The Crisis around Ukraine and Security Issues in the Visegrad Four Countries

Peshkin Vitalii Mikhailovich Educator, Department of International Journalism, Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University 603155, Russia, Niegorodskaya oblast', g. Nizhnii Novgorod, ul. Minina, 31a vitaly1209@bk.ru Other publications by this author

 Speaking about the role of the Visegrad Group in the Ukrainian crisis, it should be pointed out that V4's foreign policy activity was one of the reasons for its occurrence.

This circumstance in the spring of 2014 allowed the Visegrad Group to position itself as the European "flagship" for solving the Ukrainian crisis. However, the transition of events in Ukraine from the regional to the global level caused V4 to withdraw from active positions in resolving this conflict in the period from 2015 to the beginning of its in February 2022. At the same time, the events of the end of 2014-2015 became an important milestone in the rethinking by the V4 countries of their future activities in the field of security and defense cooperation, intensified the interaction of the Visegrad Group, both with individual NATO partners and with the Alliance as a whole.

The relevance of this study is due to the fact that the Ukrainian crisis has become the most serious and large-scale challenge for the current system of international relations. After Kiev's announcement of its intention to "take a pause" in negotiations on signing an Association Agreement scheduled for November 2013 at the Vilnius summit, protests began in the Ukrainian capital, which will lead to an armed struggle of the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass and the beginning of a special Russian military operation in Ukraine in February 2022.

The purpose of the study is to study the activities of the Visegrad Group during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014-2022 and the impact of this conflict on the defense policy of the Visegrad Group, the intensification of cooperation through V4 – NATO

The stated goal will be achieved by performing the following tasks:

- to study the degree of involvement of the Visegrad Group in the Ukrainian crisis at various stages of this conflict;

- analysis of the growing contradictions between the V4 participants, due to the difference in the assessments of the authorities of the "four" countries of the prospects for further development of relations with Ukraine and waging a sanctions war against Russia.

- study of the intensification of defense policy and cooperation with NATO by the "quartet" countries in the period 2014-2022.

The novelty of the scientific research in the framework of this article is expressed in the analysis of normative legal acts, statements of the Visegrad Group, demonstrating a different degree of response of V4 to acute (2014-2015, the beginning of its in February 2022) and "fading" stages of the Ukrainian crisis, as well as changing approaches to the defense policy of the "quartet" countries in the specified period of time. The Action Plan of the Visegrad Group Defense Cooperation, which has not been studied before, will also be presented in the edition of 2020, which will indicate a wide range of challenges and threats, some of which do not directly relate to the security of the "quartet" countries, which indicates the actual disappearance of a purely regional component in the defense policy of the Visegrad Group.

The methodological basis for writing the article was following the principle of historicism, applying a system-structural approach to the study of political, economic, and other factors that caused the Visegrad Group's response to the Ukrainian crisis. Analysis and synthesis were applied from general scientific methods in the course of the work, which helped to isolate the military-political measures of individual countries of the "quartet", and then recreate a holistic view of the overall activities of V4 to provide military assistance to Ukraine due to the degree of dependence on energy supplies from Russia.

The sources used in writing this work can be divided into two groups – 1) information materials of the European Economic Community and the European Union, as well as documents of the Visegrad Group itself. 2) Scientific research published by various foreign scientific institutes; articles by Russian (Yu.A. Borko, A.D. Tsyganok), as well as publications in Russian and foreign media.

The Ukrainian crisis has become one of the main events in world politics and international relations of the post-bipolar period. The Euromaidan, which began as a largely "traditional" event in the domestic political life of Ukraine (since the beginning of the XXI century, large protests have regularly taken place in the country against certain actions of the authorities, including, among others, the "Orange Revolution" of 2004), eventually led to an internal political coup and the removal from power of President Viktor Yanukovych and his entourage, violation of territorial integrity due to the reintegration of Crimea into Russia, mass demonstrations in the south-eastern regions, the beginning of a bloody conflict in the Donbass, which in fact had the character of a civil war^[1]. However, the impact of the Ukrainian crisis was not limited exclusively to internal Ukrainian events, Russian-Ukrainian relations and regional processes in the post-Soviet space. In fact, other states and regions were involved in this process, which gave the Ukrainian events a global scale^[2].

Due to its geographical location, the countries of the Visegrad Group have shown increased interest in Ukraine since the latter gained independence in 1991. In the 1990s, V4 acted as a kind of "window to Europe" for Kiev, since cooperation with former socialist countries allowed (albeit dosed) to participate in various integration processes in Central and Eastern Europe (in particular, to join the Central European Initiative)^[3]. After the Quartet countries joined NATO and the EU, Ukraine's capabilities in implementing its Euro-Atlantic policy increased due to the support of its aspirations from the Visegrad Group or its individual members. Practical elements of such interaction were manifested, for example, during the presidency of V.A. Yushchenko, when V4 supported Kiev's initiatives to join the EU and NATO at the level of declarations and statements^[4]. In response, Ukraine actively supported the regional initiatives of the EU and the Visegrad Group aimed at strengthening the position of Brussels in the post-Soviet space^[5].

The "Visegrad trace" can be found in the Ukrainian crisis itself. The official reason for the start of the protests in November 2013 was the suspension by the President of Ukraine V.F. Yanukovych of the process of preparation for obtaining the status of an associate member of the EU. The signing of the relevant agreement was to take place on the sidelines of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius.

With the radicalization of the protests and the expansion of the scale of the confrontation, the topic of Ukraine becomes one of the key issues in the framework of meetings and meetings of the Visegrad Group participants. The common position of the V4 countries on the Ukrainian events was that the main demands of the opponents of the current government regarding changes in foreign policy, rapprochement with Europe and large-scale internal reforms should be supported, since they are part of Kiev's "European choice". However, among the members of the Visegrad Group there were also certain concerns about the composition of the protesters, where radicals and adherents of Ukrainian nationalism played an increasingly significant role. According to some Visegrad politicians, the latter should have been excluded from the process of developing a compromise solution between the government and the opposition. All these provisions were enshrined in the Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group countries dated January 29, 2014^[6]

The change of power in Ukraine in February 2014, which was actually a coup d'etat, was supported by the Visegrad Group. Already on February 24-25, two emergency meetings were held at the level of foreign ministers and interior ministers, and on February 28 – the chairmen of national parliaments. The documents published following their results contained wishes for the attainment of internal unity throughout Ukraine, the holding of "free and fair elections" and the implementation of democratic reforms (primarily constitutional). In turn, the Quartet countries expressed their readiness to continue supporting Ukraine's desire to participate in European integration and develop relations with the EU^[7].

Also on February 28, 2014, the V4 foreign Ministers arrived in Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk on an official visit in order to hold talks with the new Ukrainian government^[8], which was in the process of formation at that time. Later, on March 1, 2014, Hungarian Foreign Minister J. Martonyi also visited the Transcarpathian region, where a large Hungarian diaspora lives^[9].

At the same time, it is worth noting that although the statements and actions of the Visegrad Group were ahead of the EU's activity on the Ukrainian issue in their efficiency, nevertheless, the consolidation of the "quartet" countries was seriously tested already in the first months and even weeks of the crisis, which subsequently will allow us to talk about the presence of a significant split between the participants ^[10]. In addition, V4's activities regarding the Ukrainian crisis for the most part were in the nature of a reaction to the events taking place, which did not offer any constructive strategies for resolving the process.

Until the end of March 2014, the Visegrad Group tried to position itself as the "flagship" of European initiatives in relation to Ukraine. At the same time, Poland played a key role in these processes. The positions of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were more restrained, and in some aspects even critical. A kind of watershed will be the sanctions against Russia imposed by the US and the EU at the end of March 2014, which marked the beginning of a long-term sanctions war^[11].

Within the framework of the Visegrad Group's activities, the topic of Ukraine remained one of the key ones. Thus, on March 4, a Joint Statement of the Prime Ministers of the Quartet was published, which, however, practically did not contain any practical steps to resolve the crisis, except for calls on Russia to respect international law and resolve controversial issues within the framework of cooperation with relevant international organizations (OSCE). At the same time, it was emphasized that Moscow's actions create a "new dangerous reality" in Europe, drawing parallels with the events of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and 1981 in Poland. At the same time, the Statement also called on the Government of Ukraine to respect the rights and ensure the equal existence of all residents of the country, regardless of ethnicity or cultural affiliation^[12].

The next day, on March 5, the Foreign Ministers of the V4 countries sent a joint letter to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, K. Ashton, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, in which they again focused on the need to update the process of granting Ukraine the status of an associate member of the European Union, interrupted in November 2013 at the initiative of Kiev. The authors focused on the fact that not only the new Ukrainian government, but also the Ukrainian people are striving for this, and the signing of the future agreement was called "the moral duty of the EU"^[13]. Looking ahead, this process will be brought to a practical conclusion: the political part of the Association Agreement was signed on March 21, 2014, and the economic part was signed on June 27, 2014.

At the same time, the Visegrad Group also focused on the further development of the Eastern Partnership program in order to grant the status of associate members of the EU not only to Ukraine, but also to Georgia and Moldova interested in rapprochement with Europe. This is what the meeting of the V4 Foreign Ministers and their colleagues from the Eastern Partnership countries, held on April 28-29, 2014 in Budapest, was dedicated to. In the final statement, in addition to the main topic, it was about expanding and increasing the volume of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, the need to intensify cooperation between the EU and partner countries, deepening and expanding ongoing reforms, supporting territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, ensuring energy security, as well as condemning any forceful methods of resolving controversial issues^[14].

In the future, the consolidated position of the V4 countries began to be eroded. This is primarily due to the development of the sanctions war and the lack of unity within the "quartet" regarding the need to impose their own sanctions against Russia. If Poland and the Czech Republic initially supported the initiatives of the EU and the United States, and also imposed their own restrictions within the framework of relations with Moscow, Hungary and Slovakia, although they joined the pan-European trend, but individually refused any radical prohibitions and strictures in the economic sphere. Subsequently, Slovakia will change its position, which will be due to the resignation of Prime Minister R. Fico in March 2018.^[15] Hungary, on the other hand, will remain consistent within its sanctions policy, for which it will repeatedly be subjected to pressure from partners in the Visegrad Group and the EU, as well as receive accusations of "pro-Russianness"^[16].

In the context of the emerging split of opinions and divergence of positions, V4 has actually ceased to act as a key actor in European politics within the framework of the Ukrainian crisis, in fact remaining in the status of an outside observer. Until October 2014, the Ukrainian issue did not appear as the main one in the documents of the Visegrad Group. At the same time, the events of the Ukrainian crisis have become an occasion for the activation of the Quartet's policy in the field of defense policy and relations with NATO.

The reasons for the cooling of the Visegrad Group's interest in the Ukrainian crisis can be considered both internal and external factors. The first are the consequences of EU sanctions against Russia, as well as counter-sanctions imposed by Moscow, which have had a serious impact on the economies of the "four" countries. The second is the divergence of positions within the Visegrad Group on the Ukrainian issue, the active desire of Poland and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic to interact with Ukraine (including to the detriment of intraregional processes and projects), the actions of Brussels to consolidate EU policy in the framework of the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.

For the first time since March 2014, the Ukrainian issue will be the main topic of the V4 meeting at the end of October, when the Quartet's foreign ministers issued a joint statement on the results of the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine held on October 26. In addition to congratulating the "pro-European forces" who won, the participants of the statement expressed their readiness to continue active cooperation with Ukraine to carry out appropriate democratic and market reforms, insisted on the implementation of the Minsk agreements, the investigation of the crash of the Boeing MH-17 in the Donbass, monitoring the situation with the situation of the Crimean Tatars ^[17]. At the end of the statement, there was an invitation to the President of Ukraine, P.A. Poroshenko, to take part in the Visegrad Group summit in November 2014.

A day later, on October 31, 2014, the foreign Ministers of the V4 countries, together with their British counterpart, issued a statement on the upcoming local elections in the territories of Donbass not controlled by Ukraine, criticizing the upcoming events. In particular, they pointed out their illegality due to non-compliance with Ukrainian legislation, violation of the provisions of the Minsk Agreement of September 5, 2014, and called on Russia to influence their cancellation^[18]. In general, the document did not contain any new provisions that differed from the EU's position on the Ukrainian crisis. Also, the fact of the presence of the British Foreign Minister in the statement allowed some experts to conclude that the Visegrad Group abandoned its own policy towards Ukraine and fully consolidated it with the line of the EU and NATO^[19].

In the remaining months of 2014, the topic of Ukraine was discussed several more times within the Visegrad Group, both at the summits of the Quartet itself and in an expanded format. At the same time, it is worth noting two key trends characterizing the policy and position of V4 in relation to the Ukrainian crisis. Firstly, in fact, the same provisions were transferred from document to document on support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Donbass, compliance with international law, avoidance of violence, improvement of the humanitarian situation, support for democratic reforms and transformations, and also condemned Russia's actions. However, no new mechanisms and tools were proposed to improve the existing situation. Secondly, the Ukrainian crisis and its international political consequences were used by the V4 countries as part of the discussion of their intraregional defense policy and security activities (this will be discussed below).

The discussion of the Ukrainian crisis is contained in the following documents of 2014: the Joint Statement of the Heads of Government of V4 and the President of Switzerland on December 9, the Joint Press Statement of the Heads of State of V4, Serbia and Austria on December 12 and the Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of V4 and Ukraine on December 16. In the first case, the Ukrainian crisis became one of the main topics of discussion, but the final text reflects only general provisions on the conflict in Donbass, the humanitarian situation in the country and the results of the parliamentary elections held at the end of October^[20]. In the second document, the penultimate paragraph is devoted to the Ukrainian crisis, which largely duplicates the provisions on the situation in the conflict zone and in the country as a whole ^[21].

The third document is much more informative. During the meeting in Kiev, the V4 Foreign Ministers and their Ukrainian counterparts discussed a number of topics related to both the direct interaction of the Visegrad Group and Ukraine, and the intensification of cooperation through the Eastern Partnership and the International Visegrad Foundation. The Quartet countries expressed their readiness to contribute to ensuring Ukraine's energy security through reverse gas supplies, as well as to develop trade relations more intensively. In addition, they talked about the international conference on support for Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga scheduled for 2015, within which V4 was ready to act as a conductor of Kiev's interests. Cooperation between the Eastern Partnership and the International Visegrad Foundation was mainly limited to the further implementation of scholarship, exchange and educational programs, training of specialists in the field of public administration and other humanitarian projects^[22].

It is worth noting that after this meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine began to disseminate information, however, which was not of an official nature, that Kiev was invited to join the Visegrad Group^[23]. However, subsequently, this situation did not receive any development.

Starting from 2015, the topic of Ukraine and the Ukrainian crisis in the official documents of the Visegrad Group ceases to be among the key ones. The above-mentioned theses concerning the status of Crimea, the conflict in Donbass, and Kiev's "European choice" continue to be regularly mentioned as in statements following meetings of Visegrad politicians (including with colleagues from other countries)^[24], as well as in annual reports^[25] and chairing programs^[26], but in fact they serve only as a "background" for discussing other topical issues. Subsequently, the Ukrainian crisis was replaced by more pressing problems for V4 and Europe as a whole: the migration crisis, the COVID-2019 pandemic, energy security, etc. From 2015 until the beginning of the Special Military Operation (SVO) of Russia on the territory of Ukraine, only two documents were devoted to this topic. At the same time, the first one concerned not the crisis itself, but the problem of transit of Russian gas to Eastern Europe^[27]. The second, in turn, once again duplicated the collective position of V4 on the Ukrainian issue, the areas of cooperation of the Quartet with Kiev, and only in the last paragraph mentioned the willingness to cooperate in the fields of energy, transport infrastructure and logistics^[28].

On a regular basis, the documents of the Visegrad Group mention the Eastern Partnership, to which separate statements and declarations were devoted annually^[29]. In the context of this topic, the Ukrainian crisis was also repeatedly mentioned, but this did not lead to changes in the goals and objectives of the program. Basically, the V4 countries and some representatives of the Eastern Partnership expressed solidarity with Ukraine in its desire to implement the "European choice", political and economic reforms, etc.

Once again, the topic of the Ukrainian crisis became relevant after the start of Russia's SVO on February 24, 2022. However, in the first weeks, the Visegrad Group limited itself to only two documents, one of which was a joint communique dedicated to helping refugees from Ukraine^[30], and the second was a joint statement by the heads of government of V4 and the UK, in which they condemned Russia's actions^[31].

Such low information activity of the Visegrad Group can be explained by internal discrepancies both in the Quartet itself and in the EU. First of all, this concerns the issue of arms supplies for Ukraine and sanctions measures against Russia. So, if Poland, the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent Slovakia actively support Kiev with arms supplies and training in handling some of them, providing infrastructure for training new personnel for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), Hungary refused not only to supply Kiev with lethal weapons and military equipment, but also banned the transit of military cargo through its territory^[32]. In addition, Budapest does not want to abandon purchases of Russian energy resources, which has repeatedly prevented the approval of new EU sanctions packages against Russia^[33]. Such a position of Hungary caused rejection and criticism from the partners in the EU and the Visegrad Group^[34].

The Ukrainian crisis has also caused the intensification of two processes: cooperation between the V4–NATO and the development of the Visegrad Group's defense policy. In the Bratislava Declaration V4 of December 9, 2014, the heads of government of the "Quartet" countries stated that the conflict on the territory of Ukraine is not local, since the events in Crimea and Donbass, as well as Russia's subsequent actions and its "provocative activities along the eastern border of NATO have seriously challenged the security architecture ... and demonstrated that the interstate conflict with the use of conventional weapons is still possible"^[35]. The Declaration also welcomed NATO's actions to strengthen the "eastern flank" and stated its intentions to intensify its activities in the implementation of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy^[36]. In general, in the first year of the Ukrainian crisis, the assessments of events and the position of the Visegrad Group remained quite tough (despite internal contradictions in the Quartet), which completely coincided with the positions of the EU and NATO.

It is worth noting that the activation of V4 activities within the framework of defense policy occurred back in March 2014, when the document "Long-term Vision of the Visegrad countries Deepening Their Defense Cooperation" was adopted, which defined the main areas of cooperation of the "Quartet" countries. These included the development and modernization of the defense industry; the formation of joint military units and the development of cross-border activities; joint training and exercises, as well as cooperation in the field of education^[37]. Special attention was paid to long-term planning of joint defense policy, increasing military spending, and harmonizing regional military policy with NATO and EU programs. The V4 common military forces were supposed to be used either as elements of the NATO and EU armed forces, or as independent units. The deadline for the formation of the Combat Group was also set – the first half of 2016 . To implement the third direction, it was supposed to develop a separate strategy (V4 Training and Exercise Strategy) and launch a special military educational program (The Visegrad Group Military Educational Program, VIGMILEP)^[38].

A separate document, also adopted on March 14, 2014, stipulated the principles of cooperation between the V4 countries in the field of defense cooperation. In fact, he expanded and concretized the provisions fixed in the "Long-term Vision"^[39].

In June 2014, the Visegrad Group countries adopted the Budapest Declaration, which was supposed to lay a "new beginning" for defense cooperation. In fact, the heads of government of the "quartet" countries confirmed that they will implement the goals and objectives that were outlined in March. In addition, the role of NATO as the "cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security" was reaffirmed^[40].

Developing the provisions of the above documents, the countries of the "quartet" on April 23, 2015 adopted the Visegrad Group Action Plan in the field of defense Cooperation (Action Plan of the Visegrad Group Defense Cooperation). Within its framework, the implementation of the directions of joint activities outlined in the "Long-term Vision" was assumed and the time period of the first stage, 2016-2020, was established.^[41]

In the future, the communiques issued following the meetings of the V4 defense ministers only briefly recorded the results of the implementation of the main areas of defense cooperation. In addition, when describing the interaction of the Quartet with NATO, as well as common threats to the Euro-Atlantic region, there is a shift from the Ukrainian crisis towards the fight against terrorism, the migration crisis, conflicts in different regions of the world, the COVID-2019 pandemic, etc.^[42]

By 2020, the Visegrad Group managed to increase the volume of military cooperation and implement the goals and objectives stated in the "Long-term Planning" concerning the creation of a Combat Group, conducting regular general exercises (in the V4 format and together with NATO), and joint military procurement^[43]. In June 2016, Ukraine joined the Combat Group^[44], but the number of its military personnel involved was small. In 2019, Croatia also joined the participants^[45], which strengthened the trans-regional status of the Combat Group. The Headquarters of the Joint Logistics Support Group (V4 Joint Logistics Support Group Headquarters) was also established, which started operating in 2020^[46]

In order to further develop defense cooperation, a new version of the "Long-term Vision" was adopted on June 24, 2020, which recorded the achievements of V4, as well as the stages at which the key interaction processes and future prospects were. The main goal is to increase its presence in the activities of NATO and the EU and at the same time strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance and the European Union^[47].

The main areas of cooperation were identified as "strengthening cooperation in the field of operational and force planning", implying more active involvement in the missions of NATO, the EU and the UN; joint activities in "critical areas", which include the main goals and objectives of NATO at the present stage, further harmonization of military planning, development of existing formats of interaction; implementation of the adopted development of plans, programs and strategies; building a "flexible partnership" with states outside V4 (V4+ format)^[48].

A characteristic moment is the section dedicated to the security challenges of the Visegrad Group. Along with pan-European and regional threats (terrorism, uncontrolled migration, "aggressive actions of Russia"), such processes as the "rise of China", regional conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel region are also mentioned^[49]. Such a wide range of challenges and threats, some of which are not directly related to the security of the Quartet countries, indicates the virtual disappearance of a purely regional component in the defense policy of the Visegrad Group.

At the same time, the cooperation of the Visegrad Group states in the field of defense policy in the period 2014-2022 also experienced a number of problems, difficulties and contradictions. The main part of them, as mentioned above, is connected with the split within V4 regarding the Ukrainian crisis, the volume of interaction with Kiev, participation in the sanctions policy against Russia. It is here that the so-called "split line" between Poland and Hungary passes (at certain stages, Warsaw's position was criticized in Slovakia and the Czech Republic). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has repeatedly stated that he does not consider Russia as a threat to his country^[50] and refused to stop purchasing Russian energy resources.

In the period 2020-2022, the pace of building a common V4 defense policy decreased under the influence of external factors, such as the COVID-2019 pandemic. Nevertheless, despite the objective difficulties, the countries of the "quartet" continued to implement key processes, including the Combat Group, a new stage of institutionalization of which is scheduled for 2023.^[51]

With the beginning of the SVO, the process of building a joint defense policy was again under threat due to the divergence in the positions of Hungary and the rest of the V4 participants. However, despite significant contradictions and serious criticism of Budapest, on June 14, 2022, a meeting of the chiefs of the General Staffs of the armed forces of the Visegrad Group took place in Debrecen (Hungary). At the same time, the summit was held in an incomplete format, since the head of the Polish General staff was absent. One of the key topics of discussion was the strengthening of the "eastern flank" of NATO, the decision on which was supposed to be taken at the next Alliance summit in Madrid at the end of June 2022.^[52]

In general, the Ukrainian crisis has become a significant test for the Visegrad Group, activating two processes in parallel. On the one hand, the Quartet countries have intensified their defense policy and cooperation with NATO in order to ensure their own security, as well as actively developed the rhetoric of European unity and solidarity. On the other hand, the prolongation of the crisis led to an increase in contradictions between the V4 participants, since the authorities assessed the prospects for further development of relations with Ukraine and waging a sanctions war against Russia in different ways. For example, the Hungarian leadership has repeatedly emphasized that it will not worsen the economic situation in the country by severing ties with Moscow. In addition, the ambiguous historical, national and educational policies of Ukraine have been repeatedly criticized by representatives of V4.