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Fedyushko D.I. The Evolution of the Deterrence Doctrine in the Projects of the RAND Ñorporation Analysts: from Mutual Assured Destruction to Nuclear Utilization Target Selection (1950s-1960s)

Published in journal "Politics and Society", 2015-2 in rubric "WAR AND PEACE", pages 214-220.

Resume: The author studies the issue of the US deterrence doctrine evolution in the 1950s – 1960s. Special attention is paid to the role played by the RAND Corporation analysts in this process. The origins of nuclear deterrence theories, their evolving and influence on the decision-making process in the United States during the early period of the Cold War are also regarded in this article. The author pays special attention to the stages of the American nuclear deterrence evolvement and to the role of the RAND Corporation in its establishing and further development. The methods of historical comparison, historical typology and historical periodization are the essential approaches exploited in the article. The review of nuclear deterrence evolvement in the RAND analysts' works, particularly in those written by B.Brodie and D.Elssberg is a feature of the article novelty. The transition from mutual assured destruction doctrine to the theory of nuclear balance in the relations between the superpowers is also stuided. The author brings into application the mathematical expression of nuclear deterrence, offered by A. Lee Burns, D. Ellsberg and D. Hunter.

Keywords: Analytics, Desicion, RAND, Nuclear weapon, Doctrines, Deterrence, the USA, Cold war, Method, Development

DOI: 10.7256/1812-8696.2015.2.14578

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