Egypt in U.S. policy in the Middle East in the early 1950s.

In modern conditions of aggravation of tension in relations between major powers, emerging new challenges and threats to international security, it seems relevant to turn to the historical experience of resolving such situations during the period of bipolar confrontation. Thus, the end of the Second World War catalyzes the process of the collapse of colonial regimes, as a result of which the Middle East region becomes the focus of attention of geopolitical rivals – the countries of the West and the USSR. At the same time, until the mid-1950s, events took place in the region that demonstrated the weakening of the influence of European colonial regimes, which created a kind of vacuum, attracting the attention of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The problem of Egypt 's importance in US policy in the Middle East after World War II has been studied by a number of domestic ^{[1, 6, 10, 13, 15, 20, 21]} and foreign ^{[3, 5, 16, 24]} researchers. However, they mainly considered the design of the Baghdad Pact, without paying due attention to the project of the "Middle Eastern command", which was the first attempt to create a military bloc opposing the "communist threat" in the Middle East. In this regard, it seems necessary to identify the role of Egypt as a central player in the first draft of the future bloc, whose position became decisive for the United States in reorienting the format of their military-political alliance and setting Washington's strategic objectives in the region in the early 1950s. The purpose of this article is to consider the importance of Egypt in the policy of the United States in the Middle East in the in the early 1950s.

So, after the first Arab-Israeli war, Washington, realizing the importance of maneuvering, attached special importance to maintaining and strengthening its influence on both sides of the conflict. In turn, the American administration understood the importance of the gradual displacement of Great Britain from the region, seeking to prevent the increase of Soviet influence there using various methods. A new circumstance in the conditions of the formation of bipolarity was that in the regions of the Middle and Middle East, the United States had to act as a competitor to Great Britain, which relied on its perimeter defense along the Suez Canal, mandatory Palestine, Iraq and Yemen. Washington was able to use the Anglo-Soviet contradictions in connection with the "Iranian crisis" of 1946, seriously strengthening its positions there, and in 1953, having removed Prime Minister Mossadegh, completely eliminated the British presence in Iran. The "Truman Doctrine" was also extended to Turkey, which was the "key" to the Middle East. At the same time, indirect methods of destabilizing the positions of the latter dominated the rivalry with England in the Middle East ^{[1, p. 17]}.

Taking into account the mentioned circumstances and in accordance with the "Fourth point" of the program of assistance to the countries of the "third world" of President G. Truman, the idea of creating a regional military-political bloc of states by analogy with NATO is actualized in the implementation of the US foreign policy strategy in the Middle East region ^[2]. In Egypt, the Wafdist cabinet adopted the program of G. Truman, which contributed to the realization of Washington's interests.

In 1950-1951, there was an intensification of activity in this direction, manifested in the project of the "Middle Eastern command" block consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Israel. It should be noted that membership in the bloc required skillful diplomatic maneuvering and strategic calculation to attract rivals to it, guided by the arguments of countering the penetration of the "communist threat" into the region.

The policy of Western countries in the Middle East after the Second World War was formed in line with the "Triple Declaration" of May 25, 1950, signed by the United States, Great Britain and France. In this declaration, in addition to mutual commitments to renounce the arms race, the use or threat of use of force, and the prevention of attempts to violate the armistice lines in the region ^{[3, p. 196-197]}, the Middle East was divided into spheres of influence. Thus, the area of responsibility of the United States included Egypt, Israel, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Transjordan, Iraq and the Suez Canal were assigned to England. Lebanon was under the jurisdiction of France. The Declaration stated the general orientation of the parties to create an anti-Soviet bloc of Arab states ^{[4, p. 127]}.

In general, the situation of the late 1940s - early 1950s in the Arab world was characterized by the manifestation of the implementation of the "Triple Declaration" on the division of spheres of influence. One example of this was the Great Syria project (supported by Great Britain and envisioning an alliance of Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Palestine – Ed.), in which the Hashemite regimes of Jordan and Iraq showed particular interest, which in the future could weaken Egypt's position in the Arab League ^{[5, pp. 94-95]}. Due to the competition in the region, this project was not attractive for Egypt. This circumstance, becoming another factor in the struggle against British influence in the country and the region, contributed to the US policy of attracting Cairo to the relevant military-political blocs, which gave it strategic importance for Washington.

As the first attempt to create a system of protection against "communist threats", one can consider the project initiated by the United States of the "Supreme Allied Command for the Middle East" (MEC), which assumed a solution to the problem of the base in Suez by replacing the British command with an international one. As for the proposal to create a block of "Middle Eastern command", the United States put forward one in the fall of 1951 to the United Kingdom, France and Turkey. Egypt was offered arms supplies, several high command posts and special army training for agreeing to become a founding country. In response, Cairo needed to provide the command with strategic facilities on its territory "to organize the defense of the Middle East in peacetime" or "in the event of an obvious international crisis" ^{[6, pp. 196-197]}.

The officials of the acceding countries were determined to put pressure on Egypt, which was invited to the MONTH on October 13, 1951. In turn, on October 15, the Egyptian government officially rejected it ^[7]. Based on this, Washington could establish actual control over the military base in the Suez Canal zone while displacing London's positions. However, due to the growing Anglo-Egyptian crisis and due to the fact that the United States did not pay due attention to the strengthening of anti–American sentiments in the ranks of the Arab political elite (due to the manifestation of pro-Israeli positions by the Truman administration - Auth.), this project was not implemented.

In continuation of its geostrategic efforts, Washington put forward the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) project, whose founding members were the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey. The organization was planned to be created around March–April 1952, which should not have delayed the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. At the same time, a consistent expansion of MEASURES was expected at the expense of the Arab States and Israel ^[8]. But this initiative has faced a number of insurmountable obstacles.

The increasingly growing crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations significantly complicated the process of implementing block initiatives of the United States in the region with the participation of Egypt. It is noteworthy that King Farouk I and some of his closest advisers favourably treated the policy of Great Britain. However, the government of Nahhas Pasha insisted on the complete evacuation of its troops from Egypt and Sudan, appealing to Washington to support the positions of Cairo ^[9]. In October 1951, in the circumstances of the strengthening of the national liberation movement and under public pressure, the Egyptian Parliament denounced the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which ordered Great Britain to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal zone ^{[10, p. 17]}. In solving the problem of the withdrawal of British troops from Suez, the United States acted as an intermediary, on whose initiative the project of international use of the channel arises.

After the revolution of "Free Officers" in the foreign policy program of the new Egyptian leadership, the decision on the ownership of the Suez Canal became of key importance. In the face of the need to eliminate foreign and domestic political dependence on London, the leaders of the "Free Officers" tried to rely on an alternative center of power, which opened a window of opportunity for Washington. The attitude in Cairo towards the American side and joining the military-political blocs initiated by it significantly depended on resolving the issue of the readiness of the United States to implement projects to provide weapons. At the same time, the administration of the President of the United States realized that the issue of arms supplies to Egypt "... contains more dangers for our relations with the British than any other thing."..> If negotiations on the base break down and a guerrilla war begins when the Egyptians shoot at British soldiers with American ammunition, the results could be disastrous" ^[11].

It is important to emphasize that in the strategy of the American administration, the prospect of Egypt's participation in block initiatives of Western countries was closely linked to the program for the supply of US weapons to Cairo, which brought significant tension to Anglo-Egyptian relations. At the same time, Washington's delay in the negotiation process on the sale of weapons forced the Egyptian leadership to look for alternative sources of strengthening the combat capability of the army, the relevance of which increased in the circumstances of the unresolved Palestinian problem and the growing tension in relations with Israel. For the United States, these reasons determined the expediency of maneuvering, which was confirmed by the relevant conclusions in official documents: "... at present, the United States has no other choice but to support the British in relations with the Egyptians" ^[12].

The successful solution of the tasks set by the United States largely depended on cooperation with the new Egyptian leadership. In the period from July 1952 to October 1954, the internal political struggle of the radical (G. A. Nasser) and the moderate (M. Bending) of the directions of "Free officers", on the results of which the choice of the foreign policy orientation of the state depended. In Washington, they bet on the victory of M. Naguib, who held pro-American positions ^{[13, p. 156]}. His confirmation in power could strengthen the influence of the United States in Egypt and the region as a whole, which gave them the opportunity to mediate in resolving the situation in the Suez Canal zone, leaving room for maneuver and pressure on Cairo.

Emphasizing the importance of Egypt in its bloc doctrine, the United States stimulated its activity within the framework of the League of Arab States (LAS). In June 1950 Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed the "Collective Security Pact" (Agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation) LAG ^[14]. This organization was ordered to perform the functions of the Arab version of NATO in the Middle East, taking into account the leading positions of Cairo.

The emergence of the Arab League and Egypt's desire for leadership in it exacerbated its rivalry with Iraq, which also had ambitions to become at the forefront of Arab countries. In this regard, the American administration tried to extend its influence both to Cairo and Baghdad, where Washington's positions were strengthened in the early 1950s ^{[15, p. 36]}.

The project initiated by Egypt had a significant impact on Syria, since the agreements within the framework of the "Collective Security Pact" of the Arab League stopped the efforts of supporters of the alliance with Iraq in Damascus ^{[16, p. 194]}. It is characteristic that the responsibility to the obligations of the Arab League member states was the main deterrent and means of Cairo's struggle not only with the expansion of Baghdad's influence in the Arab world, but also with the implementation of London's geopolitical plans in the Middle East region, thereby strengthening American positions there.

At the same time, another circumstance hindering the implementation of the US project to create a bloc in the Middle East with the participation of Egypt and the Arab states following it in foreign policy was the involvement of Israel in this bloc. This was necessary in order to "play a more positive role in the Middle East," and the ill will generated by the Palestinian conflict receded into the background "as awareness grows that the United States Government is acting impartially towards Israel and the Arab States" ^[17]. Guided by this consideration, the American side has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to establish bilateral Egyptian-Israeli cooperation through negotiations. However, due to Egypt's stated position on the Palestinian problem, the increase in military aid to Israel and the intensification of Egyptian-Israeli border clashes, these actions did not bring the expected results ^{[18, p. 98]}. The American policy of maneuvering between the warring parties did not contribute to their rapprochement, leading to the failure of the implementation of the plan to involve Cairo in the "Middle Eastern command" bloc.

In addition, the tasks of establishing Egyptian-Israeli relations were complicated by Israel's extremely negative perception of Egypt as the leader of the Arab League and its initiatives to consolidate Arab countries. Confirming this conclusion, the Israeli envoy to the USSR, M. Namir, noted during this period: "The Collective Security Pact of the Arab countries may have far-reaching goals, but at present it is clearly directed against Israel" ^{[19, p. 123]}.

As a result of the failure of attempts to establish Egyptian-Israeli contacts, the United States is switching to the tactic of masking its close ties with Israel, while at the same time trying to intensify cooperation with Arab states. This leads to a temporary cooling of Israeli-American relations, despite the fact that Israel does not change its foreign policy orientation. "Washington," E. M. wrote in this context. Primakov, – did everything possible to "self-mortize" for Israel the results of such a game and not go beyond its limited limits" ^{[6, p. 200]}. In the future, under the influence of the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and the realization of the impossibility of abandoning intensive military-trade cooperation, the United States emphasizes a negative approach to the Arab side, in particular, to Egypt, Syria and Jordan [Ibid., pp. 204-205]. This confirms that for the sake of rapprochement with Arab countries, the United States has not shown willingness to sacrifice its cooperation with Israel.

By the early 1950s, the problems of Arab unity were becoming an integral part of the programs of almost all authoritative political parties in the region ^{[15, p. 14]}. At the same time, for Egypt, the implementation of projects of the Arab bloc of states and their withdrawal from the sphere of influence of Western countries was of strategic importance in the context of strengthening the power of the new leadership and personally G. A. Nasser, who argued that imperialism is the enemy of the national liberation movement of the Arab people ^{[20, p. 60]}. Cairo was given a special role in the process of Arab unification in order to fight a common external enemy in the program of the Egyptian leader ^[21].

By the middle of 1953, there was an understanding in the US presidential administration that the regime established in Egypt as a result of the 1952 coup was not ready to accept American conditions within the framework of the MEDO project. The proof of this was the results of the meeting of the United States Secretary of State J. Dulles with the leader of the "Free Officers" G. A. Nasser in Cairo in May 1953, during which the Egyptian leadership strongly rejected the idea of a "Middle Eastern command", showing distrust and suspicion of any alliances with Western powers, as well as doubt about the need to defend against penetration of the USSR into the region ^{[22, p. 31]}. G. A. Nasser's argument boiled down to the fact that the presence of the British presence in Egypt creates a psychological barrier that prevents the creation of a system of protection of the territory: "The Egyptian people perceive the MEASURE as "perpetuation of occupation." He informed the Secretary of State that if the British were "here under a different name", Egypt would not cooperate with the MEDO ^[23]. In turn, proposed by J. Dulles' initiative contradicted the aforementioned Agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation of the Arab League member States, initiated by Cairo.

After the victory of the radical current of the "Free Officers" revolution and the establishment of G. A. Nasser in power, it became obvious that Egypt, regardless of Washington's position, would independently resolve the issue of the presence of British troops in the canal zone. The transformation that took place in the foreign policy strategy of the new Egyptian leadership was due to the departure from the political arena of M. Naguib, who was characterized by pro-American aspirations. Realizing the dependence of Cairo's foreign policy on the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis and the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the United States was forced to change strategic approaches in the region.

So, the idea of a "Middle Eastern command" turned out to be unrealizable due to the designated positions of Egypt and a number of other Arab countries. In this context, G. Kissinger noted: "As a result, America was drawn into Middle Eastern and Middle Eastern affairs by the same theory of "containment", which provides for opposition to Soviet expansion in any region, and the doctrine of collective security, which encouraged the creation of NATO-type organizations to counter an actual or potential military threat. However, for the most part, the nations of the Near and Middle East did not share America's strategic views. They viewed Moscow primarily as a useful lever to extract concessions from the West, and not as a threat to their independence. Many of these new nations successfully pretended that their capture by the Communists was more dangerous for the United States than for themselves, and therefore they had nothing to pay any price for American protection. And among other things, populist rulers like Nasser did not think of a future for themselves in identification with the West. They wanted the volatile public of the countries of the East to perceive them as people who ensured not only independence, but also freedom of maneuver in relation to democratic states. Non-alignment for them was not only a foreign policy choice, but also an internal political necessity" ^{[24, p. 473]}.

Thus, the implementation of the US plan to form a controlled military-political bloc of Middle Eastern states in 1950-1953 proved to be untenable for various reasons. It seems that Egypt's position played a decisive role in this issue.

Firstly, the bet on Cairo as a conduit for Washington's interests turned out to be wrong. The American administration justifiably saw in the anti-British movement gaining strength in Egypt during this period an opportunity to strengthen its influence. At the same time, hopes for victory in the internal political struggle of M. Naguib, a supporter of the pro–American orientation, did not materialize. With the establishment of G. A. Nasser in power in Egypt, a new foreign policy strategy is being developed, which was based on efforts to raise the patriotism of Arab countries and unite Arabs in the fight against the colonial past.

Secondly, it was not possible to achieve coexistence in a single block of Egypt and Israel. Despite the attempts of the United States to establish Egyptian-Israeli contacts, Cairo's foreign policy was gaining momentum towards rapprochement with Arab countries in the form of a number of military and political alliances, which was stimulated by the unresolved Palestinian issue and the aggravation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.