Abstract: The understanding of speech communication in the thinking of the outstanding French philosopher and thinker in the field of technology and technological innovations Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989) is aporetic, is a riddle, not a solution and, moreover, cannot give convincing definitions of the sought-after concepts, such as truth and virtue. Although, it seems, Simondon had all the conditions for developing an original and consistent theory of "speech communication", which in the space of linguistic communication is the dominant form of interaction. However, in his works there are only scattered reflections that do not provide a basis for a strict theory, but rather lead to an unsystematized criticism of language. Moreover, Simondon always criticized the topic of "speech communication", since in the middle of the twentieth century its theory was a paradigm of structuralist fashion. Therefore, with an emphasis on the dialectical method of research, we will try to determine those hypotheses that can explain such an absence of the theory of "speech communication" in his works. In conclusion, the author of the article came to the following conclusions. First, Simondon did not need to use the concept of "speech communication" to rethink the conditions of thinking in his theory of "individuation". Second, Simondon posed the question of speech communication differently, namely in the form of a theory of "technosocial communication" based on the relationship between technologies, information and meanings that go beyond and embrace the question of language. Third, based on these two hypotheses, an important assumption is made that Simondon sought to derive philosophy from logocentrism and the reductionist anthropocentrism that supports it, which implies a fundamental relativization of speech communication.

Abstract: The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) wrote many original works, but one short article, “The Actual and the Virtual,” is, in our opinion, one of the most important. Deleuze’s virtual appears in almost every work, and its influence can be felt everywhere from the idea of singularity to the concepts of differentiation and individuation. That is why the virtual, for Deleuze, is the real, which forms the basis of his philosophical strategy, and where this virtual is opposed not to the real, but to the actual. In other words, Deleuze’s virtual objects are created in perception as memory objects that constitute the object of perception (the actual object). Moreover, according to Deleuze, the unconscious character of his virtual images is probably the greatest obstacle in adapting his theory to the problem of computer-generated virtual worlds. Using the comparative method, virtuality is studied in Deleuze's discussion with Henri Bergson (1859-1941), which is revealed precisely as a process of creative actualization. Unlike the actualization of the possible, which is equivalent to a sudden entry into reality, the actualization of the virtual in Deleuze's sense always occurs through difference, divergence or differentiation. Moreover, for Deleuze, the virtual has the reality of a task that must be accomplished or a problem that must be solved. Therefore, in this article, the author, for the first time, tries to answer the question of whether Deleuze's idea of virtuality can be applied in the philosophy of information science, including for the study of computer virtual worlds. In this case, the main result of the study is the substantiation of the fact that virtuality, both in Deleuze and in Bergson, is an epistemological and not an ontological concept.