Applied Analysis of U.S.-China Strategic Competition in the UN System 2017-2022

Al Asad Ali ORCID: 0009-0001-0220-8951 Graduate student of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2 ali.99.al.asad@gmail.com

Tsimashchenia Viachaslau Andreevich ORCID: 0000-0002-0961-2244 Graduate student of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, ul. miklukho-Maklaya, 10/2 v.timoshchenya@gmail.com

Introduction

The strategic rivalry between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China for leadership in the modern world is becoming one of the key factors determining the development of international relations. The competition of these countries is unfolding in many directions – in the military ^[1],[2],[3], economic ^[4],[5],[6], technological spheres ^{[7],[8, [9]}. However, one of its most important aspects is the competition for influence in international organizations ^{[10],[11],[12]}.

The UN remains a unique universal international structure designed to develop common approaches to solving global problems. Control over this organization makes it possible to shape the agenda of world politics in many ways ^[13],[14]. In the first decades of the UN's existence, the United States and its Western allies had such control. However, in recent years, China has been actively increasing its presence in the organization, seeking to challenge the status quo ^[15],[16].

The purpose of this article is to identify the features of strategic competition between the United States and China in the UN system in the period from 2017 to 2022 to identify key trends and patterns in the behavior of these countries in multilateral organizations. As a result of the conducted research, the authors intend to obtain new factual data and, based on them, draw reasoned conclusions about the nature of the rivalry between the two powers in international organizations at the present stage. This will deepen the understanding of the issue under study and contribute to the academic literature on this topic.

The applied analysis and the "Case study" method in this article implies consideration and evaluation of specific aspects of strategic competition between the United States and China in the UN system in the period 2017-2022. The authors of the article use this methodology for several reasons: to analyze the positions and roles of China and the United States in specialized agencies, as well as organizations "related" to the UN, – who heads these organizations, what influence countries have; to consider the dynamics of budget contributions of China and the United States to the UN – how the shares of countries in the budget of the organization have changed over time; to analyze the reaction of the United States and China to the UN on human rights issues in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang – who and which countries supported this or that position; and, finally, to assess the prospects for the development of China's multilateral diplomacy in the context of rivalry with the United States.

The use of applied analysis allows the authors to collect and systematize factual data on various aspects of rivalry in the United Nations; to identify specific trends and patterns in the behavior of China and the United States; to substantiate their conclusions with factual data and examples, and not just theoretical reasoning.

In contrast to theoretical works, the authors consider specific practical aspects of competition in the UN system – management of organizations, financing, responses to crises. This gives a more complete picture of the real interaction of the powers. Moreover, the article is based on an empirical base – data on budgets, speeches, and votes. This increases the objectivity of the conclusions. The authors not only state the current situation, but also make forecasts of further development based on applied analysis. Thus, this article contributes to the study of this topic due to its practical orientation. This makes the work more valuable both for the academic community and for specialists in the field of US-Chinese competition.

The main part

In October 2017, at the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chinese President Xi Jinping was re-elected to the post of General Secretary. In his speech at the congress, he announced several new concepts that were supposed to determine the further development of China's foreign policy. In particular, Xi Jinping urged to adhere to the principle of "Power Diplomacy with Chinese specifics" ^[17], aimed at strengthening China's international positions. He also mentioned the idea of "A new type of International relations" ^[18], implying the formation of a new model of interaction between states under the auspices of the PRC. Another important concept was the idea of a "Community of One Destiny" ^[19], designed to strengthen China's ties with other developing countries. Thus, Xi Jinping outlined a course to intensify China's efforts to strengthen its position on the world stage.

On June 22-23, 2018, the Third Central Working Conference on Foreign Affairs was held in Beijing, at which the concept of "Socialism with Chinese specifics" was put forward as a new diplomatic guide for China's foreign policy ^[20]. However, the most remarkable thing in China's foreign policy in the second term of Xi Jinping's leadership is the transition to active diplomacy. Xi Jinping's second term of leadership was also marked by the emergence of active multilateral diplomacy, which seeks to lay the foundation for new international norms and order focused on China ^{[21, p. 29]}.

Deng Xiaoping's "Xiaokan" policy was initiated in the post-Cold War era. In his speech in December 1990 Deng called for the hidden development of the state and stressed that this is a "fundamental national policy" that China should defend ^{[22, p. 96]}. Since then, the state has played a significant role in various international organizations, including the UN, but has distanced itself from the role of a global leader. This diplomatic orientation was largely preserved under the successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Under Xi Jinping, however, the Chinese policy inherited from Deng Xiaoping has changed. China gradually expanded its influence and occupied leading positions in major international organizations and systems. One of the most striking examples of this shift is China's growing influence in specialized UN agencies, where the state is increasingly beginning to take leadership positions. In total, there are 15 specialized agencies in the UN, of which the United States, which occupies a hegemonic position in the international community, currently heads only one – the World Bank, and China – four (Table 1).

Table 1 – Secretaries-General/Heads of specialized agencies and UN-affiliated organizations and their nationalities (as of February 2023)

Source: compiled by the authors based on information from Specialized Agencies // United Nations URL: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/specialized-agencies (accessed: 02/25/2023).

In the context of the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, the PRC under Xi Jinping is undergoing institutional transformations aimed at strengthening material and human resources to increase the importance of multilateral diplomacy, especially its influence in international organizations. A striking example of the intensification of work towards the revision of China's material resources can be an increase in its budget contributions to the UN and individual financial support. China's contribution to the UN regular budget is based on the economic performance of each member state, and thanks to stable economic development, China has become the eighth largest contributor to the UN budget from 1.54% in 2000 to about 3.2% in 2010. Since then, thanks to constant economic growth, China took sixth place in 2015 with a share of about 5.1%, 3rd place in 2016 with a share of about 8% and 2nd place in 2022 with a share of about 15.25%, overtaking Japan with a share of 8.03% (Table 2).

Table 2 – UN Member States making the main contribution to the organization's budget (% of the total size of the organization's budget)

Source: compiled by the authors based on information from the Committee on Contributions // UN General Assembly URL: https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/index.shtml (accessed: 02/25/2023).

China also increased its financial support to UNESCO, from which the United States withdrew, and the World Health Organization (WHO), which was criticized for its bias towards China, demonstrating its desire to expand its influence in key international organizations ^{[23, p. 76]}. If the change in China's quota rating can be considered as a natural consequence of the economic development of the state, then the fact that Beijing "fills the void" in relevant international organizations and strengthens its individual financial support can be considered as part of China's strengthening of multilateral diplomacy through the active expansion of its material resources ^{[24, p. 52]}.

On the other hand, in recent years China has been constantly increasing its human resources support to the UN, as well as creating new systems to increase the number of Chinese personnel sent to various international organizations. For example, Beijing is making internal institutional changes to increase its human resources for international organizations. In the past, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China selected personnel for international organizations through a limited examination due to bureaucracy. However, in recent years, China has established degree programs in international management at major Chinese universities and is actively seeking to increase its influence on the formulation and application of norms in major international organizations by sending trained personnel to these institutions ^[25]. Beijing also provides financial support to domestic interns working without pay in international organizations, encouraging young people to gain experience in the international arena ^{[26, p. 3]}.

As of February 2022, China heads a total of four specialized UN agencies. Lee Yun, Director-General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, was first elected to this position in June 2013 and re-elected in November 2017, marking his seventh year as Director-General. Zhao Guding, Director General of the International Telecommunication Union, was appointed in January 2015 and served in this post for four years, after which he was re-elected in the organization's elections in 2018, and in January 2019 began his second term. Liu Fan, Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Organization, who took office in August 2015 and served a three-year term, was reassigned by the ICAO Council for a second term as Secretary General from August 2018 ^[27]. The Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations was elected by the General Assembly in June 2019 by 108 votes out of 191. In the voting for his appointment, the majority were countries of Africa and Latin America. The representative of France, Catherine Juzelin-La Nere, supported by the European Union at that time, received 71 votes, and the representative of Georgia, David Kirbalidze, supported by the United States, received only 12 ^[28].

In addition to these four specialized UN bodies, China has strong influence or close ties with the leaders of at least five other organizations, including WHO Director General Tedros Adanom Ghebreyesus, who has been accused of repeatedly criticizing China as the source of the COVID-19 pandemic ^{[29, p. 18]}.

It is obvious that China's influence and leadership in specialized UN bodies has increased under Xi Jinping, but the role and place of the United States, even if it is headed by a non-American, does not seem to be less than that of the PRC. It is also worth taking into account the broad partner network of the United States, consisting of NATO allies, as well as states that, according to the US State Department, have the status of "non-NATO allies" ^[30].

China receives the support of African, Asian and Latin American countries due to its past experience of interaction with the "third world" during the Cold War, development assistance and investments based on economic power, and representation of the interests of underdeveloped and developing countries dissatisfied with the unilateral approach of the great powers ^{[31, p. 54]}. This was the main factor that allowed China to take leadership positions in international organizations and elect people friendly to its interests, such as WHO Director-General Tedros Adanom Ghebreyesus.

Moreover, Chinese funding for WHO's fight against AIDS, which was rejected by the United States, and Chinese financial support for Ethiopia, have become one of the factors in maintaining Tedros Gebreisus' friendly and close relations with China ^[32].

The "ideological" rivalry between the US and China intensified in 2020 with the addition of the COVID-19 pandemic to the existing debates about human rights and democracy in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In this process, the international community has witnessed several confrontations between the US and China on these issues.

On July 8, 2019, the ambassadors of 22 countries, including the United Kingdom, sent a letter to the Chairman and the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the 41st session of the UN HRC in Geneva, condemning human rights violations against the Uighur minority in the Chinese region of Xinjiang ^[33].

 Two days later, the UN Human Rights Commission published a document signed by representatives of 37 countries supporting China's position. The document noted that China has made outstanding achievements in the field of human rights in relation to the Muslim minority of the Uighurs and that they oppose the politicization of human rights ^[34].

The debate and confrontation between the US and China over the human rights of the Xinjiang Uighur minority re-emerged at the third session of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, about three months after the UN Human Rights Council. The British Ambassador to the UN, Karen Pierce, issued a joint statement with 23 other countries condemning China's human rights violations against the Uighur minority, including mass detentions and surveillance ^[35].

However, China also reacted to this statement. Valentin Rybakov, Belarus' ambassador to the UN, spoke on behalf of 54 countries in support of China's position. Rybakov claimed that China is implementing effective measures to combat terrorism and radicalization in Xinjiang ^[36].

Since March 2019, protests in Hong Kong, which began against the Law on the Repatriation of Criminals, have gradually increased, increasing tension and conflict between the central government and Hong Kong ^[37]. In May 2020 The National People's Congress at the bicameral session overwhelmingly adopted a legislative decision of the Hong Kong Security Law in response to the situation in Hong Kong. The 20th Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the 13th Convocation, held on June 28-30, then discussed the draft Law on the Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and adopted it unanimously on the 30th ^[38].

The dispute between the United States, which opposed the HKSAR Security Law, and China, which defined it as a violation of China's inherent sovereignty and interference by a foreign power in its internal affairs, became even more acute as the "values" and "ideologies" of human rights and democracy were challenged. On June 30, 2020, at the 44th session of the UN HRC, Julian Braithwaite, the British High Commissioner to China, spoke on behalf of 27 countries, calling on the governments of China and Hong Kong to review the implementation of the Hong Kong Security Ordinance, stating that it would undermine the principle of "One country, two systems" and have a significant impact on human rights ^{[39, C. 226]}, as well as asking the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet to regularly provide relevant information about Hong Kong and Xinjiang ^[40].

China's multilateral diplomatic response was swift. On the same day, Cuba issued a joint statement at the UN Human Rights Committee on behalf of 53 countries, in which it supported China's position on the Hong Kong Security Ordinance. China called this evidence that its position and retaliatory measures against Hong Kong, including the Hong Kong Security Decree, are justified and enjoy broad support from the international community ^[41].

Conclusion

Thus, China's growing influence in international organizations under the leadership of Xi Jinping has become another controversial area of strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Xi Jinping took advantage of China's changed international position and economic influence to actively compete with the United States in the international arena. Indeed, China's multilateral diplomacy under Xi Jinping has made significant progress in terms of influence and standing in international multilateral organizations. In addition to the fact that Chinese representatives head 4 out of 15 Specialized UN agencies, Beijing has significant influence in China-friendly organizations such as WHO. Compared to the United States, which occupies one place in the World Bank, China leads in multilateral diplomacy.

The concern about Chinese multilateral diplomacy is that, despite the presence of many friendly powers, their influence is relatively weak compared to that of the United States. China supports a significant number of developing countries, mainly in Africa and Latin America, and in recent years this has been a frequent feature of China's multilateral behavior. In the UN HRC, China was in the minority in the confrontation between the United States and China on the issue of human rights in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in 2019 and the Hong Kong Security Ordinance in 2020. However, US allies, such as the EU, Japan and Australia, may be weaker in numbers, but stronger in terms of actual influence in international institutions.

Finally, China's biggest problem in multilateral diplomacy is that, although it can criticize the values and norms of the international community established by the United States and call for reform, the state cannot offer its own values and norms in place of the American ones. Many countries that currently support China are doing so in order to gain economic benefits, and not to share agreed or common values and norms with China. Therefore, China's cooperation with other countries is far from solid, and if the economic benefits offered by China weaken, these countries will be less motivated to support China.

It is possible to make several forecasts regarding the further development of strategic competition between the United States and China in the UN system. First, we should expect a further increase in China's financial contributions to the UN budget. Given the steady pace of China's economic growth, its share may increase to 20% over the next 5 years. Secondly, China will seek to expand the representation of its citizens in the leadership of the new UN specialized agencies. In particular, the goal of nominating a Chinese candidate for the post of Director General of WHO in the next year or two looks real. Thirdly, we should expect the intensification of China's efforts to promote its own approaches and initiatives within the UN. Particular attention will be paid to the use of the rostrum of the organization to promote the Chinese model of governance as an alternative to Western liberal democracy. Fourth, in the medium term, China may nominate its own candidacy for the post of UN Secretary General. The success of this campaign will become an important symbol of China's claims to global leadership.