
	Philosophy and Culture Reference: Karpov, K. V. ‘Middle Knowledge’ and the Forecasting Problems // Philosophy and Culture. 2012. № 7. P. 108-116. URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=61242 Karpov, K. V. ‘Middle Knowledge’ and the Forecasting Problems Abstract: Teaching about ‘middle knowledge’ says that God has a special kind of knowledge which allows Him to now not only what a person would do under these or those circumstances but also to know what a person would actually do. The teaching was introduced by Louis de Molina in the 16th century. The fullest theory was suggested by Dekker. The author provides counter arguments for some aspects of Dekker’s theory about ‘middle knowledge’. All these counter arguments can be all reduced to the following ideas: 1) teaching about middle knowledge is not an adequate solution of the omniscience issue because it uses a very problematic interpretation of free will based on the principle of alternative possibilities; 2) quietism assumes that God exists outside time, but in such context the middle knowledge does not exist, either; 3) teaching about middle knowledge is excessive because there is another, more economic theory, that claims to solve this problem (Severinus Boethuis teaching about forecasting, prophesy and free will). Keywords: philosophy, Middle Knowledge, forecasting, prediction, Quietism, future, contingency, free will, alternatives, Louis de Molina. This article can be downloaded freely in PDF format for reading. Download article This article written in Russian. You can find original text of the article here . References 1. Boetsiy. Uteshenie filosofiey i drugie traktaty / Per. V.I. Ukolovoy i M.N. Tseytlina. M.: Na-uka, 1990. 2. Payk N. Sovremennyy vzglyad na problemu predvedeniya // Filosofiya religii: al'manakh 2008-2009 / Otv. red. V.K. Shokhin. M.: Institut filosofii RAN; Yazyki slavyanskikh kul'tur, 2010. 3. Boethius. De consolatione philosophiae. PL 63, 841. 4. Craig W.L. Divine Eternity // The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Ed. Flint T.P., Rea M.C. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. P. 145-166. 5. De Molina L. On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia). Transl., introduction and notes by Freddoso A.J. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 6. Dekker E. Middle Knowledge. Leuven: Peeters, 2000. 7. Dekker E., Veldhuis H. Freedom and Sin: Some Systematic Observations // European Journal of Theology. Carlisle, 1994. Vol. 3. P. 153-161. 8. Fischer J. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994. 9. Frankfurt H.G. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility // The Journal of Philosophy. New York, 1969. Vol. 66. № 23. P. 829-839. 10. Gregorius Ariminensis. I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1 / Gregorius Ariminensis, OESA. Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum / Ed. A.D. Trapp. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978-1987. 7 t. (Spätmittelalter und Reformation Texte und Untersuchungen. Bd. 6-12). — T. 3. Super primum (Dist. 19-48). — Ed. A. Damasus Trapp, OSA et V. Marcolino. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. P. 252, 20-22. 11. Hasker W. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 12. Kvanvig J.L. The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. P. 121-126. 13. Pike N. A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem // International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Dordrecht, Boston, 1993. Vol. 33. № 3. P. 129-164. 14. Stump E., Kretzmann N. Eternity // The Journal of Philosophy. New York, 1981. Vol. 78. № 8. P. 429-458. 15. Van Inwagen P. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. 16. Widerker D., McKenna M. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003

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Karpov, K. V. ‘Middle Knowledge’ and the Forecasting Problems