Abstract: The article explores some possible ways of interaction between philosophy and the specific cognitive scientific disciplines: psychology, neurosciences, artificial intelligence, linguistics, and anthropology. The author draws on V.A. Lektorsky’s idea of the dialogue between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Philosophy and the cognitive sciences engage in a productive dialogue in which their mutual enrichment, the strengthening or weakening of certain scientific or philosophical theories, and theoretical progress can occur. On the one hand, it is asserted that philosophy can have the greatest impact on the development of the cognitive sciences in the way of clarifying problems of the philosophy of science. These problems encompass the problem of the theoretical progress of cognitive studies, the problem of the nature of individual cognitivist theories (as well as the nature of groups of individual theories such as connectionism, predictive processing, etc.), the problem of the relationship of cognitive disciplines to each other, and more. In addition, philosophers can contribute to discussions concerning the foundations of the cognitive sciences and their key concepts of representation and computation. They can also play a significant role in assessing the ethical implications of the emergence of new cognitive technologies and neurotechnologies. On the other hand, the specific cognitive disciplines can provide new insights into traditional philosophical issues, like the problem of consciousness and the brain, the problem of free will, and enrich the philosophy of science with novel empirical data.

Abstract: The article considers the opposition of the doctrines of pluralism and monism and their related principles of proliferation and unification in the context of the development of modern cognitive sciences in three important respects for philosophy of science: theoretical, methodological, and explanatory. The article criticizes T. Kuhn’s views of theoretical monism and extends the defense of theoretical pluralism undertaken in author’s previous publications devoted to the conception of theoretical complexes, aimed at the correct description of large groups of theories in the cognitive sciences, such as connectionism, moderate embodied cognition, etc. Pluralism is also defended in methodological dimension. Theoretical pluralism and methodological pluralism are represented as an inevitable consequence of the conception of theoretical complexes and its principle of proliferation calling for the creation/improvement of scientific theories and models which are both compatible and incompatible with respect to a number of basic ontological and methodological assumptions. Theoretical pluralism and methodological pluralism should promote progress with respect to a number of the so-called epistemic qualities, both associated with the approximation of the truth (e.g. predictive success, the ability to give unexpected explanations to known facts, etc.) and not so associated (empirical fit, simplicity according to some interpretations, and the broad scope of the proposed explanations). At the same time the author claims that it is currently not possible to draw a similar conclusion in relation to the explanatory context: if the strategy of explanatory monism or explanatory pluralism will turn out be the preferred strategy for the cognitive sciences should become clear in the course of further research.