Aronson, D. O. Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Practical Philosophy

Abstract: The present article is devoted to an important method of Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy – transcendental deduction. The author of the article focuses on how this method is used in Kant’s main woks on practical philosophy such as ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’ and ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. The purpose of the article is to clarify whether Kant’s practical philosophy describes the transcendental deduction of the groundwork of practical reason just like the transcendental deduction of pure reason categories is presented in ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. To solve the aforesaid problem, the author of the article provides a brief description of the deduction of reason categories. After that the author reconstructs the logic of reasoning in the main works of Kant on practical philosophy based on the supposition that the structure of the deduction of Kant’s practical philosophy must be similar to the structure of deduction in speculative philosophy. The author shows that Kant’s practical philosophy presents a successful deduction of the main grounds of partial reason. It is concluded that despite a common opinion in the studies of Kant, his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason present the same project of deduction. The author of the present article reconstructs metaphysical and transcendental deduction in Kant’s practical philosophy. The author eliminates the visibility of the vicious circle connected with Kant’s statement that freedom and unconditional partial law are mutually interdependent. It is concluded that the logic of deduction in practical philosophy makes us to significantly extend the term ‘experience’ in Kant’s philosophy.

Keywords: