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Finance and Management
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National approaches towards regulation of systemic risks in the banking sector
Gospodarchuk Galina Gennad'evna

Doctor of Economics

Professor, the department of Banking and Finance, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod - National Research University

603950, Russia, Nizhegorodskaya oblast', g. Nizhnii Novgorod, pr. Gagarina, 23

gospodarchukgg@iee.unn.ru

Abstract.

This article analyzes the new concept of international regulatory framework, published by the Basel Committee in 2010, which received the name Basel III. Special attention is given to the content of the new regulatory requirements for bank capital adequacy and its structure; establishment of the protective and countercyclical buffers by the banks; margin to capital for the systemic importance of banks; leverage ratio for preventing dubious transactions with the various financial tools. The article examines the questions of practical implementation of the new requirements of Basil III. The research is structured on the comparative analysis of regulatory documents of the Basel Committee on Baking Supervision and the national standards of central banks of different countries. The scientific novelty lies in identification of the issues emerged in translation of Basel III requirements onto the level of national jurisdictions and the decreasing overall efficiency regulatory reform. The research results demonstrate that the central banks of different countries implement the Basel III regulatory requirements through adjusting the parameters of the tools proposed by Basel III. Conceptually, the instruments do not change; the steps towards fixing the inefficiencies and downsides of the instruments are not taken by the central banks. The introduced additional requirements of capital adequacy do not contain much novelty; therefore, their massive impact upon banks reliability should not be expected. Differentiation of ratios creates a problem of regulatory arbitration. The leverage ratio looks promising, although it is yet to be developed. The author underlines the need for circumstantiation of its calculation methods with regards memorandum items; however, it complicated the calculation formula and contradicts the initial idea of creating the simple to use ratio.  

Keywords: risks, bank, capital, systemically important banks, regulation of systemic risks, Basel III, capital adequacy, capital buffer, Basel Committee, Central bank

DOI:

10.25136/2409-7802.2018.4.27692

Article was received:

22-10-2018


Review date:

16-10-2018


Publish date:

24-10-2018


This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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