Social Sciences: Characteristics of the Subject, Attitude to Sociology

Rozin Vadim Markovich Doctor of Philosophy Chief Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences  109240, Russia, Moskovskaya oblast', g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12 str.1, kab. 310 rozinvm@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Since it is believed that the social sciences began with sociology, and sociology still claims to play a leading role in the knowledge of sociality, the subject of social sciences cannot be discussed without clarifying the relationship of these sciences to sociology. Indeed, once upon a time the primacy of sociology in the knowledge of sociality, understood either as a special nature, the laws of which are established on the model of natural sciences, or as a Society, was not questioned. Currently, Sigmund Bauman, in his work "Thinking Sociologically", acting as a methodologist, shares an obvious statement for him: "sociology is a residual discipline, which is limited by what remains outside the field of view of other social disciplines." ^{[2, c. 10]}.

And it is clear why. Don't economics, history, political science, law, and other social disciplines analyze social relations, and in a more specific subject context than in sociology? And do social relations exist by themselves outside of economics, historical time, politics, law, and social institutions? Wasn't that (outside of these practices) the concept of Society that Bruno Latour is currently criticizing, and not only him. "However," Latour writes, "for AST (actor‒network theory. ‒ V.R.), the situation is completely different, because neither society nor the social exists from the very beginning <...> But as soon as you change the mode of existence of the public, turning it into a society in order to preserve the huge, contradictory and difficult task of uniting it by political means, its problematic fragility disappears. The political body turns into a society that is supposed to be held by its own strength even in the absence of any political activity <...> While we are looking for the shadow of society behind the collective, and the shadow of Leviathan behind society, no science of the social can move forward. To put it more sharply, either society or sociology" ^{[5, pp. 54, 228, 229]}.

Criticism of sociology goes in different directions. The methodology of considering sociality by analogy with the phenomena of the first nature is questioned ("born in harsh times," Latour notes, –sociology tried to imitate the natural sciences at the level of scientism" ^{[5, p. 344]}). In some cases, the role of personality is given little importance in sociology, in others, on the contrary, this role is hypertrophied. The historical laws of the development of sociality are questioned; the changes of the latter rather look like obeying the logic of a singularity.

For example, our well-known sociologist, S.A.Kravchenko, writes the following. "It was noted that structural functionalism also overemphasizes the influence of the social whole in relation to social actors – first of all, real people. In addition, the naturalism of these paradigms was criticized, which were based on the belief that social laws and the laws of nature are one in essence – they can be discovered by analyzing and generalizing facts, both of which are objective. From which it followed that the open “historical laws” made it possible to predict, in principle, an alternative future. Meanwhile, the facts of the development of societies in both the West and the East increasingly testified to the absence of rigid objective patterns in general. Weaknesses were also noted in interpretative paradigms, which were criticized for their absolutization, the maximum actualization of the subjective principle, which led to the other extreme – the diminution of the influence of the socio-cultural context on human activity" ^{[4, pp. 29-30]}.

In turn, Bauman draws attention to the fact that social knowledge is not similar to natural science, it is closer to the humanities, representing interpretations that social reality is multiple ("popularizing"), therefore, in particular, it can be described and explained in different ways that the orientation of interpretations in sociology serves the "cause of freedom". "Sociology is an extended commentary on the experience of everyday life, an interpretation based on other interpretations and, in turn, feeding them. It does not compete, but joins forces with other private disciplines dealing with the interpretation of human experience (literature, art, philosophy). Sociological thinking ... draws attention to the multiplicity of experiences and forms of life, shows each of them as a whole in itself, as a world with its own logic, and at the same time exposes all the falsity of its complacency and supposedly obvious self-sufficiency. Sociological thinking does not complicate, but promotes the flow of experiences and their exchange. And to put it bluntly, it adds to the uncertainty because it undermines efforts to “freeze the flow” and shut down all entrances and exits. From the point of view of the authorities concerned with the order they have established, sociology is part of a chaotic world, more a problem than a solution…Sociological thinking helps the cause of freedom" ^{[2, pp. 241-242]}.

Does all this mean that sociologists propose to recognize the project of sociology as unsuccessful and abandon it? Of course not, they are trying to separate social sciences and sociology by formulating the specifics of both. For example, Bauman correctly points out that the social sciences focus their study not on human interactions and relationships (as sociology does), but on deindividual processes and structures. For example, in economics, exchange processes are studied, and anthropological realities are considered as one of the factors along with others. At the same time, sociologists in economic reality will be interested in the behavior of people, however, analyzed in the context of exchange ("In economics," Bauman notes, "relations between acting individuals (actors) act as aspects of production and exchange of goods and services regulated by supply and demand"). ^{[2, c. 12]}

Summarizing, Bauman refers subjects studied in other social sciences (after all, sociology is also a social science) to the context of "broader structures". "What distinguishes sociology and gives it a special character," he explains, "is the habit of considering human actions as elements of broader structures, i.e., by no means random aggregates of actors locked in a network of mutual dependence (dependence is a state in which the probability that an action will be taken, as well as the probability of success of this action varies according to what other actors are, what they are doing or can do)" ^{[2, p. 12]}. Continuing Bauman's thought, it can be assumed that in the social sciences, the processes and interactions studied in sociology are considered as factors and anthropological conditions of the corresponding deindividual structures and processes (economic, political, legal, institutional, etc.). Let's move on to characterize, on the one hand, the subject of social sciences, on the other – its value-pragmatic context.

The first characteristic of the subject of social sciences is as follows: social sciences do not analyze individuals (individuals, personalities are the prerogative of psychology), but "associations of people", both historical, formed for joint life (for example, family, clan, ancient polis, people, labor collective), and artificially isolated social populations (voters At the same time, social associations and populations are considered from three points of view: how they are organized (composition, relationships, etc.), what changes and processes they undergo (education, functioning, development, expansion, weakening, disintegration), what "social order" they follow. Social associations (populations) and social order are two sides of the same coin. For example, in Politics, Aristotle characterizes the polis both through the relationship of citizens (an aspect of social unification) and the state (social order). "The state structure means the same as the order of government, the latter is personified by the supreme power in the state, and the supreme power is necessarily in the hands of either one, or a few, or a majority. And when one person, or a few, or the majority govern, guided by public benefit, naturally, such types of government are correct, and those in which the benefits of either one person, or a few, or the majority are meant are deviations. After all, one of two things must be recognized: either the citizens participating in public communication are not citizens, or they must all be involved in the common good.The public good is justice, that is, what serves the common good. According to the general idea, justice is a kind of equality ... and such an equally correct one means the benefit of the entire state and the common good of citizens" ^{[1, pp. 445, 471]}.

Now an important characteristic of the context is the setting (message) to such a change in the social order that meets the aspirations of citizens, for example, to improve their lives. As a rule, this is preceded by an assessment of sociality as unsatisfactory. The form of this assessment can be very different: from the statement that this is life (sic vita est) to the statement that sociality is arranged incorrectly. If Plato in the "Laws" says that it is necessary to tune in to fight two opponents – poverty and wealth (the first cause of suffering and shamelessness, and wealth has corrupted the soul of people), then K. Marx argues that capitalists steal the surplus value created by them from workers and, therefore, such sociality cannot be tolerated.

"The constant desire of what we call society," Marx wrote in 1821, "was to use deception or persuasion, fear or coercion to force a productive worker to do work for as little of his own labor as possible… Why shouldn't a worker receive absolutely the entire product of his labor?... since these materials are in the possession of other persons whose interests are opposite to the interests of the worker and whose consent is a prerequisite for his activity, does not and should not depend on the mercy of these capitalists, what proportion of the fruits of his own labor they will wish to give him as a reward for this work... in relation to the value of the product retained whether it is called taxes, profit or theft" ^{[6, pp. XII-XVI]} (emphasis ours. – V.R.).

The message of changing social life is not necessarily humanistic, it can also be selfish. For example, Alexander the Great, preparing a campaign against the Persians, "borrows from his father an important message ("social message", "social project"), namely, that the Greeks should take revenge on the Persians for previous offenses, as well as dramatically increase their well-being at the expense of their wealth. As is known, the author of this message was the Athenian orator Isocrates, who in the “Word to Philip” called for a pan-Hellenic campaign against Persia under the leadership of the Macedonian king, arguing that such a war is “better than peace and more like a sacred mission than a military campaign.” In the speeches of Isocrates ("Panegyric" and "The Word to Philip"), "the effeminacy and cowardice, allegedly characteristic of the Persians, and their inability to wage war, as well as the fact that it would be possible to capture large prey with small forces" were emphasized" ^{[8, p. 62]}.

What I call sociality is precisely related to the mindset of changing social life. This attitude was formed in ancient culture and has been accompanying social life ever since.

The second characteristic of the subject of social science and its value-pragmatic context is the idea of the type of "social action" (social technology) that should work for social change. For example, according to Plato, the mental construction of an ideal state could be realized in life, on the one hand, by the efforts of wise rulers, on the other – by explanations (the famous image of a cave from where people are taken out, after reasonable persuasion). Aristotle, as is known, denied such a social action, instead he proposed to take into account the nature of the phenomenon being transformed. "From all that has been said," he writes, "it is clear that the state belongs to what exists by nature, and that man by nature is a political being, and one who, by virtue of his nature, and not due to accidental circumstances, lives outside the state, is either an underdeveloped being in the moral sense, or a superman; Homer also reviles him, saying "without a family, without a tribe, outside the laws, without a hearth"; such a person by nature only longs for war; he can be compared to an isolated pawn on a playing board" ^{[1, pp. 378-379]}.

Marx also recognizes the nature of sociality, but understands it in a natural scientific way, and interprets social engineering in Capital as a revolution ("expropriation of expropriators"). Latour, overcoming Marxism and following M. Foucault here, understands social action as the participation of citizens in social transformations and politics; he sees the role of sociologists themselves in the study and correct description of sociality, that is, one that allows an adequate understanding of social nature, but does not distort it. "We," Latour writes, "want to be more impartial than is possible within the framework of the social engineering project of traditional sociology, since we go much further in exploring disagreements (we are talking, as Bakhtin would say, about giving voice to the actors themselves. – V.R.). But we also want more participation... thanks to which you can help assemble the team in parts, providing it with an arena, a forum, a space, a presentation thanks to the most modest mediation of a risky report – usually this is a fragile intervention consisting only in the text<...> The feeling of crisis, which, in my opinion, has become central to the social sciences, can now be expressed as follows: with the expansion of a number of entities, new associations do not form a viable assembly. And it is here that politics comes on the scene again, defined by us as the intuition that associations themselves are not enough: their composition is still needed to build a common world" ^{[5, pp. 175, 355]}.

What do you need to know in order to change your social life in a controlled way? This is the question that the social sciences answer. A lot of things. First, how sociality works and changes. Secondly, what is a social action, and in which case it is effective. There are many types of sociality described in the literature, and when it comes to the diachronic plan, social scientists face great difficulties. As in the case of the past, for example, when, it is asked, the state or the market arose – in the Ancient world or only in Modern Times, it is known that the answers are given the opposite depending on how these social realities are understood. So it is in the case of the future. "Today," writes J. Ritzer, "there are fierce discussions in sociology between those who continue to consider the current society to be the modern world, and those who claim that significant changes have taken place in recent years, and we have moved into a new, "postmodern" world" ^{[7, p. 484]}.

These difficulties arose in particular because social sciences focus mainly on the study of modern types of sociality. Social scientists in their hearts believe that sociality does not develop and is equal to itself at all times (although they verbally assert the opposite). In order to overcome these difficulties, it is probably necessary to abandon this belief.

Sociality is changing under the influence of a number of factors and conditions. It changes with a change of culture. For example, during the transition from archaic culture to the culture of Ancient kingdoms, new types of people's associations were formed – kingdoms and so-called "mega-machines" (army, labor collectives) came to replace tribal associations, new relationships were formed, for example, the power of gods, kings and priests, a new social order. One of its variants is described in the Old Babylonian myth of Atra-Khasis. Here "describes a meeting of the gods, at which it was decided to create a human being in order to save the gods from the sad need to work to maintain their own existence.

When the gods are (like) humans,

They did the work, they carried the burden, ‒

The burden of the gods is great (was),

Hard work, numerous troubles:

The Seven Great Anunnaki

The Igigs were forced to do the work.

Exhausted by hard work, the Igigi gods rebelled, "threw their weapons into the fire" and came in a crowd to the gates of the temple of Enlil, the lord of the earth. Alarmed, Enlil calls upon the king of the gods Anu, Enki, who undertake to create a man, but for this, Enki says, it is necessary to kill one of the gods in order to purify the others and mix clay on the blood of the slain.

The assembly replied: "So be it!"

The Anunnaki are great, ruling destinies.

On the first, seventh and fifteenth days

He performed ablution (Enki).

(God) was a god who had a mind,

They killed in their gathering ^{[3, p.38]}.

It turns out that the gods act as the parents of man, they made him and with the help of their own blood and mind revived (gave birth). In addition, they established a new social order, obliging man to work instead of the gods and limiting his life.

The gods, when they created man,

They determined the death of a person,

They kept life in their hands ^{[3, p. 138]}.

Interestingly, there is practically no explanation of the origin of ideas about gods in philosophical and cultural literature. I once offered a functional and semiotic explanation: the gods ‒ This is a human-invented scheme that allowed people to act in conditions of transition to the division of labor and the creation of "mega-machines" (according to Memford), i.e. large teams with rigid, vertical management ^{[10, pp. 168-169]}. But you can always ask the question: what was the reason for the transition to the division of labor and the formation of mega-machines, wasn't it a new form of awareness of reality? Academician Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov, who recently passed away, reflected precisely in this vein, suggesting that the assembly of large collectives presupposed the promotion of some new idea, meaning, that it was not need that acted as the engine of sociality, but rather new ideas and meanings of consciousness. I think he was right. In this regard, let us consider the discovery in Anatolia (in the town of "Gebekli Tepe") of a temple complex, including a circular structure and columns, dating back as far as 12 thousand years BC ^[11]. Images of totemic animals of different tribes are carved on the columns. It was this archaeological discovery that gave impetus to Vyacheslav Ivanov's new thoughts.

Based on my research on archaic culture and the culture of the ancient kingdoms, I can propose the following scenario for the creation of this complex. Several friendly tribes (exchanging brides and other products, joining forces periodically in skirmishes with other tribes) brought their totem poles (columns) to the “Navel Hill”. Later, such poles were specially made here. These pillars, and for an archaic person ‒ the spirits of the tribe, were usually understood as defenders of the territory of the tribe against foreign spirits. As a result of combining totems in one place, a new effect appeared ‒ the feeling of a new being. As several totems, such a creature was understood as a powerful spirit of all tribes. As a totem "not his own" (after all, in addition to his pillar, there were others who were not his own), he gave sanction to prohibited actions that allowed overcoming the "taboo". It can be assumed that the invention and the formation of a new one became possible only if, on the one hand, the usual, traditional ideas were blocked, and on the other, the forbidden, but imaginary and therefore often desirable, were allowed. In order for this creature to give new instructions to people, it had to speak and look like a representative of its tribe (friendly tribes), better even as a leader or shaman. Therefore, it is not surprising that over time such a creature began to be realized no longer as the spirit of the tribe (usually in the form of an animal), but anthropomorphically, as a kind of powerful being who created a new large tribe from individual tribes, giving sanctions for new unusual actions, the defender of all people of the new association, as the one to whom it was necessary to obey. Over time, such a creature received a new name ‒ "god".

In such a scenario, in order for a new whole to arise (in this case, the idea of God), at least two conditions are necessary: first, objective prerequisites (friendship of several tribes, their decision to bring totems into one place, episodic violations of taboos and acceptance by one of the leaders of unusual decisions, etc.) Secondly, it is a kind of invention of new meaning and ideas that trigger new social processes. (This is how it looks in our reconstruction, from the point of view of the "reconstructed", new meanings, of course, are not invented, but are discovered and discovered by him). Within the framework of this scenario, the creation of mega-machines and the specialization of people in new collectives (some became warriors, others artisans, others scribes, others priests or kings) became possible precisely because the gods were discovered. Another thing is that with the development of mega-machines and the specialization of people, the understanding of the gods also changed. There were more and more gods, they differentiated according to their roles, and their properties were better understood" ^{[9, pp. 63-66]}.

Sociality is also changing as a result of people's actions. A striking example is the campaigns of Alexander the Great, they contributed to "the creation not only of the empire, but also the formation of the culture of Hellenism. With the collapse of the empire of Alexander the Great, new forms of socio-economic relations began to take shape in the Near East and Asia Minor. Many Macedonians and Greeks migrated to the territory of the empire, bringing their customs and culture there. Commodity production and market relations developed. Politics was based on a combination of the power of monarchies with self-governing communities. Cities played an increasingly important role. The cultural community of this period was ensured, among other things, by the spread of two main languages – common Greek and Aramaic, but many regions retained their own languages and customs. There have been changes in everyday life. The differences between the culture of the city and the countryside became clearer. The ideology of cosmopolitanism and individualism flourished. It was a time of development of science and art." ^{[8, c. 68]}

Sociality also changes in the course of the development of philosophy and later science. It creates new forms of "conceptualization" (awareness) of social life and schemes, scenarios and projects for its change. Plato's "State" and Aristotle's "Politics" are the first examples of such conceptualization.

Prepares for a change in sociality, the development (change and complication) of life. For example, the division of labor, the development of market relations, and even the crisis of faith in the gods contributed to the completion of the sociality of the Ancient kingdoms. If in the classical period of the culture of the Ancient kingdoms, man believed that the commands came from the gods and kings and the gods wished man only good, then in the final period of this culture, man often tried to dictate to the gods and even denied their good intentions. Here are three texts from that time.

What did I get from the god I worshipped?

Before those who are below me, I bow down,

Despise me (and) the last, (and) the rich, and the proud.

And here's the reason.

I looked into the world ‒ things (are) different:

God did not block the way for the demon,

My father drags a boat through the canals,

A) his son (an adult) lay down in bed ^{[3, p. 35, 85-86]}.

---- - ----

I would like to know that God is pleased;

What is good for a person is a crime against God,

What is disgusting to him is good for his God!

Who will know the will of the gods in heaven?^{[3, c. 120]}.

---- - ----

"Tell God my father! So says Apil-Adad, your servant: Why are you neglecting me? Who will give you (another) like me? Write to the god Marduk, who loves you: let him let go of my sins. May I see your face, I'll lick your feet. And look at my family, big and small. For their sake, have pity on me. May your help reach me." ^{[3, p. 46]}

Finally, about the study of social action. We are probably only on the verge of solving this problem. In theory, it should be solved by such disciplines as praxiology, activity theory, synergetics, and social technology, but so far their successes in this area are insignificant. I wonder why?

However, in my opinion, there is quite enough material to answer the question about the nature of the subject of social sciences. Social sciences study, on the one hand, associations and populations of people, on the other – the processes and patterns of their change, on the third hand, the social actions under the influence of which these changes occur. Sociology constructs its ideal objects on the assumption that the main thing in this reality are people and their relationships. Other social disciplines consider people as one of the factors and conditions, and identify and study various deindividual processes and structures as the main ones.