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Philosophy and Culture
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Volkov D.B. The contemporary substantive approach towards the question of oneness of identity

Abstract: The object of this research is the contemporary philosophical discourse regarding the question of oneness of identity. The subject of this research is R. Swinburne’s substantive approach and its place within this discourse. The author analyzes Swinburne’s approach, and particularly its key advantages – ability to resolve the issue of reduplication of identity. However, the author demonstrates that the substantive approach also has certain vulnerabilities. First of all, it is susceptible to criticism with the help of the verification principle. Swinburne believes that his approach does not correspond with the strong version of verification principle. But as illustrated in the article, even the weak version of verification principle is an issue for the substantive approach of Swinburne. The author presents his original alternative to the substantive approach for the purpose of overcoming the argument of reduplication and interpretation of the associated with it hypothetical situations. Such alternative is the perdurance theory of identity. The article provides research in the area of history of the modern analytical philosophy, thus uses the historical-philosophical method as the key one. The work is dedicated to the substantial concept of Swinburne’s. Despite the fact that his concept represents an important alternative for resolution of the issue of the oneness of identity, it remains little-studied, especially within the Russian history of philosophy. The scientific novelty consists in a comprehensive analysis of the counterargument of verification pertaining to the substantive approach. The author concludes that the substantive approach is able to solve the issue of the asynchronous oneness of identity just partially, and most susceptible to criticism using the argument of verification.


Keywords:

Reduplication argument, Verification principle, David Parfit, Bill Williams, Richard Swinburne, Substantive approach, Physical approach, Psychological approach, oneness of identity, Empiricist theories


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