The History of Study of Aristotle's Ethics at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Platonov Roman Sergeevich PhD in Philosophy Research Fellow, RAS Institute of Philosophy 109240, Russia, Moskovskaya oblast', g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12/1 roman-vsegda@mail.ru Other publications by this author

IntroductionIn 2021, the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences creatively celebrated its 100th anniversary ^[18].

The event is as significant as it is unexpected, since the documents clarifying the genealogy of the Institute as a scientific institution were discovered quite recently. Now its history is counted from the first – organizational – meeting, then the "Institute of Scientific Philosophy" (September 9, 2021), headed by Gustav Shpet ^{[17, p. 83]}, through the merger in 1926 with the "Communist Academy" as the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences ^{[7, p. 784]}. The anniversary became an occasion for reflection on the historical fate of the Institute, as well as on its philosophical heritage and the research work carried out in various fields of philosophical knowledge ^[8]. Among others, historians of philosophy have demonstrated their achievements – the Institute conducts research on all philosophical world traditions, from Eastern philosophy to modern European ^{[22; 26]}. In our article we will consider the research of Aristotle's ethics conducted by the Institute's staff. In addition to the fact that their generalizing review is useful in itself for the research team (and may be useful to everyone interested in the ethics of Stagirite), it is also noteworthy that at the Institute by the end of the second half of the twentieth century, these studies acquired a methodological character, therefore it will be useful to identify their features and assess the perspective.

In fairness, it should be noted that attention to ancient philosophy in general and Aristotle in particular was not a priority in the first decades of the Institute's existence – researchers of the first half of the twentieth century were more concerned with the ideas of the future and they did not particularly seek to borrow them from the distant past. However, from the second half the situation begins to change. Aristotle's ethics relatively late becomes the subject of professional study at the Institute, but this study is immediately declared as comprehensive and philosophical, and not exclusively historical, that is, with the aim of a full-fledged reconstruction within the framework of moral philosophy. This approach was demonstrated by A.A. Huseynov in the work "Ethics of Aristotle" ^[12], published in 1984. Actually, it is from her that one can count down the study of the ethics of Stagirite at the Institute. It was A.A. Huseynov, then a doctor of philosophy, who set the impetus for this study and helped attract new, young specialists to it, and to this day he remains the largest domestic researcher of Aristotelian ethics. His student R.G. Apresyan (recognized as a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on 09.12.2022) writes about it this way: "A.A. Huseynov has the merit of systematically mastering Aristotle's ethics, and in the context of ancient ethics as a whole" ^{[1, pp. 157-170]}.

Basic research (research on the structure of ethical knowledge)Considering Aristotle's ethics primarily as eudemonistic, A.A. Huseynov reveals a threefold structure in all the ethical texts of the Stagirite.

The first chapters are the study of the highest good (happiness), then – the study of virtues, and finally – "plots, the identification of the thematic and systematic integrity of which remains an open problem," that is, the problem of friendship, reconsideration of the question of happiness and reasoning about abstinence ^{[13, p. 355]}. Adhering to the classical interpretation of Aristotle's practical knowledge as the relationship between ethics and politics ^{[11, pp. 94-128]}, he believes that the main subject of ethics is a perfect moral personality – its individuality, moral autonomy and active focus on the life of both his own and a friend, and a fellow citizen. A.A. Huseynov draws attention to the fact that today Aristotle "is relevant not only by his understanding of ethics as a doctrine of virtues <...> but also by the fact that he linked the virtue of the individual with socially meaningful forms of activity that have their own logic of development and evaluation criteria" ^{[10, p. 373]}. This approach determined both philosophical and historical studies of Aristotle's works at the Institute.

One of the most important achievements on this path was the publication in 2005 in the publishing house of the Institute of Translation of "Evdemova Ethics" (in this article we indicate the 2011 edition). At that time, only two of the three Ethics (Nikomakhova and Bolshaya) were translated, now the Russian reader has received a complete corpus of texts of Aristotle's practical sciences. The translation was made by three researchers: T.A. Miller (Institute of World Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences) translated books I, II, VIII (she also owns the translation of "Big Ethics" published in 1984), T.V. Vasilyeva (Lomonosov Moscow State University) translated books III and VII, and M.A. Solopova (Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences) – books IV, V, VI. M.A. Solopova also acted as the editor of the final translation, having done a lot of work to coordinate the translation language of three researchers. In the process of preparing the publication, she and A.A. Huseynov conducted additional studies of the structure of three ethical texts, their authorship, as well as an analysis of individual concepts.

At one time, doubts were expressed about the authorship of Aristotle of each of the three "Ethics". Regarding the "Nicomachean ethics" they were expressed by F. Schleiermacher ^{[12, p. 14]}, by the end of the XIX century, a whole discussion had already developed on this issue. A.A. Huseynov analyzes L. Spengel's opinion that the presence of three "Ethics" is explained by Aristotle reading the same course at different times, respectively, differently recorded, and accepts it as "plausible explanation", noting that it is not about the fact that Aristotle read from the pulpit, only about the periodic return to the topic itself ^{[13, p. 350]}. An additional argument is pointed out by M.A. Solopova – there will be no unnamed virtues left in the "Eudem ethics", respectively, "the best elaboration of the terminology of E.E." confirms the "late (compared with E.N.) dating of E.E." ^{[23, p. 390]}. However, if doubts about the "Nicomachean ethics" died out in the XIX century, then the discussion about the "Eudemian ethics" lasted a little longer. For example, the strengthening of the meaning of the concept of "god", which is not characteristic of Aristotle, remained a cause of doubt for E. Zeller, who still enjoys great authority among researchers. Today, in Aristotelian studies, the concept of "god" is considered as a synonym for the concept of "mind". A.A. Huseynov also focuses on this: "it was reasonably noted that the designation of reason as a deity is also found in other works of Aristotle and was generally typical of ancient culture" ^{[12, p. 15]}. A detailed and comprehensive analysis of the discussion on authorship was carried out by M.A. Solopova ^{[23, pp. 371-405]}. There are still some doubts about the "Big Ethics", although A.A. Huseynov notes the marginality of such a position – "it is generally recognized and in this sense proven that E.N., E.E. and M.M. <...> belong to Aristotle" ^{[13, p. 351]}, but at the same time some "scientists deny the authorship of Aristotle although there are serious arguments in favor of the opposite opinion" ^{[23, p. 371]}. We should also note that not only in Russian translations, but also in foreign publications, all three "Ethics" are included in the corpus of Aristotelian writings, although sometimes "Big Ethics" is marked as being in doubt.

The publication of the translation also took into account the structural originality of the texts "Ethic." Historically, the texts of the "Eudem ethics" and the "Nicomachean ethics" partially coincide. "The mystery of the manuscript tradition has always been that the two "Ethics", EE and EN, include three identical books <...> "On Justice" (EE IV = EN V), "On Intellectual Virtues" (EE V = EN VI) and "On Intemperance" (EE VI = EN VII)" ^{[23, p. 371]}. A.A. Huseynov sees in such a coincidence, when "three books in the structure of EE are as appropriate as in the structure of EN", an additional argument for "the identity of these works" ^{[13, p. 352]}, which serves as an additional argument for considering all three texts are as one in different editions. In general, this translation presented the results of both philological and historical-philosophical research.

But we can also talk separately about the results of, in fact, philosophical studies of Aristotle's ethical teaching. Some of their generalization was facilitated by the Moscow International Conference "Aristotelian Heritage as a constituent element of European Rationality" held at the Institute (October 17-19, 2016), dedicated to the 2400th anniversary of Aristotle. In the reports made by the Institute's staff at the section "Aristotelian Ethics", the general direction was clearly traced – the analysis of ethics as knowledge, while the complexity of such knowledge was of key importance. Next, we will show that this will contribute to the definition of moral autonomy and sociality as the foundation of Aristotelian teaching.At the level of conceptualization of ethics as a science, its relationship with metaphysics and politics is highlighted.

In the issue of relations with metaphysics, A.A. Huseynov generally defends the unitarian interpretation, which believes that ethics as a science is based on metaphysics in Aristotle. "Aristotle tore ethics away from metaphysics not in the sense that he denied the metaphysical foundations of human behavior," but in the fact that "no matter how ethics continues the ontological predestination of actions," its domain is "actions that fall out of this predestination and have an individually responsible character" ^{[9, p. 130]}. However, in the works of Unitarians, the connection with metaphysics has always been considered meaningfully, in the words of A.A. Huseynov, as the "metaphysical basis of human behavior", and its formal description was not worked out, that is, it was accepted as self-evident, without demonstrating the transition from metaphysical concepts to ethical ones. Today, this problem remains unresolved and forms the basis for criticism of Unitarianism. Ethics itself, as Aristotle points out, "has its own measure of accuracy" ^{[10, p. 138]}, like any practical knowledge, unlike metaphysics, which claims to be absolutely accurate (epistemic) knowledge. The connection of ethics with an equally relatively precise policy, of course, is not disputed by anyone. However, the most common interpretation considers ethics to be only a preparatory knowledge for politics as more ambitious in its tasks. Thus, the role of ethics as knowledge is lost, which sets the direction for the development of any practical activity. A.A. Huseynov shows that the relationship between politics and ethics is not hierarchical, but ambivalent, that "adequately understood politics cannot but be a continuation of morality, just as adequately understood morality cannot but unfold into politics" ^[11].

But the heterogeneity of knowledge at the individual level is especially essential for understanding ethics. On the one hand, in order for human nature to be realized, the work of the mind is required. On the other hand, like everything in the process of becoming, the work of the mind is carried out in a certain circle of interdependence. The mind and the "driving cause of action" that is what is implemented human nature, but he himself is already "seeking the mind" ( ) or geneticheskoe desire ( ) [EN 1139 b 5], that is, thinking () should already be directed by aspiration, which means this aspiration should already be "correct" ( )[EN 1139 a 25], that is, determined by the correct goal. M.A. Solopova calls such reasoning "the thought of the duality of every human act", uses the phrases "aspiring mind" and "reasonable aspiration" for translation ^{[25, p. 27]}. A.A. Huseynov gives this explanation of this interdependence: "The soul has a complex structure, it reaches perfection and harmony when its various parts are arranged in a hierarchy under the domination of reason, moreover, under such domination, which is not despotic, but corresponds to the impulses emanating from its lower parts" ^{[13, p. 368]}. It is in this way that the realization of nature by man turns out to be a conscious process, but not exclusively rational. This gives a significant limitation to such an important concept of Aristotle as "conscious choice", which describes the adoption of a moral decision.

In the process of development, a person is defined (becomes defined): alternatives are narrowed, since "conscious choice is not associated with the impossible," but the fullness of the power possible for him is found, realizing "the desire <...> to depend on us" [EN 1111 b 20; 1113 a 10], which is framed as a free action through a consciously made decision. It is obvious that the whole world is not subject to man, but this does not mean that man does not have his own place where he is the master, where he is the cause along with "nature, necessity, chance". Therefore, it is obvious to Aristotle that "the unjust and the licentious at first had the opportunity not to become such, which means that they are such of their own free will" [EN 1114 a 20]. Conscious choice permeates and organizes a person's entire life: so "mutual friendship is nurtured with a conscious choice" [EN 1157 b 30], and "virtues <...> are chosen by us consciously" [EN 1139 a 20-25]. However, due to the not fully rationalized component of a correctly directed aspiration, as well as the uniqueness of every act, ethics still cannot give accurate knowledge at the individual level. This reveals the humanitarianism of the act, which expresses the complexity of human nature, and the person himself becomes the cause of both the act and the choice. This is where the ethical problems themselves arise. As A.A. Huseynov writes about it: "There is no place for ethical decisions where everything can be calculated" ^{[13, p. 367]}. Today, starting from this idea of moral autonomy, O.P. Zubets continues to develop the analysis of an act in Aristotle's ethics ^[15]. Thus, the humanizing principle of Aristotle's moral philosophy is revealed and the basis of moral autonomy is given, which is fully revealed in the image of the sage.

A.A. Huseynov writes about it this way: "For Aristotle, morality is primarily a moral person." This is expressed in the fact that in his ethics "there is no universally valid, non- and supra-individual and in this sense objective criterion for distinguishing good and evil" ^{[10, p. 399]}. At the same time, the importance of personality increases, because "a decent person in every particular case is supposed to be a measure" [EN 1166 a 10]. A wise man, like a moral person in general, even if he has not yet reached perfection, already acts as a kind of expert / model, whose advantage is not only in knowledge, but also in experience. But this role is quite limited in its social and political claims, unlike the same sage Plato – the expert does not become a judge, he does not dictate to others how to do the right thing, does not turn into a moral tyrant, but remains a guide, mentor for every reasonable person. "Actions are called just and prudent when they are such that a prudent person could commit them, and the one who is just and prudent is not the one who simply commits such acts, but who commits them in the way that just and prudent people do it" [EN 1105 b 15-25]. It is clear that for a child or a slave, the criterion will be the law, the word of the father or the master, but behind this is also the experience of the development of the policy, in which the moral personality takes an active part.

Therefore, the next stage of the study of ethics as an individual knowledge is the analysis of the concept of virtue. A.A. Huseynov shows that virtues can be considered not only as a telos, some complete form of moral state (foundation), but, most importantly, as qualitative characteristics of action (it is in this case that the problematic of the act passes from the field of metaphysics (anthropology) in the field of ethics). In this sense, they represent "an active designation of the space of human development proper" ^[11], because one can do right in only one way", and virtue is exactly what "affects passions and actions", then "virtue, therefore, is a kind of possession of the middle" in an act [EN 1106 b 20-35]. Aristotle's attitude in this case is as follows: "evil refers to the infinite <...> good refers to the limited <...> that's why one is easy and the other is difficult; after all, it's easy to miss, but it's hard to hit the target" [EN 1106 b 30]. Therefore, virtue is found as the middle, but this is preceded by the search for boundaries – possible limits, invariants of correctness, and only in vices "neither the possession of the middle, nor excess, nor lack" is possible [EN 1107 a 15-25]. Vice is outside the regulation of ethical knowledge, which constitutes only the space of virtuous action, creating a habitable, habitual world of a person in which his life is "defined". Vice cannot be limited. In fact, the same action can become both bad and good, depending on the purpose and degree (measure) its implementation. In this sense, Aristotle's concept of the middle demonstrates the uncertainty of the action itself, which is what A.A. Huseynov points out – "the idea of the middle means that virtuous actions are connected with vicious states by the unity of the matter of activity; and in the case of virtues and in the case of vices, individuals do the same thing, they differ not in what is being done, but the way it is done" ^[11].

But individual knowledge gets another dimension – social, since the most complete process of committing an act is expressed only in the interaction of a person with a person, in communication of different levels and forms. A.A. Huseynov describes it this way: "Virtue unfolds in the relationship of individuals to each other, in the space between them. She sets these relations, finds her objective embodiment in them. When Aristotle says that virtue is a habit, he means habitual forms of behavior and relationships between people" ^[11], which directly correlates with the words of Aristotle himself – "the most virtuous is not the one whose virtue turns on himself, but the one whose – on another" [EN 1130 a 5-10]. Thus, the problematic of knowledge about human nature is concretized in the knowledge of an act as knowledge of virtue, which in turn reveals not only individual (not rationalized) grounds, but also social ones. This analysis no longer sets the structure of the text of Aristotle's treatises, which is important for his translations, but the structure of his moral concept itself, clarifying its logic, as well as directly leading to the level of knowledge about the organization of the polis and social relations, that is, to politics.

Complementary studies (studies of individual concepts)The key social virtue is justice as "complete virtue <...> in relation to another" [EN 1129 b 25], whereas "there is no justice in relation to oneself" [EN 1134 b 10-15].

It defines the attitude towards a person in general, thereby refers to all ethical virtues in their social orientation, representing "virtue as a whole" [EN 1130 a 10]. As A.A. Huseynov explains, starting from Aristotle's statement "justice and friendship are one and the same or very close" [HER 1235 a], justice is "the external expression of ethical virtue, its projection on the polis and at the same time the criterion of the moral structure of the state" ^{[13, p. 363]}. This is the virtue that defines other virtues.

In a slightly different interpretation (as the beginning of the development of the problematic of the circumstances of justice, that is, the definition of "the search space of the relevant context of the use of the concept of "justice""), this double presence of justice is indicated by A.V. Prokofiev. Under such consideration, the policy is understood as the same space – "an anthropological, communicative and institutional context in which the principles and norms expressing the content of the concept of "justice" have binding force" ^{[20, pp. 115-116]}. In a sense, A.V. Prokofiev presents the polis as an anthropological and communicative space that sets the understanding of virtue. However, without the interpretation of the policy as a generic person, within which the development of a particular person is carried out communicatively, it remains unclear how the general justice "stands above both types of private justice: "distributive" ("distributive") and "directional" ("commutative") and ensures their equilibrium from the outside" ^{[21, p. 144]}. How can it "stand" above them if only private justice, that is, justice, is actually represented in the policy? If justice is an acquired generic quality close to friendliness, then it is clear why it directs communication in general, and why it can be spoken of as a quality of direct communication, and how it has its correlates in the form of justice at the level of the organization of the life of the genus. But in any case, the interpretation made by A.V. Prokofiev quite successfully shows what kind of way out to modern ethical problems the ethical teaching of Aristotle can have. A.V. Prokofiev also notes a purely functional description of justice: "Stagirit does not give us sufficient indications of what the normative content of such justice consists in...> only a statement about non-harm to a slave or a child as himself (in the sense, as a part of himself)" ^{[21, p. 119]}. Note that the "statement of non-harm" does not have a meaningful definition, since the understanding of harm remains within the framework of personal experience. It is all the more obvious that verbal communication plays a special role in the realization of justice as a function of communication, since without it it remains compulsory and understandable only to judges-legislators. So, on the basis of justice, a person develops all his virtues, in turn, the whole complex of virtuous actions determines a person's condition as good or bad.

A.V. Prokofiev also belongs to the analysis of shame in the descriptions of Aristotle, who does not dare to attribute shame to virtue, which in turn follows from the fact that in contrast to Aristotle's virtues to vices, only the ability / inability to handle passions is expressed. "Both in passions and in actions, [vices] overstep their due either in the direction of excess or in the direction of lack, while virtue [knows] how to find the middle and chooses it" [EN 1107 a 5]. Therefore, shame is indicated as the middle, but not as a virtue, which in some way falls out of the middle model – "the possession of the middle is possible both in the manifestations of passions and in what is connected with passions; so shame () is not a virtue, but a shameful one () <...> in certain things, there is a middle ground" [EN 1108 a 30-35]. A.V. Prokofiev notes the duality of the nature of shame in Aristotle's descriptions: on the one hand, "shame is rather rigidly tied to the opinion of others", on the other – "shame is generated by infamy itself (dishonor), and not by its negative pragmatic consequences", as well as "a person who is ashamed to a certain extent chooses those whom he is ashamed of, and this choice is connected, among other things, with his own value preferences" ^{[19, p. 108]}. Thus, shame is both an emotional experience of the reaction of others, and a certain value orientation that guides the act. Therefore, the model of the middle is applicable to it, but its realization (modesty) is not a virtue.

Another, no less mysterious, concept – virtue (grandeur, generosity, breadth of soul) is analyzed by O.P. Zubets ^{[14; 16]}. Grandeur by its name indicates that this is the state of mind when it can be said about it that it is big, meaningfully – when a person "considers himself worthy of greatness," but only "being worthy of it." Aristotle attributes dignity () to external goods, and "the greatest of external goods" is honor (), but, however, the question here is not the price. O.V. Zubets draws attention to the fact that "one of the first questions to the fragment about the majestic (1123 a 34 – 1125 a 35) <...> – the question of what is great" ^{[14, p. 60]}. The majestic "does not even treat honor as something greatest" [EN 1124 a 15], and it is all the more strange to see a contradiction in this, since honor is not the true goal, which means that it does not express the true greatness that a person can be aimed at. In this case, the available translation options, such as "majestic" or "proud man", on the one hand, completely destroy the authentic term, on the other hand, they speak more about the tradition of interpretation than about the text itself. This, apparently, leads to the fact that O.P. Zubets states: "even highly experienced researchers cannot avoid negative reactions <...> Ross complains that the hero of the Fragment is immersed in himself and generally unpleasant" ^{[14, p. 59]}. However, those who strive for the accuracy of translation – "Russell rejects the term "proud man" proposed by the Oxford Encyclopedia, preferring "great–souled"" ^{[14, p. 55]} - still remain confused: "Russell believes that Aristotle manifests emotional poverty in his ethical ideal" ^{[14, p. 59]}. So any translation requires its own conceptualization. The "great" is that portion of true, good being, that genuine goal of ultimate (great) formalization, to which a person can strive, is the entirely correct body, that is, the most complete realization of himself by man, as he is by nature as a Person. However, as O.P. Zubets shows, "the basis of greatness is not just an adequate perception of oneself by a person" ^{[14, p. 57]}, since the essence of this state is not in the "adequacy of perception". expresses that – great, great – state of disposition when the soul (design) corresponds to a great goal, this is one of the most important achievements of the guiding work of the mind on the aspiring part of the soul - it becomes truly human.

A special role and place in Aristotle's ethics is occupied by "friendship / " (in the compartment of all its ambiguity – both as a virtue and as a form of social relations). A.A. Huseynov's research focuses on it and attaches special importance to understanding Aristotelian ethics ^{[13, p. 356]}. He emphasizes that friendship sets the "normative basis" of an ideal state, since it combines "necessary" (in this sense, it is an external good) and "morally beautiful" ^{[10, p. 372]}. That is, friendship turns out to be a unique phenomenon in that an action initially aimed at obtaining benefits (relationship with another) reaches such a level of perfection that it becomes valuable in itself. Thanks to moral development, the original self-interest is overcome in him. She is such an "external (necessary) attitude that remains in the zone of individually responsible behavior." If in many ways "the behavior of an individual falls under the external control" of the laws, then it is friendship that is "completely subject to the acting subject." Therefore, we can say that in it the "social nature of man" gets a "natural expression", and "being a friend is like being a good person." Therefore, for Aristotle, friendship is completely "organic to polis communication in its ethically adequate forms" ^{[10, p. 372]}. In other words, any positive relationship between people with proper human development is, in a sense, friendship.

The analysis of friendship is continued by R.G. Apresyan (recognized as a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on 09.12.2022), starting from the semantic overload of the concept "" in the texts of Aristotle and giving him a generalizing definition, probably the most accurate and successful existing in the literature – "in a broader sense, this word could mean the relationship of compatibility or even just correlation (in space or activity)" ^{[2, p. 72]}. What is as a virtue (friendliness)? At its core, it is nothing more than a stable communication skill of proper quality. R.G. Apresyan (recognized as a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation) describes his moral component as follows: "both in promoting pleasure and in averting suffering, he (friendly) proceeds not from the desire of Another, but from an understanding of the beautiful and the desire to practically affirm it" ^{[2, p. 74]}. "The same" interaction with others is an expression of proper behavior at the level of habit – "such a person will communicate with everyone as it should ( )" [EN 1126 b 25-30]. To understand the genesis of both the virtue of friendliness and friendship itself, it is necessary to take into account that Aristotle is trying to identify an even more fundamental phenomenon – "disposition" (). A more accurate translation would be the word "benevolence", less accurate, but generally appropriate in meaning would be "benevolence" or "benevolence", "benevolence". In the translation of "Evdemova ethics" T.V. Vasilyeva uses the word "favor". Converging even in an imperfect friendship is not necessarily "bad", because they may feel some "affection" for each other. Nevertheless, it "is neither next to benefit nor next to pleasure" [EE 1241 a 5]. It "looks like a friendly feeling <...> but it is nevertheless not friendship" [EN 1166 b 30]. The recognition of the other is expressed In the desire for the good, the recognition of the other is manifested, which is why, as R.G. Apresyan writes (recognized as a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on 09.12.2022), it is "the basis of friendly relations, a prerequisite for friendship" ^{[2, p. 76]}. R.G. Apresyan (recognized as a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on 09.12.2022) also considers the differentiation of the meaning of as love ^[3] and highlights in Aristotle's ethics the "problem of the Other" as the need for a person to "relate" himself and "adjust" to another person. This is stated in a number of Stagirite's arguments – "about payback, or "mutual retribution" (mutual suffering), in the discussion about the general characteristics of communication and sociability and in the doctrine of friendship" ^{[2, p. 70]}. It is necessary to create beauty not only in oneself, but also in another – "to be the cause (of a beautiful act) for a friend" [EN 1169 a 30-35]. This is what it means to "please the most important thing in yourself" [EN 1168 b 25-30] and "treat a friend as yourself" [EN 1166 a 30-35]. It is not surprising that in the presentation of Diogenes Laertius, it is Aristotle who is credited with the phrase corresponding to the formulation of the "golden rule of morality". Analyzing the relations between friends described by Aristotle, R.G. Apresyan (recognized as a foreign agent by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on 09.12.2022) comes to the conclusion that "the Aristotelian formula of friendship should be considered intermediate between the golden rule and the commandment of love <...> if we take into account that the golden rule not only focuses on initiative action, like the commandment of love, but it also assumes, unlike the commandment of love, the interactivity of the relationship to the other, then the proximity of the Aristotelian formula of friendship to the golden rule is beyond doubt" ^{[1, p. 166]}.

As mentioned above, the social dimension of virtue is essentially the foundation for the existence of the policy, but at the same time, the virtues themselves are formed exclusively in the policy. In addition to education (habituation) and training, an equally important result of the policy life is "leisure / ". Aristotle agrees with the opinion that "happiness lies in leisure" [EN 1177 b 5], more precisely, it is among those "that are recognized as blessed" [EN 1177 b 20-25]. It is the policy that creates leisure as an institution when "they gather <...> together, honoring the gods and providing themselves with rest accompanied by pleasure" [EN 1160 a 25]. A.A. Huseynov sees precisely in the possibility of leisure the key importance of the policy – "only in the policy is it possible to allocate leisure as a space of free activity, which is simultaneously also the space of human eudaimonia" ^[11]. It is obvious that the very orderliness of the life of the policy, aimed at general utility, provides stable leisure, just as "we wage war in order to live in peace" [EN 1177 b 5]. In a certain sense, leisure is the main goal-the means achieved by communication at this level, since only in it can perfect friendship be realized. But in general, this concerns the possibility of being virtuous in general. A.A. Huseynov figuratively calls leisure the "house of virtue", its "place" in the world, since "activity always has its own space-time parameters, it is rooted in the world and should have its place there; this also applies to virtue as an active state" ^[11].

It is important to note, despite the fact that a key objective of the policy to create/implement "the right (), which provides a measure of justice" and through this institutionalization, through a "fair trial/judicial decisions" ( ), justice/rightly () acquires its regulatory power, but all the same relations within the Polis, according to Aristotle, defines nothing like "kindness / ", described them as "a correction of legal justice" (EN 1137 b 10-15). In this context, – integrity is exactly kindness. M.A. Solopova points to two meanings of this concept in Aristotle's ethics: "in a broad sense, it is a synonym for "virtue" <...> in a narrower sense, it is benevolent, fair", it is in the second meaning that is described by Aristotle as a quality that compensates for the shortcomings of laws, "related to the collision of the general and the particular: it is impossible to prescribe in the general norm of the law all possible special cases of its application" ^{[25, pp. 25-26]}.

Of course, the thematic outcome of Aristotle's moral teaching is the concept of the highest good or happiness, which he meaningfully divides into two types based on the realization of two types of virtues (ethical, some of which were discussed above, and dianoetic, that is, characterizing not an act, but mental activity). A complete list of all the abilities of the intelligent part of the soul can number twelve, for a detailed description of them, see M.A. Solopova ^{[25, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 30]}. However, its essence can be expressed as a person's achievement of the genuine and ultimate in the realization of his nature of existence. It is in this sense "human good ( ) represents the activity of the soul ( ) in accordance with virtue" [EN 1098 and 15-20]. A. A. Guseinov explains it as "we know what signs should have objective, so she could be called the Supreme good, but not learn anything, besides, however, the name of happiness, what exactly it is" ^{[13, p. 355]}. Despite the fact that attempts to precisely formalize happiness, as well as its exclusively formal division into types, do not give anything for understanding the essence of happiness, it is especially important for ethics as knowledge that a person cannot be happy (cannot reach his telos, the limit of possibilities) without another person.  Aristotle's ethics is basically revealed not only as humanistic, but also as social, while remaining in positions of moral autonomy of the individual and eudaimonism.

Conclusion Considered, albeit very briefly, the results of almost forty years of research, allow us to conclude that they are generally focused on two key ideas – sociality and moral autonomy of the individual, which is probably due to the influence of A.A. Huseynov in the field of moral philosophy, as a result of which the range of topics covered largely responds to his theoretical analysis (emphasis on socially significant concepts of moral teaching, such as friendship/love, the virtues of justice and generosity, etc.). This circumstance could serve to form a separate research school, in any case, you can notice some promising roll calls in research.

There is also a division of research into two directions, which can be conditionally designated as philosophical-theoretical and historical-philosophical. The division of directions is largely related both to the specifics of the tasks and to the specialization of the researchers themselves, that is, it has an institutional character and has nothing to do with the specifics of the subject of research. Philosophical and theoretical research is aimed at reconstructing the teaching of Aristotle itself, building its internal logic and systematizing it as a practical knowledge of morality, while sometimes it is also addressed in the search for modern significant concepts. The historical and philosophical direction is represented by translation work, structural and comparative analysis of texts. It is already clear that tangible successes have been achieved in both directions: (1) the moral concept of the Stagirite is deployed in a certain thematic coherence based on key ideas, a number of concepts are explained in accordance with the internal logic of the concept, (2) a translation of one of the key treatises of Aristotle is published for the first time in Russian (Evdemova ethics). It is especially important and methodologically promising that in both directions researchers rely on the analysis of the philosophical language of the Stagirite, which makes not only historical and philosophical works significant for philosophical and theoretical ones, but also vice versa. It can also be mentioned that at the moment part of the state task of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a project on the theme "The legacy of Aristotle (preparation of the complete works of Aristotle)". All this allows us to hope for the further successful development of these studies and the possible formation of an original approach to the interpretation of Aristotle's moral teaching, its actualization for moral philosophy.