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Dmitrieva, A. A. Pluralistic Models of Introspection: Main Ideas and Some Conclusions

Abstract: The author of the article analyzes the content of pluralistic modes of introspection offered by modern analytical philosophers of the mind Jessie Prince, Eric Schwitzgebel and Jessie Butler comparing their approach to the perception concept of introspection typical for the philosophy of the Early Modern Period and critics of introspection typical for the early analytical philosophy of the mind. Moreover, the author of the article makes an attempt to use pluralistic models of introspection in order to the question about whether ‘introspection’ can be considered to be a scientific term, to compare pluralistic models of introspection with the theory of perception theory of the mind as well as to discuss the question about accuracy of introspection forms. In her article the author uses comparative and historical research methods that are based on a detailed conceptual analysis of different approaches to introspection. Theauthormakesthefollowingconclusions. Firstly, perceptionmodels of introspection are a ‘middle way’ between naïve belief in introspection and absolute skepticism towards it. In case we assume that perception models of introspection are generally correct, then, secondly, the term ‘introspection’ can be used in terms of scientific research only when a particular introspection form is clarified. Thirdly, introspection forms can be associated with the modules of attention, working memory and so on. Fourthly, the author establishes that different forms of introspection has a different level of accuracy.


Keywords:

introspection forms, heterophenomenology, Daniel Dennett, Jessie Butler, Jessie Prince, accuracy of introspection forms, introspection, pluralistic models of introspection, epistemology, Eric Schwitzgebel.


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