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Law and Politics
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Lyubarev, A.E. Systemic interactions of key parameters of the proportionate election system.

Abstract: The author discusses the systemic correlation of the parameters of the proportionate election system, such as the size of election district, threshold, method of dividing mandates among the lists of candidates. The author then shows how these parameters in their combinations infl uence the threshold, that is the amount of votes, having which the list of candidates can guarantee having at least one mandate. Based on legal and political analysis of consequences of application of threshold the author comes to a conclusion that one can consider reasonable only the threshold of no higher than 5%, but it is even more reasonable to apply the threshold of 3 or 4%. Such a threshold is a reasonable compromise between the ability of the parliament to do its work and representation. The author then offers legislative solutions, which can guarantee that a list of candidates, which gets more than 5% of votes shall get at least one mandate.


Keywords:

jurisprudence, elections, proportionate election system, threshold, provision of mandates, list of candidates, election district, election rights, parliament, fractions.


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