Ryabushkina, T. M. Self-Reflection of the Knower

Abstract: A classical concept about self-knowledge as the ‘appeal of the knower to himself’ (reflection) faces a difficulty: in order to make it possible for one to understand himself by the means of reflection, it is necessary for him to have the basic knowledge about his own structures (such as temporality and intentionality) allowing to state that it is him who is being the object of reflection. Spontaneous features of the knower create the grounds for credibility of facts discovered during the process of reflection. As a result, a gap between the knower and the other world can be created. The author of the article shows that critics of the Cartesian paradigm, caused by the above difficulties, is limited to subject-object relations and does not touch upon reflection as the process requiring certain knowledge about ourselves. As a result, concepts that do not take into account the role of the knower are dependent on reflective structures and certain difficulties caused by these structures. In order to overcome these difficulties we need to deny the supposition about initial equivalence of the knower and the object of self-knowledge.

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