Abstract: The subject under research of the present article is the problem of free will. The author of the article presents a critical review of one of the most important modern arguments against compatibilism in the free will debate, Derk Pereboom's 'Manipulation Argument'. The Manipulation Argument is built upon the analogy between external manipulation of the agent's actions and causal determination. Based on that analogy, Pereboom concludes that agents who act in a situation of causal determination do not feel moral responsibility. The author of the present article suggests that we should extend the borders of Pereboom's mental experiment. In the course of his research the author comes to the conclusion that the Manipulation Argument does not prove the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. In the author's opinion, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history. The method of the present research is the conceptual analysis mostly used in analytical philosophy. The author also conducts mental experiments to illustrate and prove his point of view. The main conclusion of the present research is the author's proof of the failure of Peterboom's manipulation argument. The author of the article shows that the manipulation argument does not prove the statement that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. According to the author, Pereboom's argument only proves that moral responsiblity requires an integrated personality and sequential personal history. 

Keywords: free will, freedom of the will, moral responsibility, Derk Pereboom, compatibilism, Manipulation Argument, four-case argument, determinism, philosophy of freedom, incompatibilism, Michael McKenna

References:
Pereboom D. Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will. The philosophy of Free Will. Ed. by Russel P. and Deery O. P. 424.
McKenna M. A Hard-line reply to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation Argument // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, July 2008, Vol. LXXVII, No. 1. P. 153.
Kane R. The significance of free will. Oxford, 1998.
Kane R. Free will: New directions for an ancient problem // Free will, Ed. by R. Kane. Malden, 2002.
Fischer J., Kane R., Pereboom D., Vargas M. Four views on free will. Malden, 2007.
Bourget D., Chalmers D. What Do Philosophers Believe? // Philosophical studies, 2014, No. 170. Pp. 465 – 600.
Pereboom D. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford, 2014. P. 102.
Mele A. A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism // Analysis, 2005, No. 65 (285). Pp. 75-80.
Pereboom D. Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Pereboom D. Reasons Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism; Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way // Philosophical Books, 2006, No. 47. Pp. 198 – 212.
Pereboom D. A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008, No. 77. Pp. 160 – 70.
Pereboom D. Responses to John Martin Fischer and Dana Nelkin (on my Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life) // Science, Religion and Culture, 2014, No. 1. Pp. 218 – 25.
Pereboom D. Free Will in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Roger Crisp, edt., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 606 – 37.

References (transliteration):
Pereboom D. Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will. The philosophy of Free Will. Ed. by Russel P. and Deery O. P. 424.
McKenna M. A Hard-line reply to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation Argument // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, July 2008, Vol. LXXVII, No. 1. P. 153.
Kane R. The significance of free will. Oxford, 1998.
Kane R. Free will: New directions for an ancient problem // Free will, Ed. by R. Kane. Malden, 2002.
Fischer J., Kane R., Pereboom D., Vargas M. Four views on free will. Malden, 2007.
Bourget D., Chalmers D. What Do Philosophers Believe? // Philosophical studies, 2014, No. 170. Pp. 465 – 600.
Pereboom D. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford, 2014. P. 102.
Mele A. A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism // Analysis, 2005, No. 65 (285). Pp. 75-80.
Pereboom D. Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Pereboom D. Reasons Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism; Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way // Philosophical Books, 2006, No. 47. Pp. 198 – 212.
Pereboom D. A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008, No. 77. Pp. 160 – 70.
Pereboom D. Responses to John Martin Fischer and Dana Nelkin (on my Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life) // Science, Religion and Culture, 2014, No. 1. Pp. 218 – 25.
Pereboom D. Free Will in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Roger Crisp, edt., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 606 – 37.