The history of the development of "hybrid" actions from wars "under a false flag" to "smart power"

Tikhanychev Oleg Vasilyevich ORCID: 0000-0003-4759-2931 PhD in Technical Science Deputy Head of the Department of Advanced Development Management, "Technoserv Group" 13 Yunosti str., Moscow, 111395, Russia to.technoserv@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

As the history of wars and the art of war shows, many different strategies can be used to achieve the goal of confrontation, including those implemented in the form of armed conflicts of varying intensity, the effectiveness of which depends on the conditions of conflict. As the art of war developed, the variety of forms and methods used increased, ensuring the common goal of any conflict – to achieve maximum results with the least losses. One of the most effective strategies for achieving this goal is "indirect" warfare, first described by the English military theorist Basil Henry Liddell Hart, who in his work "Strategy of Indirect Action" formulated the thesis that the purpose of war is fully consistent with the principles of The goal of organizing "hybrid" actions is to achieve a better state of the world after the war, at least from your point of view ^[1].

Historically, one of the forms of "indirect" actions can be attributed to the so-called proxy war, which ensures the conduct of military operations indirectly, by someone else's hands. But, unlike proxy actions, the so-called "hybrid war", which became its further development, is still not recognized in the official defense concepts of most modern states, although, as historical analysis shows, it has been repeatedly used and is being used to solve problems of both armed confrontation and global civilizational confrontation ^[2]..

It is believed that the very definition of "Hybrid Warfare" (HW) was introduced in 2005 by James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman as a designation for this long-used, but until then unnamed phenomenon ^[3]. Currently, experts use several options for defining a "hybrid" confrontation. The content of these definitions regarding the structure of actions (modus operandi) can be reduced to the general premise that "hybrid" or, as they sometimes say, "integral" (integral war) warfare is indirect action with the hidden use of military force, accompanied by active information and economic pressure on the enemy, providing a synergistic effect. ^[4-8]. According to the goal (metam), the main definitions of "hybrid" actions agree on the following – to weaken the enemy without suffering damage that would be inevitable during an open confrontation ^{[9, 10, 11]}.

In addition to these definitions, "hybrid" wars are referred to as "asymmetric warfare" or "combined" wars (compound war), which, however, is controversial, but does not change the essence of this type of confrontation ^[2,4]. As part of the study of "hybrid" wars, the so-called "illegitimate" wars (illegal war) are also sometimes mentioned. Note that these are not identical concepts: although "hybrid" wars, for the most part, are not legitimate, that is, they are waged without declaring war and with a departure from international laws of its conduct, "illegitimate" wars are often not "hybrid" and are conducted explicitly.

An analysis of the essence of the definitions of "hybrid warfare" and the very content of "hybrid" actions confirms that they are a natural continuation of proxy wars that have been waged before, literally since the advent of more or less massive armed confrontation. It's just that with the development of technology, the scale of military operations and the emergence of the theory of "total war" (German: Total Krieg), these proxy actions have been complemented by information and economic components that are becoming increasingly important with the computerization of society and the globalization of the economy.

Moreover, given the increased influence of information and economic actions, some experts tend to exclude the armed component from the definition of "hybrid" confrontation ^[12]. However, as the review of modern conflicts shows, the presence of the latter, although in varying degrees of intensity and involvement of participants, is still a necessary condition for achieving victory in any form of confrontation.

Another important factor is that the use of each of these components separately, as a rule, is not a "hybrid" war; in the vast majority of cases, their transition to military action requires the presence of a combination of components carried out with a sufficient level of activity.

However, despite the long history of development, there are quite a lot of unresolved issues in the theory of "hybrid wars".: according to their structure, regarding the boundaries of the application of the components of "hybrid wars", according to the methods of counteraction, which makes the analysis of their content and features timely and relevant. It is proposed to provide a solution to this problem through a critical analysis of the history of the development of the main components of proxy wars and methods of "hybrid balancing", and then the components of "hybrid wars": power, information, economic, and politico-diplomatic. The latter, combined with legal (legal) measures of influence, can be defined as the "organizational" component of the confrontation.

Using the results of the historical analysis of this process, it can be argued that over a long historical period, the main (and at first, the only) component of "hybrid" actions was the covert involvement of armed groups and organizations to solve problems of interstate confrontation, usually in the form of proxy wars ^[13]. At the same time, experience shows that the ratio of power and non-power components in the structure of "hybrid wars" has changed in different historical periods and theaters of military operations, developing this form of confrontation from classic proxy warfare to versatile and highly organized "hybrid" actions. Based on the analysis of this process, the article proposes to assess the current state and prospects for the development of "hybrid warfare", structure existing problems and identify possible solutions.

1. The structure of "hybrid wars" and views on its content in different historical periods

Many experts believe that mercenary activity can be considered the basis and historical beginning of the emergence of proxy, and then "hybrid" wars. Indeed, the mention of the involvement of mercenaries in the wars between the Greek polis states is given back in the "Anabasis" (Greek: Ἀνάβασις) Xenophon.

And later, in the period from the XV to the XVII century, the mercenary units of the German and Swiss Landsknechts played a significant role in resolving European conflicts. Landsknecht), the Irish "wild Geese". The use of mercenaries in this era was primarily due to economic reasons: firstly, the use of edged weapons required certain skills that needed to be trained for a long time, and secondly, it was too expensive to maintain a permanent combat-ready army for small states, which at that time mainly consisted of Europe. To solve the problems of armed defense or attack, it was cheaper to hire an outside force for a certain period of time.

But, in terms of analyzing the content of "hybrid wars", it is worth noting that mercenary activity at that time was not even a prototype of proxy wars, but a completely legal way to resolve conflicts. And it was only with the beginning of the formation of the system of interstate relations that the actions of mercenary military formations had to be regulated or hidden in some way, at least in "civilized" Europe.

However, it can be noted that the proxy components of conflicts close to modern ones also manifested themselves in a rather distant historical period. Experts in the field of military history refer to the early "hybrid" actions of bribing Helots during the Peloponnesian War of 431-404 BC, the Roman-German wars of 12 BC - 12 AD, accompanied by the bribery of enemies and allies, as well as active diplomatic actions, a number of other conflicts of that era.

In addition, albeit with some assumptions, proxy actions can be considered the involvement of pirates who attacked Spanish ships carrying out transportation to America and were taken over by Britain for a fee. A well–known example of the actions of such pirates is the periodic raids of Francis Drake's ships against the Spanish fleet and coast in the period 1572-1596, the actions of Berber pirates in the interests of the Ottoman Empire in the XVI-XIX centuries. However, for a fairly long historical period, such actions were typical and even generally accepted for proxy actions at sea. And they were used everywhere, including in our country. It is enough to recall the actions of privateers in the Baltic during the reign of Ivan IV or the band of Greek pirates Lambros Katsonis (Greek: λάμπρος κατσώνης) on the Black Sea in 1787-1792.

However, these were all separate loosely coupled actions that had a common goal in the absence of coordination. According to military historians, the first armed conflict that contains signs of modern "hybrid" actions was the "Thirty Years' War" (Guerre de Trente Ans), which took place in the period 1618-1648. This war, in addition to being the last major conflict involving the use of mercenaries, involved the active use, albeit at a primitive level, of information and even economic methods of confrontation.

In recent history, the earliest classic example of proxy warfare with elements of "hybrid" actions close to the modern understanding of this phenomenon is the Spanish Civil War (Spanish Guerra Civil Española), which took place from July 1936 to April 1939. The conflict was fought with the involvement of third-party armed groups and volunteers, while externally observing the agreement on "non-interference" signed by most European powers. Unlike previously implemented proxy wars, the fighting was accompanied by intense information warfare between global social systems and a large-scale set of economic measures.

Since that period, any war of modern times, in principle, to one degree or another is a "proxy". The acceptance of this hypothesis allows us to draw a number of significant conclusions. For example, the initial stage of the Second World War can be considered "hybrid". Having accepted this assumption, which is quite reasonable, it is quite logical to count the date of its beginning, within the framework of restoring historical justice, not from September 1, 1939, but from September 30, 1938, when, by signing the Munich Agreement, Great Britain and France, together with Poland, took organizational measures of "hybrid" influence, directing Germany went to war with the USSR. Poland, at the same time, not only diplomatically prevented the passage of Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia, but also participated in its partition. Later, as part of the "hybrid" actions, the countries of the collective West had to sacrifice the integrity of Czechoslovakia first, and then the existence of Poland, a state that had moved from the status of a participant in the so-called "cordon sanitaire", created against the USSR, to the status of a common border between the USSR and Germany., in modern terminology, belonging to the category of "firebrand countries". Or, as a follow-up to this conclusion, we can move away from the "Eurocentric" view of history and begin the countdown to World War II, the initial stage of which was clearly "hybrid" in nature, with the "incident on the Lugouqiao Bridge" on July 7, 1937, or even with the Mukden incident on September 18, 1931.. 九•一)), given the nature of the initial stage of Japan's aggression against China with the proxy participation of several states on each side. True, this approach will force us to reconsider our views on the history of that time, but it will make it more logical by including, for example, the fighting in Spain in the structure of the Second World War.

After the Second World War, the scale of proxy wars as a forceful expression of "hybrid" actions did not decrease, and the power component still played an essential role in their structure. Mercenary activity was prohibited by the laws of warfare ^[14], but even now it is possible to note the facts of the use of mercenaries, mainly in the form of private military companies (PMCs), which are increasingly used in modern "hybrid" conflicts. In fact, we can talk about a new stage of mercenary activity, legalized in the modern realities of "hybrid" actions, the commercialization of the right to violence.

Recall that PMCs at the initial stage of their use were small groups of mercenaries with light weapons, acting at their own risk. Significant changes in the scale and legal aspects of the use of PMCs occurred with the introduction of Executive Outcomes in South Africa in 1989, followed by its more effective successor, Sterling Corporate Services. PMCs have proven their effectiveness and advantage over "conventional" mercenary groups in solving problems in proxy conflicts, greater flexibility and versatility of application. A number of factors played a significant role in this.:

- The personnel of the PMC turned out to be more militarily experienced, more prepared to work with high-tech weapons, modern means of intelligence and control than rebel or guerrilla units. And given the sharp increase in the share of high-tech and high-precision weapons in modern conflicts ^[15], the transition from simply high-precision to ammunition that can be classified as "selective" or "precision", falling not just into an object, but into a specific element of it with the ability to choose the trajectory of approach to the target, the preparedness and technical literacy of personnel often it becomes a decisive factor in the success of military operations;

- PMCs are more organized, motivated, and manageable than "regular" mercenaries;

- the currently used methods of information and legal support for the actions of PMCs ensure a reduction in the previously negative attitude towards "hybrid" actions, as well as increase the legal protection of PMCs employees themselves.;

- PMC financing can be carried out by private companies, reducing the likelihood of hiding their actions in the interests of a particular state;

- regarding PMCs, including taking into account the previous factor, modern society has a lower sensitivity to losses, they are not ordinary military personnel, but "war workers", their losses are not so actively covered in the press, ordinary citizens do not react to them so actively.

As a result, at the end of the last century, the number of PMCs and the scale of their actions began to grow continuously, they became one of the essential components of all types of conflicts, including "hybrid" ones. Already in Operation Desert Storm, the US Armed Forces began to actively involve PMCs to solve combat and special tasks, according to open sources, several tens of thousands of employees of private companies were involved. In subsequent operations of the US Armed Forces in Iraq (Shock and Awe, Iraqi Freedom), Libya (Unified Protector), Syria (Endurig Freedom) and Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission), the number of employees employed by the US Department of Security has already exceeded the number of military personnel in the groups and amounted to 52% of all forces. Moreover, there are facts of involving PMCs in solving non-violent tasks, such as information warfare. An example is the involvement of SOS International in carrying out tasks within the framework of military Information Support Information (MISO) or the private company GDIT (General Dynamics IT) for information attacks on Russian and Chinese covid vaccines. Similar trends are observed in the armies of other militarily leading States.

Historical experience shows that the combat value and status of private military formations can vary in a wide range: from punitive battalions with police functions typical of illegal formations of South American drug lords and Latin American "death squads" (Spanish: los escuadrones de la muerte) to fully functional and self-sufficient large PMCs. capable of effectively conducting independent assault operations using all types of troops and weapons. However, both of them, as the events of 2014-2023 in Ukraine and 2023 in Russia have shown, are a rather dangerous tool that the state must keep under constant and effective control, preventing it from becoming not only a military, but also a political force.

In this regard, the experience of commercializing "hybrid" actions involving rebels and PMCs, noted during the civil wars of the 1990s and 2000s on the African continent: in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, is very significant. As a result of the conflicts in these countries, irregular groups were able to ensure not only effective armed struggle, but also targeted economic and political actions, resulting in a change of power. Even if this change was temporary, the very trend of commercialization and expansion of PMCs from the military to the political sphere is important.

In any case, the process of involving various PMCs in conducting "hybrid" operations is actively continuing and expanding, thereby changing the structure, appearance and distribution of tasks of the "hybrid" forces.

At the same time, despite its effectiveness, the use of PMCs is not the only example of the transformation of "hybrid" military actions in our time. Another option, for example, is to support anti-government armed groups inside the enemy country, many of which operate using methods contrary to international laws of warfare, or even simply terrorist. An example is the creation of the United States to counter first the USSR, and then the pro—Soviet government of Afghanistan, the Taliban movement (Pashto طالبان - students, students of madrasah). Another example is the creation and support by the West, first of the Libyan, and then of the so-called "Syrian moderate opposition" (Arabic: </I></I><I><I>), which, with varying degrees of success, counteract the legitimately elected governments of these countries and their armed forces using terrorist methods of struggle. Accordingly, the use of such methods of "hybrid" warfare raises another problem – how to counteract such actions without crossing the boundaries of legality and violating the humanitarian principles of warfare. The Israeli army faced a similar problem during the operation "Iron Swords" (Hebrew: מבצע חרבות ברזל, الیديدية).

2. The transformation of the "hybrid wars" of modern times

Summarizing the data of the historical analysis, we can conclude that the majority of conflicts in the second half of the XX – early XXI centuries have signs of "hybridity". Even a cursory analysis of some of them confirms this thesis.:

- The war in Indochina 1945-1954;

- The Korean War of 1950-1953;

- The Vietnam War of 1965-1975;

- The Eritrean War of Independence in 1961-1991;

- The war in Angola in 1975-2002;

- Armed conflicts in Afghanistan in 1979-1989 and 2001-2014;

- The war in Libya in 2011;

- a number of local conflicts on the territory of the former USSR and Yugoslavia in the period 1991-2021;

- The armed conflict in Syria that began in 2011;

- an unsuccessful attempt to organize France's "hybrid" actions against Niger by the forces of mercenaries and ECOWAS, and other conflicts of varying degrees of intensity and success;

- the economic, informational and diplomatic actions of the United States against Iran, carried out as part of a "hybrid" war since 1979, intensified in 2023 after the start of military operations in Yemen, allied with Iran, as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian;

- the confrontation between Iran and Israel, which takes place both on the territory of third countries and through the projection of force using third-party armed groups and religious and political organizations, which practically escalated into a "hot" phase in 2024;

- economic and informational actions within the framework of the "hybrid" campaign against Venezuela, accompanied by local military actions (Operation Gideon) and turned into an attempt at a "color" revolution in 2024;

- large-scale "hybrid" actions conducted by the NATO coalition against Russia, which have been conducted since the beginning of the 21st century, including informational and economic actions, attempts to organize "color" revolutions in the post-Soviet space with varying degrees of success, and which entered a phase of active confrontation on the territory of South Ossetia in 2008 and on the territory of Ukraine and new Russian regions in In 2022.

According to the totality of signs, the "Cold War" of 1948-1991 possessed certain qualities of a "hybrid" conflict, albeit in a mild version, stretched over time. With this in mind, many experts combine the ongoing "hybrid" wars into a single process – the so-called "second Cold War" (Cold War 2.0).

The experience of all these conflicts reminds us that in the structure of modern "hybrid wars", in addition to force, there are non-force components that sometimes are called "non-kinetic forms of influence" and are used both before the transition of the confrontation to the "hot" phase, and after the transition, if it could not be prevented: informational, economic and organizational ^[16]. Let us recall once again that, as the analysis of historical retrospect shows, the ratio between the components is gradually changing in favor of non-violent ones, which, however, are no less dangerous and destructive, as shown by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. So far, there are few examples of achieving victory in "hybrid" wars without using explicit force, but they do exist. An example is the already mentioned collapse of the USSR.

The first significant manifestations of non-violent components in historical retrospect, as noted earlier, are the history of the "Thirty Years' War", which, along with many other changes in the conduct of hostilities, showed a significant increase in the intensity of the information component of the confrontation and a significant expansion of the impact of hostilities on the population and its economic structure. Although at an earlier period, information actions in the interstate confrontation were used quite actively. The most famous example of this is considered to be the activities of the Jesuit Order (Lat. Societas Iesus), founded by the Roman Catholic Church back in 1534.

Despite the fact that Plato also claimed "ideas rule the world" (Greek. From the point of view of war technology, the information component has become a significant part of "hybrid" actions with the advent and spread of printing ^{[17, 18]}.

With the development of communication technologies, the variety and volume of information activities, implemented primarily in the form of explicit and implicit propaganda, grew. The conduct of the Napoleonic troops was distinguished by an active information component, it is enough to recall the attempts of agitation of the Cossacks in order to convince them that the Cossacks did not belong to the Russian ethnic group and other attempts to use the national map in the war against Russia. But the most striking examples of this can be found during the preparation and conduct of the First World War: the mass publication of propaganda articles in French and English periodicals, and the actions of the Creel Committee in the United States.

Later, during the First World War, photography allowed images from the battlefields to be published in the media. And if at first this process was hindered by moral principles that do not recommend publishing, for example, photos of the dead, then over time the need to increase the effectiveness of propaganda took precedence over morality. In 1915, the British used photos of dead enemy soldiers for propaganda for the first time, followed by the Germans, and subsequently by other participants in the conflict. During the Second World War, films, both documentary and artistic, were added to the media of information influence. The Vietnam War became the first conflict of the television era, "stepping off the screens into almost every home" (a living-room war). Nowadays, with the advent of the Internet, video from the battlefield has become commonplace, the armed component of "hybrid" actions has become almost live and is actively used in the information component of "hybrid" actions.

With the advent of the Internet, another significant factor affecting the information component has emerged - the "hybrid" conflicts of recent years have shown that the state monopoly on information is gradually ending and Internet communities (such as the InfoDefense information project or the Beregini hacker group) and even individual media personalities are beginning to exert an increasing influence on the information confrontation. the so-called "opinion leaders" ("crowbars"). This feature must be taken into account when assessing the information component of modern "hybrid" conflicts.

In the conditions of the modern "digital" world, information warfare is not just isolated into a separate form of action, it is divided into components: according to the objects of influence, information and technical warfare acting on technical and programmatic communication and control systems and information and psychological warfare aimed at human consciousness, both individual and public. According to the depth of the impact, it is sometimes divided into immediate and cognitive, aimed at forming long-term effects. There are a number of other signs showing the increasing complexity of this component of "hybrid" wars. For example, experts identify particular areas of information warfare in them, determined by the level of actions and objects of influence: psychological operations, war in the media space, information operations, cyber operations (or technosphere warfare). To solve problems within the framework of these forms of action, specialized information and psychological warfare units ^[19] and cyber commands, such as the American USCYBERCOM, are being created. At the same time, in NATO countries, psychological warfare and information operations are considered different forms of confrontation with different goals and are regulated by different documents. Conducting psychological operations is regulated by the FM 33-1 Field Charter, and information warfare is regulated by higher-level documents AJP-3.10 (NATO Standard: Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations) and JDN 2/19 (Joint Doctrine Note 2/19. Defense Strategic Communication: an Approach to Formulating and Executing Strategy). However, taking into account the impact of informatization, psychological operations have been expanded since 2010 to the status of military Information Support Operations (MISO), and information operations are divided into civil-Military Operations, Cyberspace operations, international operations (Multinational Information Operations), defensive an operation to protect the information infrastructure (Information Assurance) and others. Singling out information warfare as a separate form of action and detailing it highlights the increasing importance of this component, including in the context of "hybrid" actions.

This fact is further confirmed by the expansion of the forces and means of conducting information warfare. In addition to regular units, whose capabilities are not always sufficient to solve the growing range of tasks of information and psychological operations, a large number of organizations are used covertly, on a commercial basis, both to conduct cyber intelligence and to perform other functions within the framework of "hybrid" actions. According to Newsweek magazine estimates, in the United States alone, the number of specialists involved on such a basis for 2021 is about 60 thousand people.

However, these facts change the structure of the forces involved in "hybrid" actions, but they do not change the essence of information actions in a "hybrid war." The differences from the previously used methods are mainly in the technologies used, which ensure the use of modern methods of social engineering, increase the dynamism and scale of impact, and reach the target audience ^[20].

Another aspect of the modern information warfare, more precisely, as noted earlier, its information and technical component, is the active use of cyber weapons. In the context of total informatization of society, its application ensures a sufficiently high efficiency of impact on critical information and energy systems of various levels, both military and civilian. Given the critical dependence on information technology in all areas of management and life support for modern states, cyber-impact software and hardware have potentially devastating capabilities for disabling infrastructure and the economy, with consequences similar to nuclear weapons. At the same time, their use is not regulated by practically any international acts, and their availability is very high.: for self-development, as well as purchase or receipt from third countries. Thus, cyber-weapons, software and hardware tools for influencing critical infrastructure elements, become a kind of "weapon of mass destruction for the poor," which makes this component of "hybrid" wars very significant and dangerous.

With the advent of the post-industrial era, the development of a "digital" society, the information confrontation was complemented by the use of destructive socio-political technologies ^[21]. Their diversity allows us to build an internal classification of such influences: from simple financial and informational support for opposition movements and the creation of a "fifth column" inside the opposing state, to influence-spreading operations that, in the future, ensure the so-called "soft occupation" of the country and its transition to external control ^{[22, 23]}. One of the first cases of using such technologies in practice is considered to be the 1953 coup d'etat in Iran (Operation Ajax - TP-AJAX). In a mild form, for example, in the form of preferential tuition for foreign students, all leading countries have used and are using similar methods: the USA, Great Britain, the USSR. This can include studying at leading universities in the country, as well as the creation of special institutions, such as the Swiss School of Young Global Leaders. According to recent experience, a training program (Strategic Leadership in Global Societal Security Program, SLP) is quite effective, adaptable and implemented as part of the cognitive (mental) component of potential "hybrid" wars in training programs of various states. In the USSR, the Peoples' Friendship University (now RUDN University) was specially established in 1960 for similar purposes.

Organizations that implement such technologies, such as the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the like, are actively developing in a more intensive form of such actions.

The downside of the "soft occupation" can be considered the exertion of pressure, or even the direct elimination of politicians and activists in the countries with which the "hybrid" confrontation is conducted. And regardless of the level of participation of these countries in the "hybrid" actions. The most recent example is the assassination attempt on Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico in May 2024.

The quintessence of using destructive social technologies includes methods of organizing so-called "color revolutions" (English: color revolution, flower revolution), a sufficient number of examples of which can be cited over the past few decades.

The use of political and diplomatic (organizational) methods to ensure "hybrid" actions is very closely related to the information component. Actually, diplomatic actions have always been an integral part of the interstate confrontation in any phase, ensuring the search for allies, blocking enemy alliances and other functions. Currently, these actions have become more active and coordinated with other components of the "hybrid war". One of the first examples of a new approach to conducting such actions in the framework of a "hybrid" confrontation can be considered the creation of an Interdepartmental Working Group in the United States during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This group, which includes representatives of the armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ensured operational coordination of actions and informed the allies and the UN Security Council in the right way.

Thus, the informational and organizational components of "hybrid" actions in modern conflicts are increasingly influencing their course and outcome. In this regard, we can paraphrase the famous statement of Clausewitz (German. Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln): it is no longer war that becomes a continuation of politics by other means, but politics that becomes a continuation of war.

Experts highlight another important aspect of "hybrid" wars – their economic component. In historical retrospect, its use began with the transition from isolated national economies to a global economic system related to international trade, and as the economy globalized, so did the interstate division of labor. At the initial stage of the development of "hybrid" actions, the economic war was carried out mainly in the form of bans on the supply or export of certain goods.

The early forms of the economic component of the "hybrid" confrontation include various forms of blockades, examples of which abound in history. However, military blockades are still closer to military methods of confrontation. But other, economically uncompetitive measures of struggle, related to protective and protective measures, arose almost with the advent of a market economy. Examples are the official payments by the Dutch West India Company in the 17th century of dividends from the proceeds of mining from captured Iberian ships, or the so-called Navigation Acts of 1651, the Hat Act of 1732, which restricts the production and export of hats outside the metropolis due to competition with English ones. The British Iron Act (Irton Act), passed in 1750 with a similar purpose in relation to the steel industry in the colonies. And the essence of the Navigation Acts was that goods to England had to be delivered exclusively by British ships, which stimulated the development of British shipbuilding. The Navigation Acts were only repealed in 1849, when Britain became the world's leading shipping company. And the above are just a few examples: we can recall the regulation of British import tariffs from 1820 to 1876 to counter France, or Imperial preferences: a tariff system that was applied from 1932 to 1947 and ensured Britain's privileged position in trade with the colonies, and other acts of economic confrontation.

With the development of industry and international trade, the globalization of the world economy, the forms of economic confrontation have significantly expanded, and new measures of influence have begun to be applied: commodity, raw materials, technological, financial ^[24]. Economic confrontation is most often implemented in a non-military form, in the form of sanctions, and continues to be an active instrument of "hybrid" confrontation. In the period from 1971 to the end of the twentieth century, the use of about one hundred and twenty cases of sanctions can be noted, primarily as part of the economic war of the collective West against the USSR. In the 21st century, this tool is used no less intensively: from protective customs duties, to the American Export Control Laws and the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017 ^[25]. Sanctions mechanisms are still actively used by the United States and its allies (Figure 1), despite the changing geopolitical conditions. Figure 1 shows the status at the end of 2023, and since then the number of sanctions has only grown.

Fig. 1. The volume of sanctions imposed on different countries as of the end of 2023 (from the website www.statista.com )

An example of economic "hybrid" actions in the financial sector can be the blocking of foreign accounts of Iraq in 2012, Venezuela in 2019, bank accounts and foreign exchange reserves of Russia in 2022, blocking access of Iranian banks to the SWIFT system in 2018 and Russian in 2022.

One of the components of the economic confrontation, which is affected by sanctions, can be identified as technological. The period of decreasing international tension in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries gave rise to the illusion of universal security and launched the processes of a deep international division of labor. This, on the one hand, significantly increased production efficiency, and on the other, created the risk of economic collapse in the event of a "hybrid" impact. The latter did not slow down to manifest itself during the aggravation of global contradictions in 2014-2023. The strengthening of CAATSA bans and export control rules (EAR), the introduction of bans on the supply and so-called "conditional export" of technologies and finished high-tech products from the United States and EU countries to Russia and China, have generated a fairly large pool of problems in all areas of the economy for all warring parties. All participants in the process had to take urgent measures: the introduction of "parallel imports", import substitution programs, the search for new markets, the "rollback" of production to older technologies, etc. Given that the introduction of bans is much faster than overcoming them, the technological component of the economic form of "hybrid" confrontation has generated many problems and questions.

From the point of view of international security, one of the biggest problems with the use of economic confrontation in the framework of "hybrid" actions of varying intensity is the subjectivity of determining the boundary at which competition ends, whether in good faith or not, and an economic war begins in order to harm the opposing state or economic terrorism, an example of which is sabotage on the Nord pipelines. stream" in 2022, falling under the UN Convention "International Concept for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings" No. 52/164 dated December 16, 1997 (International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings). The resulting uncertainty can objectively lead to the transition of economic "hybrid" actions based on casus belli into the classic "hot" phase of the war, as it already happened after the introduction of US oil sanctions against Japan in June-November 1941.

It is impossible not to mention once again another component of the economic confrontation, which is on the verge of humanitarian tolerance - the resource one.

Military history allows us to note that such actions once belonged to completely legitimate forms of armed confrontation: blockades of fortresses, forbidding the supply of food, and shutting off water. Like other forms of armed conflict, blockades before the era of globalization were used mainly in the course of "classical" military operations. Since the formation and consolidation of states, the formation of various interstate relations, the blockade has become one of the forms of "hybrid" confrontation. And the "classic" siege, unlike the economic blockade, has become much less common. Although similar violations of generally accepted humanitarian rules have been committed in our time during the waging of the war of "annihilation" (German: Totalen Krieg), it is enough to recall the siege of Leningrad or the water blockade of Odessa during the Great Patriotic War.

In the framework of a "hybrid" confrontation, resource constraints similar to sieges of cities are once again being applied, now in an indirect form. Moreover, with the growth of technical capabilities and the diversity of economic ties in the modern world, the forms of resource warfare are changing, being realized in the form of transport, energy, and even, as in prehistoric times, food and water blockades. Typical examples of the latter type of action are the attempt to divert the waters of the Jordan River from Israel, which was one of the reasons for the outbreak of the "six–day war" in 1967, the naval blockade of Palestine in 2010, or the complete blockade of the Gaza Strip carried out by the same Israel during Operation Iron Swords. Another modern example is the energy and water blockade of Crimea, which lasted from 2014 to 2022, which was completed only by force.

All these, of course, are not just measures of economic confrontation or sanctions, these are inhumane actions carried out in an indirect form, coupled with other hybrid measures. And directly contradicting the requirements of the 1949 Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. As, by the way, are most of the similar measures taken earlier with the aim of influencing the civilian population: the targeted bombing of Dresden and Konigsberg, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Like modern economic sanctions, they were designed to change the attitude of the enemy's population towards the government and create conditions for its overthrow. However, as historical analysis shows, these measures are meaningless, leading only to deepening the suffering of the civilian population, and in terms of relations with their own authorities, they often have the opposite effect.

Concluding the review, it can be noted that currently new opportunities in the field of "hybrid" warfare may open up with the development of technology, including the creation of new types of weapons. So, at present, the presence of climatic or, for example, tectonic weapons by any side has not been confirmed, although there is a certain correlation, which is above the statistical error, between the earthquakes of the last few decades and the conflicts occurring in different regions. With a certain degree of tolerance, Israel's interception of rain clouds over its territory and the forced initiation of precipitation can be considered an analogue of climate weapons, which caused repeated protests from Arab countries and Iran, which did not receive rain.

The American HAARP (High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program) program, sometimes mentioned in connection with the development of climate weapons, appears to be just an experiment with no proven practical results on climate change, and the development of such weapons itself is prohibited by the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Means of Influencing the Natural Environment. from 1976. However, in the presence of such weapons, which are usually defined as geophysical, they could become an ideal "hybrid" means of economic and cognitive confrontation, destroying life support systems and industrial facilities, worsening the living conditions of the population, without revealing the obvious source of the impact ^[26]. And also from the field of "conspiracy theory": biological weapons can be an effective means of conducting "hybrid" actions, the secret use of modified versions of which, aimed at defeating predefined human genotypes, opens up broad prospects for such wars, acting in modern conditions not only on the population, but also on the enemy's economy. However, there is no clear evidence of the existence and use of these tools in modern history.

Thus, the historical analysis of "hybrid" actions, including those related to modern history, allows us to formulate a number of conclusions.:

- the theory and practice of conducting "hybrid wars" as a means of conflict resolution is not military "know-how", but a long-used form of solving geopolitical problems that combines the features of classic proxy wars, complex "hybrid" confrontation and "Offshore balancing", which in the changed conditions of modern mira is being used quite actively and is likely to be used with increasing intensity in the future. Modern concepts of the armed confrontation between the United States and NATO, such as "Remote Warfare", "Battle in a multi-domain space", recommendations of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) of the US Federal Advisory Committee on Actions in the "gray areas". zones" (English Gray zone - GZ), clearly confirm the previous thesis;

- individual, primarily non-violent, components of "hybrid" actions can be used separately, without leading to an obvious confrontation, the situation turns into a "hybrid" war only with their complex application.;

- at the same time, the content of "hybrid wars" in modern conditions is shifting towards the use of non-military methods of confrontation, while both the destructive consequences and the danger of the latter, the transition from a "hybrid" conflict to a "hot" phase, are increasing in the context of the globalization of the modern world.

Taking into account the last factor – the danger of a "hybrid" war escalating into a "hot one", as well as taking into account the constant increase in universal information awareness, any hybrid actions are currently turning into balancing on the verge of a "foul". History, from the era of the Napoleonic Wars to the present day, shows that imprudent actions are highly likely to lead to conflict and its transition into a "hot" phase with all the ensuing consequences.

3. The prospects for the development of a "hybrid" confrontation

The conducted historical analysis not only allows us to conclude that history is not a purely theoretical science exploring the past, but an effective tool for obtaining and evaluating practical recommendations: it allows us to identify some patterns in the development of the theory of "hybrid wars" and develop recommendations for countering "hybrid" threats.

The main conclusion from the historical analysis is that, given the repeatedly noted danger of a "hybrid" war escalating into a "hot" one, it is necessary to predict the consequences of the actions being taken. Experts consider mathematical modeling to be the most objective tool for such a forecast. The analysis of historical experience allows, as an option, to form a generalized model for assessing the intensity of a "hybrid" war. The structure of the model can be determined by the list of components of the "hybrid" confrontation and the forces involved.

The structure of such a model can be considered conditionally constant:

- the armed component;

- information actions;

- economic confrontation;

- organizational measures.

The interpolation of functions based on previously obtained statistics can be used as a mathematical tool for modeling all components of the confrontation. Obviously, such a model works correctly only on continuous functions, inaccurately reacting to their discontinuities, which may occur, for example, in a situation of revolutionary changes. However, none of the existing mathematical apparatus, with the exception of the apparatus of stability theory, provides work with functions that have discontinuities. But it is a thankless task to look for bifurcation points on systems described with the coarse detail characteristic of describing global systems and processes. Therefore, we have to settle for what is possible, namely, a time-series-based device.

The simulation results can be displayed in the form of a "thermal" matrix (Figure 2). The intensity of each component is determined by the forces involved and the actions they perform. And the overall intensity of "hybrid" actions is determined by the cumulative "temperature" of the action matrix, formed taking into account the weighting coefficients of each component.

Fig. 2. The model of "hybrid" actions, a variant of the representation of output information in the form of a matrix of components (variant)

The "temperature" of each of the components can be formed based on external signs obtained based on an analysis of the current situation (see Fig. 1), and according to the state of the opposing side, determined based on the standards of foreign armies. For example, in terms of information warfare, these standards are determined by the levels of information warfare and the composition of the forces involved (including the need to involve the State Department or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), specified in the document "Open psychological operations conducted by the Armed Forces in peacetime and in special situations shortly before the declaration of war" (Department of Defense Directive S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Situations Short of Declared War).

Using a similar or any other model with an appropriate set of initial data for it will allow us to assess the current intensity of "hybrid" actions and, most importantly, predict the trend of their development.

In addition to forming proposals for describing the model, historical analysis allows us to formulate a number of patterns characteristic of this form of confrontation.

First, given the development of this form of confrontation, it is illogical to recognize "hybrid warfare" as a fundamentally new way of resolving political conflicts. Although this name appeared relatively recently, the very principle of conducting "hybrid" actions has been used for quite a long time, first in the form of proxy wars, because in almost any armed conflict, besides two interested parties, at least a third is present in one form or another. Later, with the development of information and economic components, methods of relatively weak "offshore balancing" began to be used to solve geopolitical problems, including those implemented by technologies for creating "arcs of instability" (eng. Arc of Instability), and later, with the unification, development and strengthening of all the components of these concepts, such actions began to be called "hybrid".

The modern development of "hybrid" actions can be considered the so–called "smart power" (Eng. S mart Pay) - a concept that combines all forms of "hybrid" actions and, in fact, is the highest form of their development, ensuring the maximum implementation of the principles of minimizing the efforts made to achieve the goal. There is no official definition of this type of action yet, although most experts, such as Joseph S. NYE, Chester A. Crocker, Fenisler Hampson, Pamela R. Aall and others generally describe "smart force" as a complex and long-term application of all components of "hybrid" actions, ensuring the achievement of the set goal, but with a level of impact that does not allow transition to the phase of direct armed conflict.

Secondly, since the "hybrid war" is a logical development of proxy wars, as a reaction to the informatization of society and the globalization of the economy, it is logical to assume that this historical process will not stop, the "hybrid" confrontation will develop and be actively used. This assumption is confirmed by attempts to create another "arc of instability" around Russia, carried out by the United States over the past decade and a half: from the previously applied processes of creating a relatively safe "smoldering" zone of instability, a transition is visible to rocking the situation to create "firebrand states" capable of "rocking" the situation in their neighbors. It is likely that the development and transformation of forms of "hybrid" confrontation will continue, for example, taking into account the opportunities generated by the "digitalization" of the economy. It is difficult to guess how and what role the changes will play. However, it is necessary to predict and prepare for new threats, for which it is necessary to conduct further research on this process and improve tactics to counteract "hybrid" actions ^[27].

Thirdly, in historical retrospect, the principle has changed little, but the application and structure of the "hybrid forces" involved in "hybrid" conflicts have changed significantly, and their peculiar "stratification" has occurred. Militarily poorly trained, but adapted to the area of combat operations, formations are still formed on the basis of "native" armies or recruited from local militias. And the component prepared for modern warfare, whose role is constantly increasing: technically equipped and trained special operations forces and the increasingly active involvement of PMCs, aviation, including unmanned aerial vehicles, and space reconnaissance, are provided by hidden participants in the conflict and, most often, are based outside the theater of operations, operating in "gray zones."

As part of the same trend, specialized management bodies are being created to lead "hybrid" actions, temporary, but on a professional basis and with high-tech equipment, such as multi-domain task forces (MDTF), created within the framework of the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept and in accordance with the manual The United States Armed Forces Joint Publication (JP), civil-military administrations in conflict areas.

These facts once again confirm that in NATO countries they perceive the increased activity of using "hybrid" actions and forces not as a random process, but as a trend that can change approaches to geopolitical confrontation in the future, personnel and technical controls for which need to be prepared in advance.

Fourthly, an important factor is that modern "hybrid" actions, especially their non-violent components, are expanding in the spatial domain, involving not only the parties to the conflict, but also third-party states, allowing virtually no one to remain innocent. This is especially noticeable in the information and economic components. Involvement can be carried out through persuasion and coercion (in the terminology of the NATO guidance documents: persuasive communications or coercive force), for example, by the introduction of so-called "secondary sanctions". Involvement in information warfare can also be carried out by misleading using sources of information with an implicit affiliation. The latter was clearly manifested during the "hybrid" actions against Russia, as well as during the implementation of the information component of the hostilities in the Gaza Strip in 2023. These factors need to be taken into account both in the development of the theory of "hybrid" confrontation and directly in the practice of its management.

In the modern world, in conditions of total informatization and "hyper-connectivity", when everyone has constant access to mobile devices for receiving, forming and transmitting information, the possibilities for conducting information actions have increased many times. The current situation requires not only the improvement of information warfare methods, but also the development of counteraction measures.: both restrictions on the submission of information by the enemy and compliance with "digital hygiene" measures, as well as the development of a kind of "information immunity" among the population, which protects and allows critical perception of fake information. This task is not trivial, but without its solution, victory in modern "hybrid" actions is impossible.

Fifth, "hybrid" wars, like "classic" ones, rarely start suddenly. Due to the structure and characteristics of the individual components, they are sensitive to early preparation and very sluggish in terms of leadership - most of the components of "hybrid" actions are long–term, often triggered in the long term. This factor has two effects: on the one hand, it is necessary to take a number of measures to counteract the "hybrid" confrontation in advance, on the other hand, it is difficult to ensure an acceptable confidence probability of the effectiveness of the applied measures over a long period of planning.

An example of the need for advance preparation is the economic component of the war against Libya, Syria, and Russia, when the blocking of public and private financial assets was prepared in advance, but it was done when it was too late to resist these actions. In this scenario, if the party exposed to the "hybrid" impact waits for a response before the consequences occur, acting reactively, it will definitely be late in responding. Accordingly, it is necessary to start countering such impacts in advance, ensuring a transition from the currently used reactive methods of conflict management to proactive ones based on forecasting and long-term planning. An equally clear confirmation of this thesis is the so-called "mental war" ^[11] and technological confrontation, carried out within the framework of the organizational and economic components of "hybrid" actions, respectively. The analysis shows that even in the era of globalization and mutually beneficial international distribution of labor, there may be a situation of rapid cessation of the use of technology and the supply of high-tech products, generating complex problems with cumulative effects.

Taking into account these factors, in order to ensure a high probability of implementation of the measures taken, it is necessary both to increase the accuracy of action planning and to expand the range of measures taken to ensure the guaranteed implementation of at least some of them.

Regarding the last example, for any large economy, it is advisable to predict and be prepared for a critical situation: to develop our own technologies, albeit less effective than purchased ones, diversify supplies by providing them from obviously uncorrelated sources, and take other measures. Of course, these measures are costly and reduce current profits, but security has never been cheap.

Sixth, in addition to the duration of the implementation of the active factors of the "hybrid" war, it is marked by a significant asymmetry of the measures applied, which is determined by the complex structure of this form of confrontation. Accordingly, the factor of asymmetry, along with the inertia of actions, must be taken into account in detail when planning actions. In this asymmetry, non-violent methods of confrontation seem to be the most dangerous, including because measures to combat them have not yet been sufficiently developed. However, this can be done, for example, by focusing on the methods of their organization. For informational purposes, for example, on the provisions of methods for organizing "color revolutions" ^[20].

Making the right decisions contributes to victory, the cost of a mistake is very high and can only be fixed at high cost. An illustrative example confirming this thesis was given by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sergey Glazyev in an interview: from 1991 to 2014, Russia invested about $30 billion in the Ukrainian economy in an attempt to establish cooperation, while the United States spent about 5.4 billion in a comparable period to influence the country's population and train its future anti-Russian managers.. The result is known. To prevent such a situation from repeating itself, a set of specific tools is needed: planning techniques, forecasting and mathematical modeling tools, and others, the creation of which should be the subject of scientific research ^[28].

Seventh, despite all the innovations, in "hybrid" warfare, as in "classic" warfare, victory is decided on the battlefield. But, given that the power component is a tactic, not a conflict strategy, one cannot help but recall Clausewitz's statement: "Strategic miscalculations cannot be compensated by tactical successes": victory is still achieved on the battlefield, but it is ensured by actions in the rear, both one's own and the enemy's. In other words, this thesis takes on a new meaning in modern conditions. Considering this, in order to achieve victory, the targeted and coordinated use of non-violent components of the "hybrid" confrontation is extremely important ^{[29, 30]}. Effective management is the key to successful actions in any field of activity ^[31], and the management of military operations is no exception. This factor must be taken into account when preparing and conducting "hybrid" actions. And, in this regard, the increasing level of "hybridity" in modern conflicts, the high probability of maintaining this trend in the future, requires changes in military science and education. Both from the point of view of developing methods and models for a comprehensive study of the components of "hybrid" actions, and teaching future commanders and superiors how to conduct them. The leading military powers have fully taken care of this issue, as exemplified by the creation of the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC DOD) under the US Department of Defense, the organization of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and others like them.

In our country, as part of this process, the Ministry of Education and Science has included additional courses in the educational process of some universities (Sevastopol University, RSSU, MIREA) to train specialists in "hybrid" wars. In 2022, the master's course "Information and Hybrid Warfare" was included in the program of the Faculty of Political Science of Moscow State University. However, despite the timeliness of these measures, the listed courses are mainly aimed at studying the information component of "hybrid" actions for the training of political scientists, journalists or cybersecurity specialists, rather than at a systematic study of this phenomenon as a whole and giving the training process a systematic character. In addition, these are fairly small training courses, which cannot be compared with the volume of teaching the specifics of the "hybrid" confrontation in leading foreign countries. For comparison, according to the R-Techno agency, as of 2023, 36 programs for training specialists in "hybrid" conflicts are being implemented in the United States, 28 in China, 14 in India, 9 in total in the European Union, and 3 in the UK.

Finally, the use of "hybrid" methods leads to a significant transformation of the structure of the confrontation by expanding the use of relatively non-violent methods, which leads to an expansion of the list of explicit and hidden participants in the conflict, the involvement of non-state structures and interstate corporations in the conflict, changing the objects of influence, blurring the boundaries and stages of conflict development. It is especially dangerous that, simultaneously with the strengthening of information and economic components in the structure of "hybrid" wars, there is an increase in the participation of non-governmental organizations in them, a kind of "outsourcing of violence."

These factors lead to the fact that it is impossible to assess "hybrid" conflicts on the basis of existing international legislation. And if there are international regulations for proxy participation in conflicts, even if they are not always applied, for example, the "Paris Treaty on the Exclusion of War as a weapon of national Policy" (the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, Kellogg-Briand Pact) and the Budapest Resolution to this Pact of 1934, for the remaining components "hybrid" actions of such documents do not yet exist. At the same time, historical experience shows that most "hybrid" conflicts, if not prevented, sooner or later enter the active phase and become classic wars. Moreover, non-violent methods of "hybrid" actions, as historical experience shows, are periodically used purposefully to activate a sluggish conflict and attract new participants, intentionally transferring it to a violent phase.

To prevent such situations, there is a need to clarify legislation on military conflicts in terms of preventing "hybrid" actions at an early stage. First of all, this should be ensured not so much in the military sphere as in terms of cross-border and extraterritorial forms of non-violent "hybrid" actions.: informational and economic confrontation, organizational methods of action. For such forms, it is necessary either to legislatively abandon the principle of the extraterritoriality of certain institutions, or to legitimize the extraterritoriality of the response to them. As part of the regulation of such actions, it is necessary to clearly define the boundaries of the transition from economic competition, through "unfriendly actions" of an economic and legal nature, to economic warfare, as an integral part of the "hybrid war". Similar boundaries should be established in the information space. And although most states understand the importance of this process and take certain information protection measures, such as the Russian Federal Law No. 255-FZ dated July 14, 2022 "On Control over the Activities of Persons under Foreign Influence" or the Belarusian Law "On Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Belarus "On Mass Media" of 2023, These measures seem incomplete. If we consider "hybrid" actions to be a war, then it is necessary to respond to them as an armed attack: harshly, without looking back at the principles of peacetime.

As part of solving these problems, it is necessary to legally regulate activities in the technogenic segment of the cyber sphere, in the processes of economic interaction, and organize a number of other measures.: both in terms of developing regulatory documents to remove participants in the confrontation from the "gray zones", and the creation of international bodies for the control and regulation of the cyber sphere and economic competition processes, similar to those currently created in the field of nuclear energy (IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency - IEEE) or the prohibition of chemical weapons (OPCW, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The importance of legislative regulation of the non-violent components of "hybrid" actions is shown by the attitude of the main beneficiaries of this form of confrontation to measures to counter external information influences and actions of the internal opposition, most often also coordinated from the outside. One of the first examples of legislative opposition in modern history is the German "Law against Treacherous Attacks on the State and the Party and the Protection of Party Uniforms" of 1934 (German Gesetz gegen heimtückische Angriffe auf Staat und Partei und zum Schutz der Parteiuniformen). Modern apologists for such actions continue to develop similar acts, for example, laws on foreign agents that are actively applied in their country (the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, FARA) and are not allowed to be adopted in other countries.

Moreover, as part of the improvement of international legislation, it may be necessary to clarify the very concept of "aggression", defined by UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3314 of December 14, 1974 as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other way incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations."". However, this also applies to other international legislation regulating behavior in cyberspace, international economic cooperation and competition, arms supplies, and many other unresolved issues that may serve as potential sources of conflict intensification.

Conclusion

As historical analysis has shown, "hybrid" actions have gone through a long history of development: from simple "false flag operations" and proxy wars at the tactical level, to methods of "offshore balancing" at the global level, their components developed from disjointed propaganda methods and blockade actions within the framework of economic warfare, from the use of "soft power" to the transition to "smart power", which combines all forms of "hybrid" confrontation. Despite the long period of use, the modern international community was not quite ready for their conduct: the features of "hybrid wars", the increased frequency of use of this technology of confrontation, the historically high probability of the transition of a "hybrid" conflict into a "classic" war, require an adequate response to geopolitical processes, for example, clarification of international and domestic conceptual and planning documents regulating the areas in which "hybrid" actions can be implemented.

But, most importantly, historical analysis shows that a "hybrid" war is a systemic process and it can only be won, or at least not lost, by acting systematically.