Gaginskii A.M. —
Heidegger and Plato's idea of the Good
// Philosophical Thought. – 2023. – ¹ 11.
– P. 34 - 64.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2023.11.69032
URL: https://en.e-notabene.ru/fr/article_69032.html
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Abstract: The article deals with the question of Plato's reception in Heidegger's philosophy. In particular, the research focuses on the question of how Heidegger interpreted the idea of the good from Plato's "State". Here a number of difficulties important for the history of philosophy arise. What is the ontological status of the idea of good? How is the idea of the good connected with the demiurge from the dialogue "Timaeus"? On the one hand, it is well known that the late Heidegger criticized Plato and all European metaphysics, which was and remains Platonism. On the other hand, the early Heidegger clearly presents an attempt to master the shining heights of Platonism: the question of the meaning of being needs an angle from which a definite answer can be highlighted – and Heidegger borrows this angle from Plato. Just as the good endows existence with being and truth, so the understanding of being is possible from time, because it is temporality that is the condition for understanding being, it highlights its meaning. And if Plato's being "pounces" on the good, or on the one, then for Heidegger, time is such a condition. This line of thought, fundamental to the whole project of fundamental ontology, is directly related to the philosophy of Plato, who for the first time was able to rise so high as to become ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, to see things as if from the outside, i.e. in the light of the transcendent idea of good. Nevertheless, Heidegger criticizes Plato, which allows us to raise the question: how did Heidegger understand Platonic ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας and the doctrine of the good? It is impossible to answer this question unequivocally, since Heidegger approached this question from different sides and at different times interpreted this most important position of the Greek thinker in different ways. Nevertheless, the main remarks can be reduced to two: (1) the good was conceived by Plato as something moral and therefore mixed with the existing, (2) the good subordinates the being, brings it under fitness.
Gaginskii A.M. —
Being and givenness in the philosophy of M. Heidegger
// Philosophical Thought. – 2023. – ¹ 10.
– P. 93 - 105.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2023.10.44016
URL: https://en.e-notabene.ru/fr/article_44016.html
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Abstract: The author believes that it is possible to discuss Heidegger's philosophy only in the light of a more or less clarified understanding of being, but this is precisely the main difficulty: Heidegger invites you on the road without saying where to go and what to guide you on the road. What should serve as a guideline to understand it correctly? From what preliminary understanding of being should we proceed when talking about fundamental ontology, ontotheology, ontological difference? First of all, my own being is for me a point of reference and a starting position in the comprehension of being and the construction of ontology. Therefore, the meaning of being is read not from the existing in general, but from the concrete existing, from itself. The being of Dasein – finite, because the existing one is mortal. However, the existence of a person is different from the existence of a number, a tree or an angel – how then to understand what meaning this word has? If being is time, and time is myself, then what is being a rock, a number, or God? In addition, Heidegger does not limit himself to the statement that God or an angel are given to consciousness, that is, given as certain entities, he says that they exist, that is, that entities are essences. This corresponds to the concept of "givenness" in phenomenology. At the same time, the datum can refer to anything, for example, to a unicorn and pegasus, Zeus and Hera, a round square and a wooden iron, but without considering them as something existing. Therefore, the question naturally arises about how Heidegger understands being after all, why does reality act as a synonym for being for him?
Gaginskii A.M. —
Some aspects of F. Brentano's ontology and its influence on the philosophy of M. Heidegger
// Philosophy and Culture. – 2023. – ¹ 9.
– P. 128 - 151.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2023.9.44027
URL: https://en.e-notabene.ru/fkmag/article_44027.html
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Abstract: The article examines some aspects of Brentano's ontology, starting with his 1862 dissertation "On the ambiguity of Being according to Aristotle", as well as its influence on the philosophy of M. Heidegger. The author shows that the ontology of the early Brentano is not limited to ousiology, since it includes a discussion of the field of mental being (ens rationis, ὂν ὡς ἀληθές) and it is in this aspect that he influences the young Heidegger. Following Aristotle, Brentano assigns a central role to the ontology of essence, which in the late period leads him to the position of reism, but in the lectures of the middle period Brentano discusses the problems of intentional inexistence, thanks to which projects of "new types of ontology" by Husserl and Mainong appear. The author believes that Heidegger was also influenced by these ideas. Of course, there are fundamental differences between the positions of Brentano and Heidegger, but the similarities are quite large. In particular, if Brentano, highlighting the real and true areas, gives preference in favor of the former, then Heidegger's ontology is built on the second member of this opposition. In particular, everything that can be given is called being by Heidegger, because we are talking about intentional being, about ens rationis, or ὂν ὡς ἀληθές