Abstract: The collapse of the USSR marked the collapse of the former state order. The former Soviet republics faced such destructive phenomena that seemed simply unthinkable in the conditions of the former socialist way of life. Associations and groupings became sharply active in the political arena, the participants of which expressed aggressive hostility to the changes taking place in the country. The purpose of this article is to use various materials (normative legal acts and draft laws, periodicals, statistical data, Internet resources, as well as research literature) on the basis of a comprehensive use of various materials to identify the main problems and contradictions of the state policy aimed at countering political extremism in the first post-Soviet years. The subject of the study is a holistic political and legal process aimed at the development and adoption of adequate anti-extremist legislation.  For the most complete disclosure of the problem posed, problem-chronological, formal-legal, institutional and systemic approaches were used.
The scientific novelty of the research lies in an attempt to comprehend the state-legal policy aimed at combating various forms of political, national and religious radicalism as an integral and, at the same time, extremely contradictory strategy, which was implemented in the context of the crisis situation in the country. The acquired knowledge will allow us to better understand the changes that have occurred in the understanding of political extremism at the state and legal level in subsequent years. The formation of anti-extremist legislation in post-Soviet Russia was complicated by the confrontation in which all branches of government were involved. Even after overcoming the "crisis of dual power" and the adoption of a new Constitution, the Russian state was in a state of division, which made it difficult to develop and adopt a law on combating extremism. In the mid-1990s, the opinion prevailed in the socio-political discourse about the increased threat from radical nationalist (fascist) formations with the dangerous inaction of law enforcement agencies. These attitudes influenced the President and Parliament, who were the main subjects of the legislative initiative. Excessive politicization of the legislative process made it significantly difficult to develop adequate solutions. The situation was exploited by radicals who continued their illegal activities unhindered. Thus, the problem of countering political extremism did not lose its relevance in the second half of the 1990s and can serve as a subject for further study.

Abstract: The object of the study is the policy of the Russian authorities aimed at leveling protest activity in the Armed Forces in the context of the protracted crisis of the 1990s. After the fall of the one-party dictatorship that subordinated the security forces, Russian legislation provided for a rigid model of de-partization and depoliticization of the Armed Forces. However, in the post-Soviet years, this strategy lost its relevance both due to the weakness of the parties themselves and the apolitical nature of the officer corps, tired of years of pressure from political organizations (CPSU). The problem was something else: the huge "Soviet-Russian" army, being a vestige of the previous system, did not fit into the paradigm of the new statehood, and therefore was subject to radical and painful reform, which threatened to put the Armed Forces on the brink of disaster. For thousands of military personnel and their family members, the most acute problem has become the elementary problem of survival. Historical, sociological, formal legal, institutional and systemic approaches are used as the main research methods. In the second half of the 1990s, against the background of chronic underfunding in the army, cases of spontaneous protest became more frequent. These actions were nonviolent, spontaneous and scattered in nature, and therefore did not pose a serious threat to the authorities. Among the main factors that restrained open rebellion, one can name the lack of an all-Army protest coordination center, the lack of independent political thinking among senior officers, and the lack of a constructive program. This also includes army discipline, as well as the availability of sufficient means for the regime to pre-empt and suppress individual pockets of protest. At the same time, the authorities, realizing that by condemning their military to a miserable existence, they themselves act outside the legal framework, tried to resolve the conflicts that arose cautiously, trying not to resort to harsh measures. The question of how long this delicate balance could have been maintained remains open. At the end of the 1990s, there were faint signs of a revival of the army. The military was one of the first to catch these trends: exhausted by the "five-year plans" of liberal reforms, after all the temptations offered to them by opposition parties, they regained faith in the state. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the application of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of a complex problem related to the restructuring of the Russian army during the years of unstable internal political instability.