's parallel between a community and an individual organism seems interesting. From his point of view, the body is a perfect community of organs, each of which receives as much blood and, accordingly, nutrition as it should for its contribution to the whole. If the organ does not work well, then its nutrition becomes scarce, and it gradually degenerates; if it works well, then it develops better than the others. Thus, the organism turns out to be a kind of ideal society, within which "social" justice is realized.

However, the philosopher also notes that pre-human justice is imperfect, since in a vast number of cases the percentage of benefits is not related to the specifics of behavior, i.e. it does not always depend on the qualities of a particular individual. This is partly due to the fact that animals are more dependent on the natural environment than humans. That is why often the best die along with the worst due to the severity of the climate ("elements"), due to lack of food, the presence of a large number of parasites, etc. Hence Spencer makes an interesting conclusion that the higher the level of organization, the higher the level of justice: "It is obvious that the higher the talents, spiritual and bodily, of a given species and, consequently, the higher its ability to cope with environmental accidents, the less the continuation of each individual's life depends on accidents that it cannot cope with" ^{[9, p. 10]}. At this stage of the development of Spencer's thought, the contours of its further development are already outlined in the transition to the analysis of justice in human society.

Already at the level of herd animals, the law is manifested, according to which, taking care of oneself, one should not interfere with performing similar actions to others: "In herd animals, and even more so, the more significant their cooperation, the law also plays a role ..., stating that those actions by which an individual, by nature, achieves benefits and avoids evil, must be restrained by the need not to interfere with similar actions of other individuals" ^{[9, p. 14]}. This, in fact, is what we see as the basis of social justice, as Spencer understood it.

For example, let's give a definition of human justice, compare it with the definition of justice of the herd animal world already given and try to find differences. The definition of human justice has the following wording: "Each person, when performing actions that support her life, and without encountering interference when achieving normal, good or bad consequences of her actions, must take into account the restrictions imposed on her by performing similar actions of other individuals; these latter, in turn, must use such the same normal, good or bad consequences" ^{[9, p. 19]}. As we can see, the definition has not undergone significant changes, except that it has become more detailed and, as a result, more "heavy". This is the end of the review of Spencer's ethical ideas, since then he actually moves away from the field of ethics into the field of law, and the analysis of the legal aspects of his theoretical views goes beyond the scope of this work and requires a separate study.

At the same time, after analyzing Spencer's theory of justice, it should be concluded that it exactly fits into the definitions of the so-called "reasonable egoism", which many philosophers, both foreign and domestic (in particular, N.G. Chernyshevsky), adhered to in different periods of the development of philosophical thought. By the way, the Russian Marxists sought to protect Chernyshevsky from the concept of "reasonable egoism", interpreting his views as follows: "What Chernyshevsky considers to be a reasonably understood personal interest, in fact implies not egoism, but the active participation of a person on the side of the masses in the struggle for changing the social order, for the liberation and happiness of the whole people" ^{[5, p. 365]}. It is doubtful that Chernyshevsky did not realize in what sense he uses this or that concept, but after an ideologized reading of the concept of "egoism" his views became practically flawless in this aspect.

In general, the concepts of O. Comte and G. Spencer are similar in many points, although they contain significant differences. The most important difference is the understanding of the nature of morality, which finds its basis either in the human mind (Comte) or in the natural animal environment (Spencer).

Among the most significant similarities, it should be noted, first of all, the definition of society as a unity, resembling a biological organism in its characteristics. This provision seems to be productive today, since it actually corresponds to the modern understanding of society as a kind of ecosystem, all levels of which are organically interconnected. In addition, we recall that both thinkers sought to harmonize the societies of their time, eliminate internal contradictions, direct people's activity not to conflicts, but to cooperation and mutual understanding. Equally openly and quite reasonably, they did not accept the revolutionary path of socio-political transformations.

The second similarity should be recognized as the understanding of human history as a progressive process in which the individual human mind, morality and society as a whole are simultaneously improving. How much this provision corresponds to reality is a big question if we pay attention to the humanity of our time. Regarding the latter, the most significant is the problem of parallel development of reason and morality: these processes do not seem to be synchronous and, moreover, coincident. Rather, both actions intersect from time to time, while remaining independent and having different trajectories.

The third similarity is the idea of both thinkers about man, presented in the spirit of reasonable egoism. Their ideas about morality can also be attributed here, not as something eternal, but as a mobile situational system, or even better, a set of principles: the "reasonable egoist" is guided not by traditional morality with its frozen concepts of Good and Evil, but by situational ethics, in which each case is considered in an individual, unique way the key" ^{[11, p. 215]}. The question is whether situational ethics is the pinnacle of the progress of the human mind or, because of its non-necessity, one should try to return God as a firm, unshakable foundation of moral principles.