Reference:
Burakov D.V..
Credit Risk Transmission: an Experimental Study of Limited Liability Effect
// Finance and Management. – 2016. – ¹ 2.
– P. 38-49.
DOI: 10.7256/2409-7802.2016.2.18356.
DOI: 10.7256/2409-7802.2016.2.18356
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Abstract: One of the main problems of modern banking is the issue of limited liability of credit institutions. The author of the present article discusses the relationship between liability of creditors and their willingness to take risks. Starting from the hypothesis of the existence of channels of credit risk transmission, the author sets a task to experimentally test the liability channel of creditors, according to which, tightening of creditors' responsibility leads to a reduced willingness to accapted risk due to the behavioural effect of endowment. The methodological basis of this research includes experimental research methods. To identify endowment effect and to assess its impact on willingness to take risk in terms of credit relations the author has developed a number of experimental settings. The first setting involves the comparison of the willingness to accept risk when making choice under risk and certainty. The second setting meant having the opportunity to make money, by solving a series of simple arithmetic equations before the experiment. Based on the study of changes in the level of responsibility of creditors, it can be assumed that the channel is an important element in transmission of credit risk in the movement and development of the credit sector. However efficiency of the mechanism of increasing monetary liability has limitations related to the increasing rate of income above the market average, as well as decision making in the frame of losses.
Keywords: risk, uncertainty, behavioral economics, bank, credit risk transmission, limited liablity, endowment effect, credit cycle, credit risk, lending
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