Abstract: This article analyzes the memorandum "Our Present and Future Military Policy in Russia" dated November 13, 1918 as a factor in the policy of British intervention in Russia in November–December 1918. Its author was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Henry Wilson, one of the most influential figures in the top leadership of the United Kingdom. The memorandum contained his point of view on the past, present and future of the British intervention policy in Russia. Due to its significance and informative value, this document is the object of research, the subject is its content as a factor of British intervention in domestic Russian affairs in November — December 1918. The author of the article aims to reveal the influence of the memorandum of the head of the Imperial General Staff on the policy of British intervention in Russia during this period. The work used retrospective, systemic and narrative methods. Thanks to them, the process of development of British politicy in November – December 1918 is shown; the relationship between the content of the document and the military-political situation, as well as their mutual influence, is presented; the content and nature of the memorandum are reflected in sufficient detail, focusing on the most important aspects for the topic of the work. The involvement of this document in the study of British intervention policy makes it possible to expand and deepen it, as it demonstrates the complex process of shaping this policy in detail, which gives the work a scientific novelty. The main conclusion of the study is that the main problems of Great Britain regarding interference in internal Russian affairs after the Armistice of Compiegne were the prevention of potential German influence in Russia and the containment of Bolshevism. Mr. Wilson proposed, as a modernized form of British intervention policy, to provide assistance to the newly formed states in the former Russian Empire and the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces to solve these two problems. The contents of the memorandum of the Head of the Imperial General Staff strongly influenced the decision of the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom to continue and strengthen the intervention policy in November–December 1918.

Abstract: The subject of this study is the discussion on March 14, 1918 in the House of Commons of Great Britain of the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia as the events of the British intervention in Russia. In this regard, the speeches of deputies from various political forces and a high-ranking official of the Military Cabinet of the United Kingdom in the lower house of parliament are disclosed and analyzed. Thanks to the content analysis method and the system method, not only the positions and arguments of the participants in the discussion are presented in detail, but also the connection of their speeches with the military-political and international situation that developed in March 1918 and which influenced the dynamics of the discussion is revealed. The scientific novelty is that for the first time in the historiography of the Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia, a meeting of the lower house of Great Britain on the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia is considered in the context of the history of British intervention policy in Russia and the significance of this event for this policy. The main conclusions of the study are that, despite the lack of a unified position in the House of Commons on the issue of Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia, the War Cabinet has caught the trend in favor of Japanese intervention in these Russian regions. As a result, he cautiously began to build a policy of intervention against Russia and to determine the place of Japanese intervention in it. Only large-scale events could force the House of Commons to adopt the policy that the Cabinet considered necessary to pursue in the current circumstances.

Abstract: The object of this research is the changes in the policy of rendering British aid to the White Forces of Siberia and Southern Russia in July 1919 and their causes. The subject of this research is the information on these matters, contained in the meeting protocol of the British War Cabinet of July 25, 1919 and related decision. Within the framework of the question “Situation in Russia”, were comprehensively discussed the reasonableness and possibilities of rendering British aid to A. V. Kolchak’s army in Siberia and A. I. Denikin’s army in Southern Russia. The author applies narrative method of research for description of documents that have not been previously introduced into the scientific discourse by the Russian scholars. The comparative method is used for correlation of data collected from various sources. The scientific novelty consists in the comprehensive examination of the claimed topic based on the meeting protocol of the War Cabinet of July 25, 1919, as well as other newly introduced documents from the United Kingdom National Archive. The author comes to the conclusion that the escalation of social tension in British society, major defeats of A. V. Kolchak, successful offensive operations of A. I. Denikin, along with the lack of financial resources for supporting the White Forces on all fronts, led to curtailing of British aid to Kolchak’s army and increased support of Denikin’s army, since his military achievements at the moment theoretically allowed counting upon invasion of Moscow.